North Korea as a Military Dictatorship
-
Ronald Wintrobe
Abstract
In this paper I apply the model of dictatorship, developed in my 1998 book, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, and elsewhere, to understand the workings of the North Korean regime. I argue that initially, under Kim Il Sung it was a Soviet-style regime but the shocks of the 1990s – the fall of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, the capitalist turn of China, the economic takeoff of South Korea and the succession crisis caused by Kim Il Sung’s death threatened the stability of that regime. Kim Jong Il shored up the regime by marrying it to the military. However, military rule is typically unstable. Kim Jong Il resolved this paradox essentially by militarizing the entire society. This is the distinctive feature of the regime. I analyze the stability of that regime, and ask whether engagement or isolation is the best way for the rest of the world to deal with North Korea.
- 1
See Wintrobe (2007) for a survey of analytical approaches to dictatorship.
- 2
See Wintrobe (1998, chapters 3, 9 and 10) for a more detailed description and analysis of Communist institutions along these lines and an account of their role in the rise and fall of the former USSR.
- 3
See Eberstadt (2007), or Noland (2000).
- 4
More detail on the process of “buying” loyalty can be found in Wintrobe (1998, chapter 2).
- 5
See Remmer (1989) for example, on the Latin American military dictatorships of the 1970s.
- 6
A referee has suggested that it is possible that the only purpose of a military regime is to solve a crisis or problem, after which they hand power over to a civilian regime. On this view the military are disinterested in power themselves. But such a public interest oriented approach does not square with rational choice. And if the military can solve crisis problems, why are they incapable of governing over a longer term? If they are unselfishly looking after the public good, why is it that these military takeovers typically result in a substantial increase in the military budget?
- 7
For a list of the provocations from 1950 to 2003, see North Korea: Chronology of Provocations from the US Congressional Research Service at www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf.
- 8
See Snyder (2013).
- 9
For more on the implications of my model for dealing with dictatorship, see Wintrobe (1998, chapters 3 and 14), or Wintrobe (2001) for an informal account.
I am grateful to the participants in the ASAN Institute seminar on The Viability of North Korea, September 2011, the University of Western Ontario and the 13th Jan Tinbergen Peace Science Conference, and especially to Go Myon-Hyung and Bob Young, for helpful comments. Any errors that remain are entirely my own.
References
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©2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
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- Macroeconomic Consequences of War and Terrorism in Lebanon
- A Note on War and Fiscal Capacity in Developing Countries
- On Defence Expenditure Reduction: Balancing Between Austerity and Security in Greece
- North Korea as a Military Dictatorship
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Introduction
- International Relations
- Major Power Status (In)Consistency and Political Relevance in International Relations Studies
- New Incentives and Old Organizations: The Production of Violence After War
- When the Weak Roar: Understanding Protracted Intrastate Conflict
- Determinants of Extremism
- You Shall Not Overkill: Substitution Between Means of Group Removal
- Does Higher Education Decrease Support for Terrorism?
- The Curvilinear Effects of Economic Development on Domestic Terrorism
- Regional Dimensions of Somali Piracy and Militant Islamism: Anthropological and Econometric Evidence
- Institutions Factors and Violence
- Climate Change and the Risk of Mass Violence: Africa in the 21st Century
- Constitutional Design and Conflict Management in Africa
- An Overview of the Influence of Domestic Constraints on Crisis Initiation and Termination
- Consequences of War and Militarization
- Macroeconomic Consequences of War and Terrorism in Lebanon
- A Note on War and Fiscal Capacity in Developing Countries
- On Defence Expenditure Reduction: Balancing Between Austerity and Security in Greece
- North Korea as a Military Dictatorship
