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Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943 - Timothy P. Mulligan, 1987
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Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943

Timothy P. MulliganView all authors and affiliations
Volume 22, Issue 2
https://doi.org/10.1177/002200948702200203
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1. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Operation Lucy: Most Secret Spy Ring of the Second World War (New York 1981), 163.
2. The best monograph on the Red Orchestra (including Lucy) is The Rote Kapelle: The CIA's History of Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Networks in Western Europe, 1936-1945 (Frederick, Md. 1979), prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency ca. 1973 (hereafter cited as Rote Kapelle): on Lucy, see 165ff.
3. For a critical review of the literature and various theories regarding Lucy, see Nigel West, A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II (New York 1985), 51-67. The chief memoirs include: Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (Garden City, N.Y. 1949); Alexander Rado, Codename Dora, trans. by J.A. Underwood (London 1977); and W.F. Flicke, Agenten Funken Nach Moskau: Funkspionagegruppe'Rote Drei' (Wels-Munich 1957). Journalistic accounts include Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet, A Man Called Lucy, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York 1968), and Read and Fisher, Operation Lucy.
4. The controversies and claims to 1970 are reviewed in Heinz Hoehne, Kennwort: Direktor (Frankfurt/M. 1970), 13-25, an excellent study of the Soviet espionage network in Germany in 1942. Paul Carrell's narrative history of the Eastern Front at this time, Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War 1943-1944, trans. by Ewald Osers (Boston 1970), devotes an entire chapter to the betrayal of information prior to Kursk (pp. 95-114). Reinhard Gehlen, wartime director of the German Army High Command's intelligence section for the East, Fremde Heere Ost, alleged in his memoirs that he had obtained 'proof' that the traitor was Martin Bormann (see The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, trans. by David Irving [New York 1972], 70-1). See also Wilhelm von Schramm, Verrat im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Vom Kampf der Geheimdienste in Europa, Berichte und Dokumentation (Duesseldorf/Vienna 1967).
5. Rote Kapelle, 173, 185. Of these, 332 are messages from Dora to 'Director' (Moscow), the remainder transmissions of instructions from Moscow. According to Hoehne (Kennwort, 63-4), the Director was Gen. Ivan T. Peresypkin, head of the 'Razvedupr' (short for 'Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie', or Chief Intelligence Administration of the Soviet General Staff, alternately known as the GRU or the 'Fourth Department').
6. Attempts to locate the collection of intercepts cited by the CIA proved fruitless. Joseph Thach, Jr., in his solid monograph, 'The Battle of Kursk July 1943: Decisive Turning Point on the Eastern Front' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1971 ), 214-5, 534, quotes from a collection of these messages in the custody of David Dallin's widow in New York, to which Thach apparently gained access. The best published collection of these intercepts appears in Schramm, Verrat, 350-64.
7. Rote Kapelle, 185.
8. Ibid., 185-93; West, Thread, 65-7; Schramm, Verrat, 175-95.
9. Schramm, Verrat, 150-6.
10. Ibid., 154-7.
11. Rote Kapelle, 177-8.
12. The initial determination to defend the Kursk salient and prepare for a summer offensive resulted from a series of meetings between Stalin and his senior generals between 8 and 12 April 1943: see Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, trans. by Novosti Press Agency (New York 1971), 427-39, and G.A. Koltunov and B.G. Solovyov, Kurskaya Bitva (Moscow 1970), 27-35. See also footnote 17 below.
13. 'Dora an Direktor (von Werther 12. Maerz)', 17 March 1943, in Flicke, Agenten, 326.
14. 'Dora an Direktor (von Rot)', 20 April 1943, in Flicke, Agenten, 329, and Rote Kapelle, 191.
15. The key extracts of these messages, dated 20 and 29 April, appear in Carrell, Scorched Earth, 102, but they are not corroborated by other sources; Thach ('Kursk', 212-3) quotes these but confuses the 20 April message from 'Rot' with a different message for the same date cited by Carrell.
16. See Ernst Klink's excellent Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation Zitadelle 1943 (Stuttgart 1966), 105-16 on the postponement to 9 May and 292-4 for Hitler's 'Operationsbefehl Nr. 6'.
17. A copy of Stalin's 'alert' directive of 8 May 1943, warning of a probable attack from 10-12 May, appears in V. Gurkin, 'Dokumenty i materialy: Podgotovka k Kurskom bitve', Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 6, 1983 (June), 68; see also the memoirs of Sergei M. Shtemenko, wartime Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, or 'Stavka', The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945, trans. by Robert Daglish (Moscow 1970), 164-5, and Zhukov, Memoirs, 444. Gurkin's documentary collection also includes many key documents pertaining to the strategic decisions in April ('Dokumenty', 64-7).
18. The texts of these messages are reproduced in Schramm, Verrat, 356-9.
19. See the discussion by Walther Hubatsch, Kriegswende 1943 (Darmstadt 1966), 25-9, 139-44.
20. On the prolonged postponement of Zitadelle, see Klink, Gesetz, 140-4; the OKW perspective is presented in Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45, trans. by R.H. Barry (New York 1964), 332-4. The planned transfer of armour to Italy is confirmed in Hitler's teletype to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, 22 May 1943, reproduced on National Archives microfilm publication T78, Records of the German Army High Command (OKH), roll 343, frames 6301178-180 (hereafter cited in the format T78/343/6301178-180).
21. Text of message in Read and Fisher, Lucy, 162.
22. Text of message in Schramm, Verrat, 166-7.
23. The texts of Pakbo's and Werther's messages appear in Schramm, Verrat, 243, 169-70, respectively.
24. Ibid., 359-60.
25. See Warlimont, Inside, 622-3 (note 9).
26. The statement was made by British journalist and wartime intelligence officer Malcolm Muggeridge, in an article in The Observer, January 1967 (West, Thread, 60).
27. The quotation appears in Read and Fisher, Lucy, 146; a similar conclusion appears in Richard Deacon, A History of British Secret Service, 2nd ed. (London 1980), 407. Among secondary works, John Ericson's The Road to Berlin (Boulder, Col. 1983), 65, 654, relies on Read and Fisher; Janusz Piekalkiewicz's Unternehmen Zitadelle (Bergisch Gladbach 1983), 63-8, 75, 91, 117, rejects the Lucy-Ultra link and does utilize some declassified Ultra intercepts, but extrapolates beyond their context to draw unwarranted conclusions.
28. See F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 3 vols. to date (New York 1979-84).
29. Ibid., vol. II, 29, 616-27, 658-68; vol. III (pt. 1), 477-87.
30. See Hinsley, Intelligence, II, 58-66, and Piekalkiewicz, Zitadelle, 63-8, 117.
31. See Chapman Pincher, Too Secret, Too Long (New York 1984 [pb.]), 384-9.
32. The bulk of the documents cited in Hinsley regarding Eastern Front intelligence had not been turned over to the Public Record Office (PRO) in September 1982, when the author visited that institution, a condition still applicable as of May 1986 (letter from PRO to author, 12 May 1986).
33. Military Intelligence (MI) 14/SIF/12/43, 22 March 1943, in file W.O. 208/3573, PRO, Kew, England.
34. See Hinsley, Intelligence, II, 624, 764-5 for a reproduction of the intercepted German report.
35. See Magic Summary Nos. 392 (22 April 1943), 400 (30 April), 414 (14 May) and 417 (17 May), SRS 943, 951, 965 and 968, Records of the National Security Agency, Record Group 457, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as RG 457, NA).
36. The Ultra intercepts are discussed in Hinsley, Intelligence, II, 624-5; for the strategic estimates, see: Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 'Forecast of Developments on the Russo-German Front' (JIC 83/1), 5 May 1943, CCS file 381 (2-17-43), and JIC, 'German Plans and Intentions During the Summer and Autumn of 1943' (JIC 100),12 May 1943, CCS file 381 Germany (2-3-42) Sec. 2, both in the Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NA.
37. Hinsley, Intelligence, II, 626.
38. Ibid.
39. Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, 'G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation: Eastern European Theatre', 28 June 1943, G-2 Division (North America Branch) Subject File, Records of the US War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NA.
40. Magic Summary Nos. 465 (4 July 1943) and 469 (8 July 1943), SRS 1016, 1019, RG 457, NA.
41. A copy of Churchill's message to Stalin is included in the former's letter to President Roosevelt on 13 June 1943, published in Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley and Manfred Jonas (eds), Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York 1975), 342-3. On the Stalin-Churchill exchange during this period, see Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Pnnceton, N.J. 1967), 131-6.
42. Dr Ernst Klink, interview with author, Freiburg/Br., 30 September 1980.
43. See, e.g., the 'Tass' radio communiqué of 20 February 1968, quoted in Thach, 'Kursk', 205.
44. On the crisis in German strategy in 1943, see Hubatsch, Kriegswende, 119ff. A serious debate on German occupation policy and war aims in Russia during the period December 1942-June 1943 also influenced Hitler in favour of a major offensive: see the author's 'The Politics of Illusion and Empire: The Attempts to Reform German Occupation Policy in the USSR, Autumn 1941-Summer 1943' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, 1985).
45. In August 1944, the German Army consolidated many of these observations into a handbook for general distribution: see Merkblatt 19/8, 'Truppen-Ic-Dienst im Osten vom 1.8.1944', in the National Archives Collection of Seized Enemy Records, RG 242, NA. A summary of these appears in David Kahn, Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York 1978), 411.
46. See United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-70: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with some Additional Titles from Other Sources, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 1972.
47. See the introduction to Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va., No. 82: Records of Headquarters, German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres - OKH/FHO), Part IV (Washington, DC 1982), iv.
48. Gehlen, Service, 69.
49. See Kahn, Spies, 448, and esp. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, 'Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945', in Zwei Legende aus dem Dritten Reich (Stuttgart 1974), 51-4.
50. Klink, Gesetz, 194-6. The daily intelligence summaries prepared by FHO during this period ('Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom ...') are reproduced on T78/557/419-791.
51. See e.g. the daily summaries prepared by the air haison officer (commonly referred to as the 'Flivo') to Ninth Army, 'Tagesabschlussmeldungen von den 27.6., 22.-26.5.1943', on microcopy T312, Records of German Army Field Commands: Armies, roll 321, frames 7889910-916 (hereafter cited in the format T312/321 /7889910- 916). Aerial photographs can be found among the records of staff operations (Ia) and intelligence (Ic) at the levels of German armies (microcopy T312), corps (microcopy T314) and divisions (microcopy T315) for the units involved in Zitadelle.
52. Flivo, Armeeoberkommando (hereafter cited as AOK) 2, 'Luftwaffeneinsatz der Luftfl. 6 (9. Armee) und VIII. Fliegerkorps (4. Pz. Armee) vom 5.-9.7.43', 10 July 1943, T312/1243/000097.
53. Fremde Heere Ost (I), 'Erfahrungen in der Auswertung der Luftaufklarungs ergebmsse fur die Beurteilung der Feindlage', December 1943, T78/556/337-382. Specific references to air reconnaissance in Second Panzer Army's sector can be found in FHO's 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage' of 13 May, 1-3, 10,15 and 24-5 June 1943, T78/557/437-618.
54. See US Forces, European Theatre, First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report, 'The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign', 22 July 1945, 27-8, 153-7, in RG 165, NA. The report was apparently prepared by Gehlen or his FHO associates.
55. Prisoner and deserter statistics are taken from Ortwin Buchbender, Das tönende Erz: Deutsche Propaganda gegen die Rote Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart 1978), 244. On the military and political connection between Silberstreif and Zitadelle, see Mulligan, 'Politics', 376-80.
56. Early accounts of German and Soviet signal intelligence include David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York 1967), 646-61, and Albert Praun, 'German Radio Intelligence', Foreign Military Studies (hereafter FMS) Mss. #P-132 (US Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1950), 86ff., in the Records of US Army Commands, RG 338, NA. These have been largely superseded by Volker Detlef Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufklärung (Ost) und sowjetrussisches Heeresfunkwesen bis 1945 (Freiburg 1985), passim.
57. FHO, 'Kurze Beurteilungen der Feindlage vom 18.4., 13.5., 1.7.1943', T78/557/618,727-28,1140.
58. XXIII Armeekorps (hereafter AK)/Ic, 'Zusammenfassender Bericht uber die Nachrichtennahaufklarung vor der Korpsfront wahrend des Unternehmens Zitadelle fur die Zeit vom 5.-7. Juli 1943', and 'Zusammenfassender Bericht uber die Nachnchtennahaufklarung fur die Zeit vom 8.-15. Juli 1943', T314/690/496-99, 587- 92. Such summary reports of intercept activity are not commonly found among the microfilmed German records, though precisely such data are necessary for an assessment of Soviet signal security.
59. Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufklärung, 130-5; XIII AK/Ic, 'Tatigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic', 16 August 1943, T314/523/000012-13.
60. 'German G-2 Service', 21-22. This report also describes agent operations on pp. 107-12.
61. See the FHO study, 'Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront', ca. June 1943, T78/562/00001-52, and the translated 'Merkblatt an den operativen Bearbeiter der Abteilung Gegenspionage "Smersch" der 46 Armee zur Aufdeckung von Fallschirmspringer, Funkern, Saboteuren und anderen Agenten der deutschen Spionage', July 1943, T78/489/6475089-096.
62. See 'Sovetskiye organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti v gody Velikoy Ote chestvennoy voyny', Voprosy Istori, 1965, no. 5, 20-39 (a German translation of which appears in Sowjetwissenschaft. Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Beitrage, 1966, no. 11, 1200-18); Sergey I. Tsybov and Nikolay F. Chistyakov, Front taynoy voyny (Moscow 1968), 51-3; and the Soviet official history, Istoriya velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-1945, comp. Institut Marksizma-Leninizma Pri Tsk KPSS (6 vols.; Moscow 1960-64), VI, 485-98 (hereafter cited as IVOVSS).
63. M.N. Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 (Moscow 1977; trans. and published by the US Air Force, n.d.), 117-21, 130.
64. Helmuth von Wienskowski, 'Beitrag zur Studie T-9 (Bd. II), Materialsammlung fur die Darstellung des deutschen Angriffs auf Kursk im Juli 1943', FMS Mss. #T-9 (US Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1953), 21, in RG 338, NA; IVOVSS, III, 252.
65. Cf. FHO (IIE), 'Einzelnachrichten des Ic-Dienstes Ost Nr. 14, 7.6.1943', and ibid., 'Nr. 20, 21.10.1943', T78/492/6478445-446, 6478499-500.
66. FHO (IIe), 'Beilage z. Anl. 1 der Einzelnachrichten des Ic-Dienstes Ost Nr. 30', 22 May 1944, T78/492/6478626. The item is a translation of a captured Soviet training pamphlet of the Voronezh Front dated 25 May 1943.
67. Koltunov and Solovyov, Kurskaya, 39.
68. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, intro. and commentary by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston 1970), 207-11.
69. E.g., IVOVSS, III, 258-9; Koltunov and Solovyov, Kurskaya, 102-3; Zhukov, Memoirs, 454-5.
70. 3. Panzerdivision/Abt. Ic, 'Überläuferaussage', 7 July 1943, T314/1174/677-80.
71. Generalkommando II. SS-Panzerkorps/Ic, 'Feindlage 11.7.43, Beutepapiere', 11 July 1943, Records of the Waffen-SS, T354/605/662-63.
72. For a general review of this literature (including pieces on current application), see David G. Chizum, Soviet Radioelectronic Combat (Boulder, Col. 1985); more detailed information on historical examples can be found in David R. Beachley, 'Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat in World War II', Military Review, LXI, 3 (March 1981), 66-72. For an early disclosure of the Soviet cryptanalysis based on German records (see footnote 75, below), see Kahn, Codebreakers, 649.
73. See the collection of documents accompanying the report of AOK 2/Nachrich tenführer, 'Verlust von Schlusselmaschinen und Schlüsselmitteln in Dezember', 2 January 1942, T312/1164/522-28.
74. XXX. AK/Korpsnachrichtenfuhrer, 'Geheimhaltung-Tarnung der Nachrich tenubermittlung', 18 September 1942, T315/1530/221-222.
75. Anlage 185 zum Kriegstagebuch II, H.Gr.Nachr.Fue.Nord, 'Funksachbear beiter-Besprechung in Zossen vom 7.1. bis 9.1.1943', 17 January 1943, T311/83/ 7108488-491.
76. E.g. Panzerarmeeoberkommando (hereafter PzAOK) 4/Ia, 'Besondere Anordnungen für die Nachr. Verbindungen zum Operationsbefehl', 28 June 1943, in Klink, Gesetz, 316-7.
77. PzAOK 4/Nachrichtenfuhrer, 'Funkuberwachung', 18 July 1943, T313/ 386/8675197.
78. 11. Panzerdivision/Abt. Ic, 'Beutepapierauswertung', 14 July 1943, T314/ 1174/955-57.
79. See e.g. OKH/Chef des Generalstabes/Chef Heeresnachrichtenwesen (HNW) IV, 'Funkdisziplin', 28 September 1943, T311/84/7109349; OKH/Chef HNW I, 'Funkblatt Nr. 6', 15 November 1943, T78/204/6149210; and Oberbefehlshaber West/Ia, Ic, Nachr. Fuhrer, 'Sonderanordnung des OB West Nr. 20 fur das Nachrichtenwesen: "Die Abhörgefahr" ', 29 February 1944, in Schramm, Verrat, 376.
80. A. Paliy, 'Radioelektronmaya bor'ba v khode voyny', Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 5, 1977 (May), 13-14; some of the relevant data appears in Beachley, 'Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat', 68.
81. See Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufklärung, 178-80.
82. US Forces, European Theatre, CI-Consolidated Interrogation No. 16, 'German Methods of Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Service', 9 September 1945, p. 6, in RG 165, NA; Abwehr Leitstelle III Ost, 'Vorschlag zur Aktivierung der Irrefuhrung des gegen die deutsche Ostfront gerichteten sowjet. Aufklarungsdienstes', 8 January 1945, T78/488/6473315-320.
83. Koltunov and Solovyov, Kurskaya, 39.
84. See XLVIII. Panzerkorps/Ic, 'Augen auf! Aufgepasst!', 31 January 1943, T314/1128/903-06; and AOK 9/Ic, 'Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic/A.O. für die Zeit vom 26.3.-17.8.1943', T312/318/7886243-246.
85. See PzAOK 4/Ic, 'Tatigkeitsberichte der Abt. Ic/A.O. für die Zeit vom 25.3. bis 31.5.1943, für den Monat Juni 1943', T313/371/865115-118; and XLVIII. Panzer korps/Ic, 'Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung Ic für die Zeit vom 1.5.-30.6.43', 30 June 1943, T314/1167/811, 817. For additional information on Soviet penetration of indigenous units, see H.W. Pozdniakov, 'German Counter-intelligence in Occupied Soviet Union', FMS Mss.#P-122 (US Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1952), 171-3, RG 338, NA.
86. Pozdniakov, 'German Counter-intelligence', 73ff., and Hans Pottgiesser, Die Deutsche Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug (Neckargemuend 1975), 57-8.
87. Schramm, Verrat, 167-8, 391-2.
88. Pozdniakov, 'German Counter-intelligence', 160. For an example of one Soviet female agent's activities in this manner in the rear of Army Group South, see LVII. Panzerkorps/Ic, 'Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 3: Beispiel fur Agentinnen-Tatigkeit', 1 July 1943, T314/1494/000078-79.
89. IVOVSS, VI, 138-9.
90. AOK 9/Ic, 'Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic/A.O. fur die Zeit vom 26.3.- 17.8.1943', T312/318/7886243-246. Intelligence activities of Soviet partisans are described in Kurt DeWitt, 'The Role of the Partisans in Soviet Intelligence' (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 1954, mimeographed).
91. This account appeared in Front bez liniy fronta (Moscow 1965), 134-9, and is repeated in Ericson, Road, 65; a more elaborate version can be found in Nahum Kohn and Howard Roiter, A Voice from the Forest: Memoirs of a Jewish Partisan (New York 1980), 166-72.
92. See the documents reproduced in Gurkin, 'Dokumenty', 64-6, and Zhukov, Memoirs, 446-9.
93. XLVI Panzer Corps reported that 'the enemy expected our attack, nevertheless the day and hour remained unknown to him' ('Tatigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic des Gen.Kdo. XLVI. PzK. 1.6.-30.9.1943', T314/1091/509-11); XLVIII Panzer Corps' interrogations of prisoners revealed that Soviet units on the corps' right flank expected the offensive when it began, but their neighbours on the left flank were taken by surprise (XLVIII. PzK/Ic, 'Vernehmungsbericht', 5 July 1943, T314/1174/596).
94. Zhukov, Memoirs, 450.
95. See Khnk, Gesetz, 217-9, 230-4, 242-4, 255-7, 264-7.
96. Gehlen, Service, 66-8, 93-101; Kahn, Hitler's Spies, 538-41.
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