The Calculus of Consensus Democracy: Rethinking Patterns of Democracy Without Veto Players
Abstract
We present a theory of comparative political institutions based on the concept of consensus democracy and social choice theory. Unlike Lijphart, we argue that “consensus democracy” is not a special form of democracy characterized by mutual vetoes, but rather the simplest form of democracy, which we refer to as PR-majority rule. We construct a typology of political institutions based on differences with this simple model. Contra Tsebelis’s veto players approach, our theory predicts that PR-majority rule should be the most flexible form of democracy. We test this with data on overall patterns of government spending and on welfare state reform.
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Biographies
Anthony J. McGann is associate professor in political science at the University of California, Irvine. His research interests include democratic theory, social choice, electoral systems, and comparative political institutions. His recent publications include The Logic of Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 2006), “Proportional Representation Within the Limits of Liberalism Alone” (with Eliora van der Hout, British Journal of Political Science, 2009), and “Liberal Political Equality Implies Proportional Representation” (with Eliora van der Hout, Social Choice and Welfare, 2009).
Michael Latner is assistant professor at the California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo. His research interests include political behavior, electoral systems and representation, and methodology. His recent publications include “Geographical Representation Under Proportional Representation: The Cases of Israel and the Netherlands” (with Anthony McGann, Electoral Studies, 2005).
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Article first published online: June 10, 2013
Issue published: July 2013
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