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also referred to as the new or revised Hamas charter

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[ This talk section is about the starting sentence; the debate over article title is in #Requested move 10 June 2025. --Corriebertus (talk) 16:42, 13 June 2025 (UTC) ][reply]

This makes it sound like everyone accepts that this is a new charter. This is obviously not the case, I've provided a source that doesn't describe it as a charter and says that it's seen "by some" as a charter. Alaexis¿question? 08:42, 8 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I reverted the "some" part, needs more than just a single ref for that. Selfstudier (talk) 08:48, 8 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Let's tally the sources currently in the article
  • Slater: explicitly calls it a new charter
  • Dunning: explicitly calls it a new charter
  • Ayoob: explicitly calls it a new charter
  • Schulz: explicitly calls it a new charter
  • Hroub: this document "can be considered a new charter"
  • Musgrave: "which was seen by some to be a new Charter"
  • Seurat: calls it a document
  • Milton-Edwards: calls it a new document
  • Spoerl: calls it "2017 “Document”"
  • Bartal: calls it “A Document of General Principles and Policies"
  • Levitt & Rich: calls it a "new statement"
Media articles
  • Abu Saada: doesn't call it a new charter
  • Dunning: explicitly calls it a new charter
This is what we have in the Reception section, I'm not including politicians from both sides, non-scholars and the Israeli think tank. The sources in the "Assessments..." subsection are mostly media outlets and think-tanks so they have less weight.
Given this distribution, I think it's clear that while some sources do call it a charter, this is not a universally accepted name. Musgrave and Hroub are correct in saying that it's sometimes considered a new charter, and this is what we should say here. Alaexis¿question? 21:22, 8 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
We have clear high quality RS that explicitly refers to it as a new charter. The fact that other terms are also used for it like "document" or "statement" elsewhere does not undermine that fact. Unless you can find non-fringe RS of equal weight and prominence that explicitly say it is not a charter and those RS who refer to it as such are wrong to do so, we should not artificially add any ambiguity here, as again it is not reflected by cited high quality RS.
Also, stop adding highly contentious lines into long-standing consensus pages that without seeking consensus first. You clearly did not establish consensus for it and yet you still keep adding it after other editors reverted it. This violates WIKI:EDITWARRING. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:32, 11 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Your demand for "RS of equal weight and prominence" isn't appropriate, WP:WIKIVOICE has no such standard. Our policy is simply to not use wikivoice for opinions or interpretations.
We don't need a source explicitly saying "this is not a charter" to see that it's an opinion or interpretation; the sources Alaexis mentioned already make that quite clear. — xDanielx T/C\R 17:09, 12 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If an article designates a name as a bolded aka, then it is perfectly OK to use that aka (wikilinked) until such time as it is no longer a bolded aka, for which an RM is needed. Selfstudier (talk) 17:18, 12 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@XDanielx Fortunately it's not a mere opinion or interpretation, it's how high quality RS "also refers to it as", per the sentence and cited sources.
We don't add ambiguity where there is no reason to do so, which would be the case if there are non-fringe high quality RS explicitly disputing its designation as such. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 17:34, 12 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Are you suggesting that the sources Alaexis mentioned are somehow fringe? How so?
Here's another, Haaretz: Hamas isn’t renouncing [the charter]; nor is the new document called a “charter.” Do you think Haaretz is fringe also?
Here's one more: Hamas in Power (Qossay Hamed): In Arabic, similar to English, there exists a semantic difference between Wathiqa (Document) and Methaq (Charter). [...] In the context of Hamas, called the new literature a ‘Document’ has a significance. Ahmad Al-Betawi and Adnan Asfour explain that Hamas has never declared that the New Document is an alternative, amendment, or replacement of the Charter. Hamas’ Charter of 1988 is a long-term eternal covenant and promise that accounts for the movement’s moral and honorary commitment toward Palestine..
The latter is from a book which discusses this particular semantic distinction in depth, which carries a lot more weight than sources which simply use one or the other term in passing, with no indication that the author thought through the semantic distinction. — xDanielx T/C\R 21:53, 12 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
First of all, stop making edits to long-standing text that are being discussed in talk for which there is clearly no consensus. Both you and @Alaexis are edit warring, and you have a habit of doing that. If you continue with this behavior, I will bring it up in arbitration. And I will revert your latest malicious edit, you have to obtain consensus for it here first.
The majority of the sources on the page noted by @Alaexis explicitly call it a charter, and none of them say that it should not be called a charter. In fact, some of them explicitly call it a charter themselves in other texts:
Milton-Edwards: As Hamas leaders now set about revising the charter, they’ve set aside the exhortation to jihad against Israel. And the new charter emphasizes leaders’ long-held willingness to move from maximalist positions. The revised charter, for example, offers the possibility of Hamas accepting political solutions to achieving Palestinian statehood in the territory of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. In short, this could be Hamas’ two-state solution moment.
Also, of those who don't call it a charter, Spoerl, Bartal and Levitt & Rich aren't subject-area experts. And @Alaexis is wrong about the Abu Saada Al Jazeera piece not calling it a charter, it explicitly does under the name of their senior political analyst Marwan Bishara: He said their philosophy and the philosophy behind writing a new charter is that “we are going to be a dynamic and open organisation”.
Regarding the Haaretz piece, do you think people will not bother to click on the links you provide? The title of that Haaretz piece calls it a "new charter": Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis, and there are also links to other Haaretz articles on the same page explicitly referring to it as a charter:
Hamas Presents New Charter Supporting Palestinian State Along 1967 Borders: After some initial delays, Hamas presented its new charter on Monday.
House Foreign Affairs Head Dismisses Hamas's New Charter as 'Rebranding Effort'
Moreover, Hass concludes: But the Hamas charter is no longer the organization’s official ideological platform. Do you agree with this conclusion? Because I recall you arguing against that.
So I suppose you believe Haaretz is fringe when it disagrees with you, but a highly credible reliable source when you can nitpick it through a quick Google search.
Regarding the other source, that's from a PhD dissertation, not granted at a reputable institution, that was published through "IGI Global", a vampire publisher that has no editorial standards and is a PhD publishing mill, listed as a Vanity Press (meaning pay to publish) on Beall's List of predatory publishers. The fact that you had to resort to this obscure fringe source that you found through a Google search, and decided to ignore the rampant grammatical errors strewn throughout, shows I think what is actually happening here.
And though it shouldn't even be entertained; it merely explains the distinction between the terms, and doesn't say that it is not also referred to as a charter, which it plainly is by high quality RS, or that it shouldn't be.
Again, there are countless high quality RS that confirm (along with your precious Haaretz) the current lede description, namely that it is "also referred to as a new Hamas charter."
In fact it is so often referred to as a new charter that it is WP:COMMONNAME, hence why the page is named that. If you and @Alaexis want to argue otherwise and contest its usage as such, then it's not only about adding "some" to the first sentence, it's about an RM, as @Selfstudier noted.
If you want to go ahead with that, good luck. I oppose it for reasons mentioned. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:21, 12 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It seems like you haven't fully grasped some of our policies:
  • WP:HEADLINES - we give very little weight to them. Typically they're not even written by the author, but an editor with less context.
  • WP:EXPERTSPS - a dissertation by a (now) PhD holder in the field is a reliable source, regardless of where it's published. It also seems farfetched to call a dissertation a "obscure fringe source" for being published in IGI Global, when traditional journals don't accept dissertations due to length etc. You also seem to be misreading Beall's List, which calls IGI Global vanity press but not predatory (not that it would be relevant anyway).
  • WP:NPOV tells us to represent all significant viewpoints, which means that if two articles disagree (whether or not they're under the same publication), we normally represent both, unless one can be shown to be insignificant which is a high bar.
The fact remains that the aforementioned dissertation is the only source we have where a subject matter expert discusses this exact semantic question in depth. Merely using a word in passing isn't exactly an argument that that label fits precisely and isn't subtly wrong. — xDanielx T/C\R 00:26, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It seems like you're incapable of grasping that headlines are matched by the content of the pages, specifically with respect to the Haaretz pieces I linked that use the term "new charter" in the articles.
Also, I know it's embarrassing that you presented a PhD dissertation from a non-reputable university by a person who is not a reputable scholar in the field (his main publication is the one from the PhD Vanity Press pay-to-publish mill) as your main go-to source to argue (inaccurately) that it says that the term "charter" should not be used, which it never does, but unfortunately it has zero value per WP:Reliable Sources: Reliable scholarship – Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses.
Even if this had been published in a reputable academic press by a reputable scholar, it still wouldn't matter as it merely provides an analysis of the distinctive uses of the terms, and does not say that "charter" should not be used.
So this is clearly not a significant viewpoint, and WP:NPOV would only be violated if it were artificially introduced and presented as such on the page.
The entire discussion is moot, as the first sentence of the lede calls it by its official name, and then says: "also referred to as a new charter." It doesn't say that it is only referred to as such. By adding "some" like you wish to do even though it violates WP:NPOV and WP:DUE, you want to inaccurately portray its use as such as a minority or fringe position, when in reality it is the standard consensus usage for it in RS, both in media outlets and among subject-matter experts. In short, it is WP:COMMONNAME, which is why the page is titled "2017 Hamas Charter". Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 01:17, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If you disagree with WP:HEADLINE, feel free to propose a change to it, otherwise our current policy is to deem headlines unreliable.
You're quoting the less-specific section of WP:SCHOLARSHIP, rather than the section on dissertations. Dissertations are normally reviewed by a committee of scholars at the university, not volunteers for a journal. University of Bordeaux is a pretty good political science program, not sure why you would call it a "non-reputable university". It also just seems a bit silly to scrutinize this dissertation when it's the only source we have which really discusses this semantic issue.
By "official name", you mean the current title? We don't use Wikipedia as a source for itself. The current title being questionable doesn't oblige us to mirror that with questionable content. — xDanielx T/C\R 03:26, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The current title refers to the WP:COMMONNAME. From Hareetz you seem to be focusing on a single article, but there's plenty (some already mentioned above) that call it a charter in the body and sometimes in the header too (some examples 1 2 3 4 5). Regarding your other source, per WP:SCHOLARSHIP Completed dissertations [...] can be used but care should be exercised [...] Some of them will have gone through a process of academic peer reviewing, of varying levels of rigor, but some will not (emphasis by me). It doesn't seem the best source to use. Surely there are more RS supporting your point? I haven't properly checked the article to see if the list provided by Alaexis is accurate, but assuming it is, from the 13 sources, the vast majority called it a charter, and some call it a document, which is already reflected in the lead. So I'm not sure what exactly is that trying to prove.
This entire discussion seems like a waste of time. Per WP:WEIGHT, If a viewpoint is held by a significant minority, then it should be easy to name prominent adherents. I'm not seeing that. - Ïvana (talk) 19:39, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Re dissertations, care should be exercised is out of context - it's followed with as they are often, in part, primary sources, which is not the case here. And it seems safe to assume that a dissertation at a reputable program like University of Bordeaux's would have gone through a meaningful committee review process.
Are there any other reliable sources which actually discuss this semantic issue and arrive at a different conclusion? Are there any prominent adherents to the view that this is a charter? Using a label in passing with no discussion of it doesn't really make one a adherent. — xDanielx T/C\R 20:02, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
WP:SCHOLARSHIP specifies a preference for citing published book versions. Some theses are later published in the form of scholarly monographs or peer reviewed articles, and, if available, these are usually preferable to the original thesis as sources. and Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses. As pointed out above by Raskolnikov.Rev, the dissertation was posted by a vanity press.
"Are there any prominent adherents to the view that this is a charter?" yes, and one comes to mind, Khaled Hroub, a leading scholar on the subject, who published two books about it and also has an article analyzing the charter where he explicitly calls it the new charter. "Using a label in passing with no discussion of it doesn't really make one a adherent" and presenting cherry-picked examples of articles that do not use the term doesn't prove that it is actually contested. If you can provide multiple reliable sources that analyze both terms and explain why charter is not applicable, you are welcome to cite them here. Otherwise, this perspective remains a minority view that should not carry significant weight. - Ïvana (talk) 21:20, 13 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Dissertations from reputable institutions are vetted by a committee of scholars. Publication in a vanity press doesn't mean there was no review, it just means there was no review by a journal's unpaid volunteers. That's 100% normal for dissertations. A PhD in the relevant field clearly passes WP:EXPERTSPS in any case. I wouldn't say this is the ideal source, but it's clearly a reliable one.
The paper you mention says the document could be considered Hamas’s new charter, which isn't exactly a definitive statement that the label fits precisely. It also uses the label new charter twice. There doesn't appear be any discussion of this semantic issue at all beyond that sentence in the abstract. We're still left with zero sources expressing the view that "charter" is a precise label and not subtly wrong. — xDanielx T/C\R 02:43, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I and others would argue that it is difficult to use that source because we cannot conduct an expert analysis of that dissertation, and if you are doing so as an expert in the field, then that constitutes original research.
I agree with @Raskolnikov.Rev and @Ïvana - we are going around in circles because the view that it is not a charter does not have prominent adherents. On the other hand, the view that it is a charter does. Even the people over at RAND corporation call it a new or revised charter. I'm not sure how anyone could express the specific view you are demanding here: We're still left with zero sources expressing the view that "charter" is a precise label and not subtly wrong. We have plenty of sources saying that it is a charter. Smallangryplanet (talk) 07:48, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
We don't really have any sources clearly expressing this view that it is a charter though. To draw a comparison, if we look at something like Native American name controversy, its sources actually discuss the semantic issue; we don't take the mere use of a label like "native American" as an endorsement of one side of the semantic controversy. — xDanielx T/C\R 17:01, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If that's your position, run the RM and get it removed as an aka (which means that there are sources referring to it as a charter). Selfstudier (talk) 17:09, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From the article and this talk page:
  1. Luz 2023, p. 163: the current charter of Hamas [1]
  2. Alsoos 2021: Hamas’s new charter [2]
  3. Radonic 2021: the Hamas Charter of 2017 [3]
  4. Ayoob & Lussier 2020: p. 124 new charter, p. 125 2017 charter [4]
  5. Schulz 2020, p. 72: 2017 Charter [5]
  6. Slater 2020 p. 334: new charter [6]
  7. The editors of Contemporary Review of the Middle East 2017: new charter [7]
  8. Hroub 2017, p. 102: de facto Hamas’s new charter [8]
  9. Brenner 2017, p. xii: new de facto charter [9]
The assertion that We don't really have any sources clearly expressing this 'view that it is a charter' misrepresents the sources. Levivich (talk) 17:59, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
This isn't responsive to the point I've been making, which is that the mere use of a label isn't an argument that it's precise and not subtly wrong. — xDanielx T/C\R 18:12, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's responsive to We don't really have any sources clearly expressing this 'view that it is a charter'. You should admit that we really have sources clearly expressing this view that it is a charter, because they call it a "charter." Their view may be wrong -- and you're free to disagree with it -- but that doesn't change the fact that it is their view. And we will include that view. Levivich (talk) 18:18, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yeah my bad, I shared the abstract when I should have shared the actual article where Hroub calls it the de facto Hamas’s new charter.
Regarding the dissertation, it was published through IGI Global which is listed on Beall's List of predatory publishers. That is two red flags per WP:VANPRED, who not only calls out IGI Global specifically, but also points out how one of the indicators for predatory publishing include being listed on Beall's List. It also adds On Wikipedia, we, unlike scholars, cannot assess individual published works. We must instead rely on the reputation of the venue in which something is published [...] while it is possible to have good research published in a predatory journal or vanity press, it is unlikely. In those cases Wikipedia errs on the side of caution and does not consider those references to be valid. Vanity presses and predatory journals are disregarded for failing to conduct proper review and for their willingness to publish the work of researchers who actively avoid peer review. I think that makes it clear that it is not a valid source. - Ïvana (talk) 13:38, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, de facto Hamas’s new charter does seem more useful, although it's still only part of a sentence vs Hamed's substantive discussion of the matter.
Clearly actively avoid peer review doesn't apply here - there's just no peer-reviewed journal which would accept a book.
While I think this passes WP:SCHOLARSHIP, really WP:EXPERTSPS is the most relevant here. This isn't empirical research or anything like that, it's just expert commentary which would pass EXPERTSPS even if it was published on a blog with zero review. — xDanielx T/C\R 17:31, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for this, I'll recheck my list and prepare a table, adding more relevant RS. Alaexis¿question? 08:37, 14 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

To this and @Arminden:'s comment above, I think a helpful place to start is to note in the article how the 2017 document explicitly uses a different noun to describe itself (in Arabic). Are there any instances of members of the organization using the same term to refer to the two documents in a quote or paragraph? If not, a different noun in English for the 2017 document would be clearer. Arabic Wikipedia uses "Hamas Document (2017)" (but only has an article on the 1988 charter, titled "Hamas Charter"). – SJ + 00:04, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Sj It should be noted that the Arabic word وثيقة (wathiqa, "document") does not necessarily sound as pedestrian in Arabic as it does in English. For example, the Arabic name for the Bill of rights (or Charter of Rights) is ar:وثيقة الحقوق (wathiqa al-ḥuquq); the Constitution of Medina is known simply as "Al-Wathiqa" (see [10]). Andreas JN466 17:39, 12 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

This talk section is started 8Oct2024 because of disagreements over the starting sentence(that had become apparent in edits starting 7Oct20:57 in the article) – NOT about the article’s title.

Therefore, first of all I’d like to stress to everyone, that the contents and phrasing etc. of the starting sentence is a distinctly different problem than the titling of the article. Ofcourse, in both discussions the same ref sources and similar arguments can play roles, but those ‘roles’ do not have to be identical. I deem it absolutely impossible to solve any of these 2 problems by mixing them together so that discussants can’t see clearly whether an argument is made in favor of a certain opening sentence or in favor of a certain article title. (You can’t bake an omelet and run a marathon at the same time, though both activities can be wonderful and delicious, if enacted separately.) So, please: in this talk section focus only on that starting sentence, and for the issue of the article title please give your arguments in section #Requested move 10 June 2025. (By the way: subsections ‘Updated table’ and ‘More sources’ can probably serve for BOTH discussions; therefore, we must be quite ‘liberal’ in how far those lists will expand, bearing in mind that what is or seems irrelevant in those tables for discussion #1 can be relevant for discussion #2, and vice versa.)

Secondly, and adressing @Alaexis: the starting line is now in many ways different than before your edits of 7+8Oct2024. Do you still object? If so: can you say precisely what is wrong with this current version? Personally, I see no major problem in it; even if only a (small) minority of influential scholars would call it “new charter”—which is to be settled in the other discussion!—, it would probably be linguistically correct to state(in Wikivoice) that it is “also known as…” or ‘also referred to…’. ‘Also known as…’ does probably not necessarily mean that it is ‘known’ (or ‘referred to’, or ‘called’) so by a majority.

Thirdly: to all others: if you want to join in THIS debate, please react on the basic issue, and that is Alaexis’ objection to the starting sentence (and therefore first wait now for Alx’s answer on my question above). I see SJ posting(9Nov) an off-topic idea for adding information to the article—please, just add it, don’t suggest it here!—and then arguing about the article title which he should do in #Requested move 10 June 2025, not here. And then Andreas reacting(12June) on SJ but he also not reacting on the issue of THIS section, and also posting his argument about article's title in the wrong talk section. --Corriebertus (talk) 16:37, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Updated table

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Debate over usefullness of 'Updated table'

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I might have missed something - corrections are welcome. I found two discrepancies compared to the previous list. Radonic doesn't seem to use the term "charter" while Brenner's book was published in 2017 and doesn't mention the new document. Alaexis¿question? 20:29, 13 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

What does your asterisk (*) mean, by Alsoos and Hroub and Musgrave? --Corriebertus (talk) 12:42, 3 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
They use the word "charter" with qualifications - ranging from "widely regarded as" to "could be considered." Alaexis¿question? 20:18, 5 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
With all due respect, this is a too vague talk section (with vague sub-section). Please: what is the purpose of this talk section? We see this list or table, and some mr/mrs Luz in 2023 allegedly refers to the 2017 Document as "the current charter of Hamas" (if I go by the investigation of Alaexis). But then I’d like to know, why? Is it because Luz wants to ‘downplay’ the relevance of the ‘old 1988 charter’, in any sense? I’m sure he/she will give answers to this, in his/her 200-odd- pages book...? We don’t write a 200-page-book for no reason, do we? --Corriebertus (talk) 06:03, 4 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The purpose of this table is to serve as evidence that "charter" is not the WP:COMMONNAME of the document. If no one refutes it I'm going to open a request to rename the article. Alaexis¿question? 20:20, 5 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Alaexis has stated that his "source analysis" table includes not only the cited sources that refer to the new charter on this page, but also on the main Hamas page and the prior discussion, saying: "I've finally combines all the sources that are used in the article and in the parent article or have been mentioned in the discussion above into a single table. As you can see most of the sources use the term "document" or "statement" rather than "charter" (10 vs 8, with some overlap). I included even qualified mentions of "charter" in the tally."
This is false and a gross misrepresentation of the actual sources cited on this page, the main Hamas page, and in this discussion.
First of all, Alaexis has not included the Marwan Bishara source that I cited in this discussion [posting of Raskolnikov, 12Oct2024,23:21, section Talk:2017 Hamas charter#also referred to as the new or revised Hamas charter — helpful comment inserted here by Corriebertus --Corriebertus (talk) 14:02, 11 June 2025 (UTC)] and is also cited on the main Hamas page in reference to the new charter. He has also not cited the Pfahl-Traughber source cited on this page. Both of these refer to it as a charter.[reply]
This already brings the tally to 10 for charter and 10 for document, and the final tally is actually 13 for charter and 9 for document, the opposite of what Alaexis has claimed.
And even that does not take into account the actual content of what the RS say about it, nor their relative significance, which clearly show that the charter is of great significance which the attempt to rename it seeks to downplay and distort.
Now for the most egregious part of what Alaexis has done here: On 31 May Alaexis removed Brenner's reference to the new charter in relation to its acceptance of the 1967 border from the page. This was sourced to Brenner 2017 page 206, with the following content: "Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders: Brenner 2017, p. 206."
And Alaexis said this in the edit summary: "there is nothing about it on p. 206 - probably it's a mistake, considering that it's a 2017 book".
However, just two days prior Alaexis had removed another source from the main Hamas page on the same subject of the 2017 charter's recognition of the 1967 border, which accurately cites Brenner page 206 except the 2022 edition of the book.
So Alaexis must have known that the Brenner reference for page 206 was not mistaken, but was merely referencing an earlier edition of the same book, as he kept the information on the main Hamas page, which is still there now and is cited to Brenner 2022 page 206: "In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto".
Alaexis has moreover frequently edited in that recognition section and was deeply involved in the debate and sourcing related to its current version (as I was as well, alongside @Vice regent and @Smallangryplanet), and so has checked all the sources and knows them intimately.
So my question to Alaexis is: Why did you remove the Brenner source (page 206) that refers to the 2017 charter and its recognition of the 1967 border from this page shortly before making an RM justifying a move away from "charter" by citing the prevalence of "document" in the cited sources on the page as the main justification for it, even though you must have known that Brenner refers to it as a new charter in the 2022 edition of the same book as you saw him doing so on the main Hamas page just two days before you decided to remove it from this page, and also knew from your close involvement with that section and its sourcing?
In the 2022 edition of the book, Brenner explicitly refers to it as a new charter on pages 28, 204, 205-206 (which Alaexis removed), 208, 209, 216, 217, 226, 228.
There is another serious problem for Alaexis. Once again, he claimed that his "source analysis" table included not only the cited sources that refer to the new charter on this page, but also on the main Hamas page and the prior discussion: "I've finally combines all the sources that are used in the article and in the parent article or have been mentioned in the discussion above into a single table."
Brenner 2022 is cited on the main Hamas page referencing the 2017 charter, and he knows it. He was closely involved with Brenner's addition to the recognition section, and again, just two days prior to removing Brenner's page 206 reference from this page as regards the exact same content that is on the main page that he kept up, he saw that it refers to the 2022 edition of the book there.
So why you did not include Brenner's 2022 edition in your "source analysis" table, even as you removed it from this page as it is still on the main Hamas page?
Then there is the reference to Brenner 2017 and his use of "new de facto charter" that @Levivich had cited for page xii. The page is actually correct, but it also refers to the 2022 edition, and it is not from Brenner, it is from a Foreword to the book written by scholar Shual Mishal who is a subject-matter expert and praises Brenner's book while also referring to it as a new de facto charter: "This new de facto charter depicts the movement as tracing wasatiyya, ‘the middle road’, between extremism and flexibility. In Hamas’s own words, on its official website, ‘Hamas is a national liberation movement with a balanced middle way of Islamic thinking.’"
Mishal is now cited on the main Hamas page recognition section to argue the point that Hamas still seeks to take over all of Mandatory Palestine. Given his strong endorsement of Brenner's book, which explicitly makes the case that Hamas recognized the 1967 borders and by extension the existence of Israel as being on the other side, the 2006 source appears to be outdated for this claim and should be removed.
When we add Brenner and Mishal which is in the Brenner that Alaexis removed while knowing that the page number was accurate but the edition wasn't, the tally becomes 12 for charter, 10 for document.
What about the other sources in Alaexis' "source analysis" that are used to up the tally for "document"? Let's check the Deutsche Welle article. First of all, this article is a very short interview with political scientist Beverley Milton-Edwards, and she only once refers to it as a "new document" as a shorthand in an answer that has nothing to do with the question of the charter's nature.
But it gets worse for Alaexis's tally and the inclusion of Beverley Milton-Edwards as one for "document" instead of "charter": Beverley Milton-Edwards has written a recent book on the subject of Hamas (Hamas: A Quest for Power, 2024), and she refers to it as a "new" and "revised" charter multiple times in it. And she does the same in an article that I cited in this discussion and Alaexis ignored and did not add to his table or tally.
The tally is now 13 for "charter", 9 for "document".
Then we have to consider, why is a very short Deutsche Welle interview article that was published when the charter was announced included in the tally, but not the other RS articles that explicitly refer to it as a new charter? This includes the the Guardian, and also ironically Deutsche Welle itself where it refers to it as a "new charter" in its own voice.
Any editor can add countless sources using "charter" like that Guardian and other DW piece and argue the opposite.
Moreover, Alaexis' tally doesn't take into account the relative value of each RS, counting up uses of "document" in sources that are not focused on the subject like a off-hand reference to it in the DW interview, and assigning it the same value as academic scholarly articles and texts by the foremost experts on the subject who use "charter", once again like the author of that DW interview did in her recent book on the subject. This makes the entire table useless when it comes to the question of which term is the best to use for the article per WP:COMMONNAME.
Another instance of this is the "Muhammad Afzal Upal Carole M. Cusack Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements, p. 82" source counted in the tally as one for "document", which references a piece by Richard Lagervall on the main page as saying: "Rickard Lagervall, of Jönköping University, viewed this as an "ambiguous formulation." I am not even sure why this is cited on the page as it is not WP:DUE for inclusion. The piece is a chapter on the Muslim Brotherhood that only discussed Hamas in the most general terms over a few short paragraphs, and one of them discusses the 2017 charter and calls it by its official title. If we include passing references like this in the tally, we can easily make it 500 sources for charter versus 9 for document. Then there is Spoerl, who is a philosopher and not a subject-matter expert.
Ironically, Alaexis himself acknowledged this, saying to me: "Also, not all of these sources are created equal. A scholar's magazine article should have less weight." And then he proceeded to include a short interview with Milton-Edwards in DW as a use of "document" even though she refers to it as as new and revised charter in her recent book.
So Alaexis' table that he is using as the primary reason to change the title of this page grossly distorts the sources that he has used.
Finally, @Alaexis cites WP:NPOV as an argument for the name change, but has not explained at all why referring to it as a new charter as the majority and consensus in RS do is a violation of it. Non-invested editors may be confused by this, so let me explain: Editors who are pro-Israel like Alaexis want to downplay the significance of the new charter, and have been obsessively trying to do so for a very long time as you can see from the prior discussion on this page and the main Hamas page. They believe that by changing the name from "charter" to "document", they can present the original 1988 charter which is anti-Semitic as the "real true" beliefs of Hamas, and the new 2017 charter as just a meaningless propaganda ploy that has no value as it's just a "document".
I discovered something interesting as I was looking for the sources on this. CNN also originally called it a "new charter" when it was published, but then the Israeli advocacy group CAMERA shot off an email to them to demand they change it to "document" instead, and they altered it and then boasted about having successfully gotten it changed.
Now of course as the RS on this page and the main page clearly state, this is not an accurate view of the new charter. Hroub, Seurat, Milton-Edwards and other subject-matter experts say the new charter codified the fundamental shift in Hamas' positions since 1988, which was already underway since the 1990s and reflected in other policy documents.
This also further distorts the sources and the content of their analysis of the 2017 charter. By renaming the article, it puts sources cited for the "document" reference in the camp of downplaying the charter's significance per CAMERA, but in fact many of them do the exact opposite, like Seurat and the Paul Burke, Doaa’ Elnakhala, & Seumas Miller source. Regarding the latter, which is one of the sources Alaexis conveniently added to the main Hamas page ahead of the RM, it refers to the 2017 document as an "addition" to the original charter, and then highlights its significance:
"Hamas’s April 2017 document, which is considered an addition to, rather than a modification of, its 1988 Charter, reiterates the ‘liberation of Palestine and fighting the Zionist project’7 (that is, the State of Israel) as the central goal of the organisation (Orabi, 2017)." (page 60)
"Hamas’s documents and official statements have repeatedly stressed that Palestine extends from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, yet its April 2017 document states a willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 borders, a hitherto unprecedented statement by Hamas. In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas’s original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible (Akil, 2017)." (page 61)
And again, by the same author:
"Over time, Hamas issued several official documents adding to and modifying its founding Charter; the last of those was published in April 2017. The document expressed Hamas’s willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which constitutes a remarkable shift, since Hamas previously advocated a Palestinian state comprising the entire area between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean (Salah, 2017)." (page 199)
So here we have a source that highlights the importance of the 2017 charter, says it is an addition to the original charter, but calls it a document, and Alaexis is using it as a justification for downplaying and dismissing the importance of it, in direct violation of the actual content of the source.
The proposal to downgrade the significance of the new charter, which again the overwhelming consensus in the RS is to call a new charter, is itself a gross violation of WP:NPOV. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:30, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Raskolnikov.Rev, I'll respond to the rest later but I really want to set the record straight regarding Brenner's book Gaza under Hamas. From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. I haven't found anything about the 2017 document on p. 206 or elsewhere in the 2017 edition. I tried to be very clear about this in the edit summaries but it's possible that I got confused or confused others, for which I apologise.
Since you saying that the 2017 document is discussed in the 2022 edition, could you provide a quotation that's enough to understand the context? In that case I'd happily add it to the table. Alaexis¿question? 17:18, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I'm sorry but I don't quite understand your response here. You removed a source from the main Hamas page in a section that cites Brenner's 2022 edition for the same 206 page for the same claim as regards the 2017 charter that you subsequently removed from this page for the 2017 edition of the book. This was two days apart. And you must have already come across the Brenner page 206 source from the 2022 edition before as you were intimately involved in the drafting of that recognition section where it is cited in relation to the 2017 charter.
How is it possible that you had seen Brenner 2022 page 206 being used still for this content on the main Hamas page: "In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto", as you removed another faulty source that was there for that claim while keeping the Brenner for it, and then shortly thereafter you saw the exact same page from Brenner cited for the same claim on this page you removed it instead of updating the edition from 2017 to 2022?
That doesn't make a lot of sense.
As for the content, I cited all the pages in which Brenner (and Mishal in the Foreword) uses the term "charter". These are: xii, 28, 204, 205-206 (which you removed), 208, 209, 216, 217, 226, 228.
Specifically for page 205-206, the section is titled: "Hamas’s First Change: Issuing a New Charter", and it then says that the new document is a de facto new charter as it explains its relation to the old charter and the naming, and then includes the content for which it is cited on the main Hamas page and was cited for here, namely that it recognizes the 1967 borders and by extension also Israel as an entity on the other side:
"Many of the new policy positions had already been communicated for years by Hamas’s leaders. However, they had often been dismissed by Israel and the international community as mere opinions by individuals not representing the entirety of the movement. With the new document, such objections and doubts were no longer possible, at least not to the same extent. Still leaving some room for question, Hamas had stopped short of formally renouncing the old charter. Being asked about why, several Hamas leaders nevertheless responded affirmatively that ‘The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement’s bookshelf as a record of our past.’3 While Hamas did not explicitly name the new document its ‘Charter’, due to a lack of internal consensus on that; in practice, this was precisely what it was.
Of equal key importance was Hamas’s revised position on the establishment of a Palestinian state. The new document still referred to Palestine as the territory ‘from the river to the sea’. However, it also added that it accepted the pre-1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of these borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there. In addition, Hamas expressed that it would be ready to back ‘any peace agreement’, would it be approved in a popular referendum. These new formulations amounted to nothing less than a de facto recognition of Israel. During its deliberations, the movement had reached an internal agreement on accepting a two-state solution."
Once again, Brenner also refers to it as a "charter" on all the other pages I cited. For example on page 208: "However, to the dismay and much surprise of the Hamas leadership, the new charter went largely unnoticed, both by regional powers and by the international community at large." Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:44, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, I've added it to the table. Alaexis¿question? 13:03, 12 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I've added Milton-Edwards' 2024 book which uses both terms. As to Marwan Bishara, he's not a scholar and so his article has less weight - there are probably dozens of analytical pieces in various media outlets and it's better to focus on the best available sources. Alaexis¿question? 09:56, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Marwan Bishara is a PhD in political sociology and strategic studies from one of the top universities in the world, and he is a senior political analyst. I cited him in the discussion we had, and you falsely claimed you included all the sources that were cited in the discussion in your table. You did however include a Deutsche Welle interview article to your table because it had only one passing reference to "document" in it, even though it turned out the same author, Milton-Edwards, had written a recent book on the subject where she calls it a charter, and she also calls it a charter in a specific article on the subject that I had mentioned in this discussion and you ignored.
If your argument is to not include non-academic articles, then why did you include the Washington Institute of Near East Policy by Levitt & Rich? That piece does not even analyze the charter. It's a short polemical piece about how it doesn't really signify any real change and then to argue this cites some supposed Hamas actions.
Also while I'm looking at your table again, your designation of "yes with qualifications" is entirely misleading too. It creates the impression that scholars like Hroub call it a charter but do not really consider it to be of much significance and certainly not in relation to the 1988 charter, hence "with qualifications".
But the exact opposite is the case as I laid out in detail. Hroub, Seurat and others all consider the 2017 charter to be of much greater significance as a reflection of Hamas' positions than the 1988 charter. Yet you count Seurat and others as "document" and Hroub and others as "charter with qualifications", thereby entirely distorting the content of these sources as you then proceeded to argue that we need to change the title of this page because it violates NPOV if we do not because supposedly the consensus in RS is that the 2017 "document" is much less significant than the 1988 charter.
You have deliberately created a table that is wholly misleading ahead of your RM and then cited it as your primary argument for it.
If you do not change all these things in your table yourself, including all the other sources I mentioned that you have decided to ignore like the Mishal, I will make a new version of the table in my own reply that is accurate. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:33, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Please see the new grouping. I've moved all media articles and think-tank pieces to Tier 3 (lowest weight). If you insist we can add Bishara and various other political analysts to it - or maybe it would be better to remove it entirely and look only at academic source.
The *significance* of the 2017 is irrelevant. I never said that it's more or less significant than the original charter. This discussion is about the name of the article. Alaexis¿question? 15:56, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I will go over the recently added sources soon to verify them, and include a content analysis tab clarifying whether the source considers the 2017 charter to be more significant than the 1988 one or not. As I explained in detail in my initial reply, if that is their position it cuts against the reasoning used for the RM of it being a NPOV violation. Rather, it establishes that changing it violates NPOV as it downplays its significance in relation to the 1988 charter when the consensus in RS is that it is more significant. It does not matter whether you agree with this or not. Other editors can decide for themselves whether this is relevant information for them. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 08:55, 17 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I'm going to try to separate the sources in the table by relevance (those directly dealing with the topic vs those that just mention it, scholarly works vs media pieces). Alaexis¿question? 10:00, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis: you’ve created this ‘updated table’, containing “all the sources [ that have mentioned the 2017 document/charter ] that are: [A] used in the article, and [B] in the parent article, or have been [C] mentioned in the discussion above”. Subsequently, you have made this table play a (great?) role in your motivation for your Requested Move(RM) of 10June, but there limited to [A] and [B] (‘in the article or in the parent article’).
I’m not sure yet, which role – if any role at all – this table should play in our decision for an article name; if we would let the ‘score’ in this table play a great or decisive role, this would mean choosing for the (politically/propagandistically motivated) preference for either ‘charter’ or ‘document’ of those (perhaps few) editors who have invested the most time, and made the most edits, in the article (or of those editors who have invested the most time on merely talking on this talk page). This firstly does not seem democratic; secondly, personal politically/propagandistically motivated preferences of editors are not included in the WP:CRITERIA that are allowed to play any role in choosing the title.
Nevertheless: if we do let this table play any role, we should be able to discern between sources of the groups [A], [B] and [C]. ‘[C]’ is already considered by you as less relevant; but discussants here might also want to know whether a source is referenced in this article or in the parent article. So: could you please divide your table in three parts, indicated above as [A], [B] and [C]? --Corriebertus (talk) 22:06, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent:, @Alaexis:, @Raskolnikov.Rev: I’ve figured it out: unfortunately, it seems severely against Wikipedia guidelines to let (the ‘score’, ‘tally’ in) this Updated Table play a (great) role in settling the #Requested move 10 June 2025. This seems to be also the stance of Raskolnikov; see my elaborate arguing in my posting of 14June,22:14 in talk page section #Requested move 10 June 2025.
(‘There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics’ (dixit Mark Twain). I presume, what holds for statistics holds also for tables: structuring some alleged information into a statistic or a table gives it an aura of importantness and relevance, and disheartens the readers to challenge either that alleged information or its suggested importance, relevance, etc. ) --Corriebertus (talk) 06:06, 15 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

More sources

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Some more sources that use the term "charter".

  • "On the other side, in May 2017, Hamas has officially revealed its new (amended) charter in Doha, Qatar..." Gaza’s Cycle of Destruction and Rebuilding: Understanding the Actors, Dynamics, and Responses (1st 2024 ed.). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. 2024. p. 5. ISBN 9783031671975.
  • "As outlined in Hamas' new charter, announced by Meshal in May 2017, this policy was a..." “Fragile Stability” as a Political Background of October 7: Current and Foreseeable Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1st 2025 ed.). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2025. p. 142. ISBN 9789819625864.
  • "Hamas charter, revised May 2017". Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2023). The Arab-Israeli conflict: a ringside view. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781000871845. "*"
  • "The 2017 charter just as they were in the 1988 one." Responses to 7 October: law and society. London New York: Routledge. 2024. ISBN 9781040101582. "*"
  • "In the 2017 Charter we see a shift in language in relation to Israel." Schulz, Michael (2020). Between resistance, sharia law, and demo-Islamic politics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 72. ISBN 9781538146101.
  • "In 2017 Hamas replaced its charter and removed these references." Israel-Palestine: lands and peoples. New York: Berghahn. 2021. ISBN 9781800731295. "*"
  • "The revised 2017 Charter of the Palestinian group Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, departs from its earlier rhetoric..." Key concepts in the study of antisemitism. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 2021. p. 46. ISBN 9783030516581.
  • "However, in 2017, Hamas produced a new, much more moderate charter..." Christie, Niall (2020). Muslims and crusaders: Christianity's wars in the Middle East, 1095-1382, from the Islamic sources (Second ed.). Abingdon, Oxon New York, NY: Routledge. ISBN 9781351007344. "*"

Where I have marked "*" it means I don't know the page number, but you can find the quote on google books. Please add these to the table.VR (Please ping on reply) 10:19, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Vice regent, thanks for adding more sources. As far as I understand they haven't been used in this article, right? I'll add them and will also add those that call it a "document." There are many such sources - I focused on the sources already in the article to avoid potential cherrypicking. Alaexis¿question? 14:06, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent, having obtained access to Muslims and Crusaders I searched for "charter" and "Hamas" and couldn't find these words. Are you sure they are present in the book? Note that some of the sources from your list use both terms. Alaexis¿question? 14:55, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Does this link show you anything?VR (Please ping on reply) 01:47, 15 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The first edition of this book published in 2014, predating the 2017 charter. But the 2nd edition was published in 2020.VR (Please ping on reply) 01:52, 15 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the link, I do see it now and I've added this source to the table. Alaexis¿question? 21:58, 16 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Renaming the article as: ‘Hamas 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies’

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This Document is not their “charter” (= document laying out their basic principles and goals etc.). Why should we want to call it a “charter” when it is not a “charter”? --Corriebertus (talk) 11:54, 29 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Corriebertus, I also think so and it's the reason I've been researching sources on the history and ideology of Hamas to find out what the common name is (see the table above). Alaexis¿question? 19:14, 29 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I disagree with this as we do not subjectively decide how something is called, we go by what the consensus of the sources say.
I will look at the list @Alaexis has provided and check if they are accurate and see if there are more that explicitly refer to it as a charter. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 19:45, 29 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Please note that the table contains the sources that are either present in this article or the main article, or were mentioned in the discussion above. I did this to avoid potential cherrypicking - which would happen if I simply searched for "2017 Hamas document" on Google Books, so please take it into account.
Also, not all of these sources are created equal. A scholar's magazine article should have less weight. Alaexis¿question? 09:37, 30 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Raskolnikov.Rev: By the way Raskolnikov, what do you mean exactly with: “I disagree with this”? Most likely you refer to the opening statement "This Document is not their “charter”"? In that case, you contend, it is their charter? How do you know that or what are your arguments for that stance? As for the rest of your remarks, see my reaction below in my posting of 3 June. --Corriebertus (talk) 05:28, 4 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The page is created on 4Dec2023,14:25 by Jayen466 with title A Document of General Principles and Policies, and with starting sentence: “The Document of General Principles and Policies (…), often described as the new or revised Hamas charter,(…)” (which is roughly comparable with its current starting sentence).

Later that day, 17:36, it was moved (= renamed) by Selfstudier to 1917 Hamas charter --which ofcourse was a slip of the pen, he obviously meant 2017 Hamas charter. His given motivation was: “Descriptive name rather than official uninformative title”. That was a bold move and edit, but it is time now to challenge that edit and that motivation. By saying “descriptive name(…)”, Selfstudier implicitly contends that the 2017 doc is a “charter”, but he gives no proof or argument for that thesis, so basically his motivation for that move holds no ground, is unproven, unbased: O.R.. Meanwhile, whether Selfstudier was aware of it or not, his ‘move’ is (politically) loaded: the word “charter”, especially in relation to Hamas, has (enormous) political and propagandistic side notions, (side) meanings, etc. (see the many discussions on this talk page and elsewhere). By calling the 2017 doc a “charter” – exactly the term Wikipedia once has decided to call the 1988 Covenant with – Wikipedia inevitably suggests that the ‘new charter’ (sort-of) replaces the ‘old charter’. Most likely, this is indeed the reason why some (scholars and) authors choose to say “could be considered Hamas's new charter” (Hroub), “widely regarded as its new charter” (Alsoos) (etc.), and others on the contrary emphatically say “Finally, ..2017, Hamas published its Document of General Principles and Policies. (…) While refusing to speak of a new Charter, Khaled Mesh’al nevertheless stated that this document was now Hamas’ political reference: (...) For all that, the Charter could not be considered obsolete: "(…)Our principle is the following: no change of document(…)"” (Seurat, p.17-18). Authors are free to write and suggest what they want, and usually they clearly explain in their book why they suggest ‘…could be considered (…) charter’ etc. But suggesting ‘…could be considered…’ (etc.) is a great difference with stating it is a charter, as our colleague Slfst implicitly, and without proof, did with his move of 4Dec2023. I therefore propose to quickly (partly) ‘revert’ that edit of 4Dec2023,17:36: not to fully return to the indeed too vague and “uninformative” initial name but to name it as I proposed on top of this talk section; that new title effectively removes the problem of “…uninformative title” that Slfst correctly mentioned.

@Alaexis: says here(29/30May), he has been “researching sources on the history and ideology of Hamas to find out what the common name is (see the table above)”. With all due respect: what is the relevance of that research and that table? " Uses ‘Charter’" (Luz 2023, Koinova) is not the same as saying it is a charter. Authors will have various reasons for calling it either a “new document”(Milton-E, Levitt&R) or “Document”(Spoerl, Bartal) or “new charter”(Slater, Dunning, Ayoob, etc.—if that is all investigated correctly…), and quite a few say things like “can be considered…”(Hroub, Musgrave, Alsoos), but why and how should that influence us Wikipedia? Those authors use their words in their own contexts and probably explain there, why they do so (though Alaexis's list does not yet give information on their reasons); but likewise, we Wikipedia use words in our own context(see above)—which will always be a different context. Alaexis, you will never find a “common name” (except ofcourse 'Document of General Principles and Policies'), just an endless ‘name-dropping’ by endless scholars and would-be-scholars (and others). We(Wiki) started out with a correct name (‘Document’), this was moved to the name ‘charter’ with incorrect (pretended) motivation(see above) and thereby importing a political stance into the article (see above) without any motivation. This name-change should therefore be (partly) reverted (the way I propose here). Then, if people want to make a case for the name ‘charter’, they will have to bring convincing arguments for that. @Raskolnikov.Rev: says here: “we do not subjectively decide how something is called”: well fine, then the name should be “Document” which is the official name (and thus our initial name for it); if someone then wants to (subjectively) change that into ‘charter’ or whatever, he will have to prove that that is “the consensus of [what] the sources say” (as Rsk also states). N.B. I’ve rewritten this posting a few times; in one earlier version (3 June, 08:27), I have alerted @Selfstudier:, to give him a chance to defend or explain his moving edit of 4Dec2023. --Corriebertus (talk) 15:29, 3 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Map caption

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The purported acceptance of the 1967 borders is no less notable than the lack of the recognition, per the sources already quoted in the article and added by me. For example, Ayoob & Lussier say on p. 133 In its May 2017 charter, Hamas expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders of Israel and Palestine. The statement, however, does not include recognition of Israel or acceptance of the two- state solution proposed by the Oslo Accords Alaexis¿question? 19:24, 29 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The other sources like the Brenner, Seurat and Zartman do not mention that point, but in any case that is not the relevant standard here.
The entire reason the map and the caption was added was to specifically point to the noteworthy aspect of the 2017 charter having changed from its 1988 charter in that it now accepted the 1967 borders. If you add the qualification to it then it defeats the purpose of having the infobox showing the 1967 borders at all.
Now if that is what you want, to have the entire thing removed, then argue that. But adding qualifiers that undermine its purpose and that are not reflected in the cited sources serves no purpose.
I for one believe the infobox should stay as is, as it is indeed a notable aspect of the new charter that it recognized the 1967 borders, per RS. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 19:43, 29 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Well, regarding Brenner, there is nothing about the 2017 document on page 206 of the 2017 edition of Gaza Under Hamas. Since you mentioned it, could you double-check it? Alaexis¿question? 09:39, 30 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
As to your general argument, the WP:DUE tells us to present all major aspects and viewpoints with the weight they are given in RS. The RS mention both the conditional acceptance of the 1967 borders and the claim over the whole territory between the river and the sea. Therefore it makes sense for the map and its caption to show both. Alaexis¿question? 09:43, 30 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You do not not consensus for your addition, so please refrain from adding it again until you do.
You are right regarding the Brenner, it is not in there, but again, the sole purpose of the 1967 map is to make the point that the 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders unlike the previous one. RS say that this is a particularly notable part of the new charter, hence why the infobox was made in the first place and the 1967 map was used.
When you add that they in fact did not accept this as some sources claim, not all and certainly not the majority, it defeats the purpose of even having the infobox with the map.
So we should either keep it as is, or remove it entirely. If we cannot find consensus on this here then we'll have to take it to an RfC. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 15:34, 1 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis I believe I have found a compromise that we can both agree to. The sources including those you added do say that even though it accepted the 1967 borders, it did so without recognizing Israel. I have included that along with the link to the recognition section on the main page. This now accurately conveys what the consensus in RS is, and also doesn't undermine the point of having the map in the first place. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 15:44, 1 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Requested move 10 June 2025 (INACTIVE!)

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The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: superceded by #Requested move 18 June 2025. (closed by non-admin page mover) —Compassionate727 (T·C) 13:26, 24 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

2017 Hamas charter → 2017 Hamas Document of General Principles and Policies – The current title does not reflect how this document is most commonly and neutrally described in reliable sources, contrary to WP:COMMONNAME and WP:NPOV. An analysis of sources used in this and parent articles shows that sources more frequently use "document" or similar terms (10) than "charter" (8), even when generously counting sources that use "charter" only with qualifications like "widely regarded as" or "could be considered." Among sources that consider whether this constitutes a "charter," there is no consensus, with some explicitly noting the document "does not replace the charter" and that Hamas "refused to speak of a new Charter." The proposed title uses the official name given by Hamas, reflects the predominant terminology in sources, and maintains neutrality on the contested question of whether this document constitutes a new charter. Alaexis¿question? 17:14, 10 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • support: Forgive me for again updating my opinion on this RM question. There are two reasons for removing the word ‘charter’ from this article title. Firstly: no one has really argued that it is a charter, nor argued that ‘..charter’ is the most commonly used name for it.
    Secondly: calling it a charter when that is not its official name and not its WP:COMMONNAME, would (and currently does) arbitrarily downplay the relevance of the 1988 charter, thus indoctrinating our reading public. (Stunningly enough, the three editors defending the current title here implicitly admit that they see this indoctrination, but nevertheless keep defending this current title; see my more comprehensive explanation below, in my reaction today to Jayen466.) --Corriebertus (talk) 16:47, 8 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Oppose "2017 Hamas charter" is the clear WP:COMMONNAME, and as WP:CRITERIA states, page titles should be named in accordance with "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency", and per WP:COMMONNAME ambiguous names should be avoided even if they are more widely used in RS, which is not the case here as I have shown in detail in my response to the RM creator Alaexis' so-called "source analysis" table, which reveals problematic behavior like the removal and omission of sources that ended up padding references to "document" and got it above "charter" in their tally ahead of making the RM. As I show there, the real tally is the opposite of what they claim, namely 13 for "charter" and 9 for "document".
Moreover, as I have also detailed in my response, the attempt to change it to "document" is itself in violation of WP:NPOV, as it is an attempt to downplay its significance in violation of the consensus view in RS, including those that use "document" such as Seurat, Legrain and Kear. All of these sources state that it marked a significant shift by codifying Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders and removing antisemitic verbiage, and all of them downplay the signifance of the 1988 charter as being representative of the Hamas movement's goals and aims.
By keeping the 1988 charter title as is and changing this to a overlong document title, it gives the impression that it is somehow of lesser value than the charter, when in fact the overwhelming consensus in the cited RS is that it is of much greater value in reflecting Hamas' officially codified consensus position. Once again, this would be a violation of WP:NPOV.
In short, "2017 Hamas Document of General Principles and Policies" falls afoul of all the Wikipedia standards for naming a page, whereas the current title of "2017 Hamas charter" meets all of them. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:37, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
First preliminary reaction on Rsk’s posting: your posting is presumably written in great hurry and very difficult readable (which is sort-of an ‘insult’ to colleagues who would like to grasp the essence of your posting). Just quickly scanning now your first four arguments in it:
* “is the clear WP:COMMONNAME”: unargued;
* "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency": rather arbitrary(vague) criteria, but Rsk does not make a clear argument for any of these five;
* “ambiguous”: no argument why proposed name is (too) ambiguous;
* Proposed name “not… more widely used in RS, .. as shown in.. my response [11:30,11June, section #Updated table, 2255 words(!)]” : extremely long posting there, and not visibly structured (and as such an ‘insult’ to colleagues who would like to grasp the core of that posting!). First statement of Raskolnikov in that posting, about Marwan Bishara, is right though: this Jazeera analyst(who indeed says: “writing a new charter…”) has been missed/neglected by Alaexis. Therefore, I suggest a time-out now in this RM discussion, and ask for the two antagonists, to first work out a clear, well-readable, “updated table”. So all other discussants will have clear information to react on. --Corriebertus (talk) 14:36, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Procedural proposal: time-out in this RM discussion, asking Alaex and Rask to make a more complete and correct and surveyable “updated table” (see my explanation here above, same date stamp). --Corriebertus (talk) 14:36, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Makes sense. I hoped to get this kind of feedback on my analysis before starting the RM, but in any case I'll review it and add sources to the table. Alaexis¿question? 17:23, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Speaking of logistics, are there any objections to temporarily removing the RM request? Hopefully we'll have a new version of the table and then restart the RM. The cast votes would remain valid. Alaexis¿question? 17:26, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    I don't mind that. But if you read my response to your "source analysis" table, the entire effort doesn't serve any purpose with respect to this RM, as the use of "charter" or "document" on sources that were already cited on this and the main Hamas page (which as I showed you had selectively presented), says nothing about the prevalence of either term in RS generally which happen to not be cited on either page, the relative value of each source's usage of it (you included a passing one-off reference to "document" in a short DW article as one for "document", when the same author has written a book and entire article on the subject where she refers to it as a "charter"), and the significance assigned to the 2017 charter particularly vis-à-vis the 1988 charter where sources you count as sole "document" mentions (Seurat, Kear, Legrain and others) assign much greater value to the former than the latter yet you use them to downgrade its status in relation to the other.
    More important, it has no bearing whatsoever on the WP:CRITERIA for WP:TITLES, which clearly show that the current title is far superior to your proposed overlong clunky technical jargon "2017 Hamas Document of General Principles and Policies". Even if you can show that there is a greater prevalence in relevant RS that use "document" as opposed to "charter" and assign greater value to the old charter, it still doesn't change the fact that per the criteria of "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency", the current title ought to be kept as is.
    But if you want time to work on a new draft for your table to remove the errors I pointed out, go ahead and time out this RM for now. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:23, 11 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Raskolnikov.Rev: you do have a point with your objections concerning length and “clunky technical jargon”. So, please read my compromising proposal, below, posted 14June,05:50. But if Alaexis can't accept that compromise, we shouldn’t feel too embarrased by, or withhold ourselves from, choosing a rather long name if that would seem the best name – only because it is ‘eight words long..!..!..’. --Corriebertus (talk) 06:01, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  •  Comment: For reference, Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2024) cover the matter as follows in their 2024 book:
    • ... Khaled Meshaal and the rest of the Hamas leadership announced a new covenant. In one of his last acts as leader, Meshaal said the 1988 founding charter of the group had been updated and revised. The new document had Hamas dropping its call for Israel's destruction and agreeing to a transitional Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
  • They go on to present a lengthy quote from a piece (currently not cited in the article) by RAND Corporation political scientist Colin P. Clark:
    • ... In the original charter of 1987, Hamas makes clear that its purpose is to elevate the concept of “jihad of the sword,” or offensive military actions, in its efforts to mobilize Palestinians. The language in the revised charter, importantly, does not renounce violence and still considers jihad a legitimate right of the Palestinian people. But even before the charter's revisions, Hamas's tactics had proved flexible over time. Despite its occasional inflammatory rhetoric, its ideology—much like Hezbollah's—is pragmatic, and the group has demonstrated flexibility before.
  • In their Chronology at the end of the book, their entry for "2017, May" reads:
    • In the Qatari capital Doha, the Hamas leadership present their new and revised charter-covenant. As Hamas leaders now set about revising the charter, they appeared to set aside the exhortations to jihad against Israel. Instead, for example, it offers the possibility of Hamas accepting political solutions to achieving Palestinian statehood in the territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.
  • So overall, in Milton-Edwards & Farrell (2024) "charter" is the most common term. I started the article with the full official title back when, but acquiesced to the title change and in the end came to find the new title preferable. --Andreas JN466 16:52, 12 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks, I've paused the RM for now and will update the table. Alaexis¿question? 14:10, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Alaexis: why do you place this: “I've paused the RM for now…” under Andreas who has made no comment about that pause? --Corriebertus (talk) 22:01, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Jayen466: this irritates me a lot. We are in a RM debate here. So, can you please state your stance towards (pro/contra, oppose/support) the proposal, AND motivate it? “M-E & F [use ‘charter’] the most” is not a serious(convincing) argument; “I find the new [= current] title preferable [over the very first one which is now NOT being proposed!!]”, is not even a stance in this RM debate. --Corriebertus (talk) 22:01, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Jayen466, you're right about Milton-Edwards but take a look at the quotes from the sources that specifically discuss whether this should be considered a new charter. In the absence of consensus we should use a more neural name. Alaexis¿question? 15:50, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Alaexis Could you quickly provide a link to the relevant post? The page seems to have filled up considerably since I last visited. Andreas JN466 16:05, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Jayen466, I was referring to the quotes from works by Seurat, Hroub, Alsoos and Legrain here. Alaexis¿question? 16:08, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Looking at Seurat, she says:
    While refusing to speak of a new Charter, Khaled Mesh'al nevertheless stated that this document was now Hamas' political reference: 'The difference is that today, we present this program in a document that is our own." For all that, the Charter could not be considered obsolete: "Hamas refuses to submit to the wishes of other states. Its political thought is never the result of pressure from outside. Our principle is the following: no change of document. Hamas does not forget its past. The Charter illustrates the period of the 1980s and the Document of General Principles presents our policy in 2017. Each document belongs to a specific period."
    So it seems to me Mesh'al said that the new document fulfilled the same function now as the old charter did in its time. Hroub and Aloos say the Document "could be considered" or is "widely regarded" as the new Charter.
    Legrain provides a detailed textual comparison between the Charter and the Document; he argues that for anything the Document remains silent on, the Charter may still be deemed to be valid, while for anything where the Document contradicts the Charter, the Charter may be deemed to be repealed (p. 88). (That is a nice distinction, which I think I'll add to the article.)
    Overall I don't see a material downside in the current title. I was originally against the move to 2017 Hamas charter, as you can see at Talk:1988 Hamas charter/Archives/ 1#New article for 2017 charter, but have come round to it because the current title better meets WP:CONCISE. As long as the article makes the matter clear, with a lead that contains the full official title and hedges the "new charter" moniker a bit, I am okay with the current title. Andreas JN466 15:13, 28 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Jayen466: Jayen/Andreas says he is “okay with the current title” because he doesn’t see “a material downside in the current title”. The first downside, only implicitly alluded to by @Alaexis:, is that Wikipedia should call things by their correct name and none of our editors has argued yet that the 2017Doc is indeed a charter (Slfst has daringly suggested it with his bold move on 4 Dec 2023, but without argument). The Doc can also be called ‘charter’ by us if that would be the most commonly used name for it – which also has not yet been argued by any Wiki contributor.
A second downside of calling it a (new) charter when that is not its official name and not its WP:COMMONNAME, is that such naming would (and currently does) arbitrarily further downplay the potentially still existing relevance of the 1988 charter as compared to the situation when Wikipedia would not call the 2017Doc a ‘charter’, thus indoctrinating our reading public. The three Wikipedia contributors who now oppose this title move seem to be aware of this indoctrination but nevertheless to admit that this indoctrination is what they appreciate:
(1)@Raskolnikov.Rev: Rsk(11June,11:37) gives as argument against the proposed title change: if this article is no longer called ‘2017 charter’, this would give “the impression that it is somehow of lesser value than the [1988]charter(…)”; in other words: giving it the name ‘2017charter’, as Wikipedia did on 4Dec2023, enhances its importance in the perception of our readers in comparison with the perceived importance of the 1988charter; so Rsk understands that ‘indoctrinating’ effect of title “charter”, which he nevertheless appreciates and defends, because he has read that some authors consider the 2017Doc to be of greater value in some respects than the 1988charter. (Ofcourse its importance in relation to the 1988 document is relevant and must be treated in our article, but only by transparently presenting the ideas of sources about it, not by giving its article the title ‘charter’ and thus also in Wiki voice emphasizing its importance in comparison with the 1988charter.)
(2)@Vice regent: VR(13June,09:46) states that title ‘2017 charter’ is preferable from the viewpoint of consistency with ‘1988 Hamas charter’, thus saying the ‘similarity’ (as perceived by VR) of the functions and status of the two declarations should be expressed in their Wikipedia article’s titles and that title ‘2017 charter’ to a greater extent expresses that similarity than a title not calling it ‘charter’—thus showing he understands that ‘indoctrinating’ effect of a title calling it ‘2017 charter’, which he nevertheless says he prefers. (Opinions of scholars about similarity should be presented clearly in the article, but a mere personal judgement of one or many Wiki contributors about ‘similarity’ or any other characteristic of the 2017 document should not influence our choosing or preserving this or that title for the article, lest we abandon our neutrality.)
(3)Jayen/Andreas says(28June): “…it seems to me Mesh'al said that the new document fulfilled the same function now as the old charter did in its time”, therefore he is “okay” with article title “2017 charter”—apparently appreciating that such title evokes the idea in the reader that the 2017 ‘charter’ fulfills the function the old charter fulfilled earlier (in plain speech: replaced the 1988 charter), even though he cites no one saying the 2017Doc replaces the 1988charter or fulfills all its earlier functions. So, he also is aware of the rhetorical/indoctrinating effect of title “2017charter” but nevertheless appreciates and defends it, because it incites readers to presume what he presumes: ‘replacement’ of the ‘old’ charter. (It is allright to summarize the statements of Mesh'al, or to mention the equally vague remarks of Hroub and Aloos, in the article; but it is not allright to arbitrarily ‘translate’ Mesh'al’s vague words into a clearer stance and then deliver that ‘translation’ to the readers in the form of an arbitrary article title, thus forcing our own interpretation of the topic (‘2017 doc replaces the 1988 charter’) as seemingly ‘objective truth’ onto our readers; this is what happened though on 4Dec2023.) --Corriebertus (talk) 16:47, 8 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The 1988 charter was never officially called a "charter" either; it was only published in Arabic. Both mithaq and wathiqa (the two words derive from the same root) can be and have been translated as "charter" in other contexts; the Charter of Medina, for example, is known as both mithaq al-Madinah and wathiqat al-Madinah in Arabic. Andreas JN466 19:46, 8 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
That may be so, we cannot expect strict one-to-one correspondence between two related words in two different languages. However Legrain says that "linguistically the wathîqa is supposed to be less binding and fixed." My Arabic isn't good enough for me to have my own opinion but it seems to be supported by the Wiktionary entries ميثاق وثيقة. Alaexis¿question? 20:09, 8 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
My Arabic is pretty non-existent (though I have a rudimentary acquaintance with the Arabic alphabet). I can offer a few sources:
  • "... the Madinah charter is known in the Islamic history with several denominations. The Arabic words kitab, wathiqah, nahd, and sahifah, have been commonly used to denote the pact. It has been translated into English using various terms such as constitution, charter, covenant, treaty, contract and peace negotiation which all mean the same." [12]
  • Here is an English-Arabic dictionary where the entry وثيقة (wathiqah) reads: "Confidence, faith. A confederacy, compact, treaty, promise, engagement. A letter, writing, obligation." [13]
  • Another dictionary has: "Firmness, solidity. Confidence, faith. A confederacy, compact, treaty, promise, engagement, writing, obligation, bond, written agreement." [14]
Legrain says, in full, "By designating its text as a “wathîqa” (document), Hamas refers somewhere to his [sic] 1988 “mîthâq” (Charter)3 even if linguistically the wathîqa is supposed to be less binding and fixed". I understand Legrain to be saying, in his somewhat broken English, that he is aware that the two terms are cognate, and that he sees an intentional echo of "mithaq" in "wathiqa". Andreas JN466 21:23, 8 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
These dictionaries are a bit dated, the meaning might have changed.
Anyway, even if we assume that both terms are equally appropriate from the linguistic point of view, my main argument is that the article should have a name that is more neutral (everyone agrees it's a document but not everyone agrees that it's a charter) and a bit more widely used by RS. Alaexis¿question? 08:08, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You are wrong as I have shown with a detailed source analysis. The majority of RS use charter, and the overwhelming consensus in RS is that the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 charter. Therefore using "document" for the former and "charter" for the latter is a dishonest attempt to downplay the significance of it in violation of RS and every Wikipedia rule standard including the WP:CRITERIA for titles. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 08:13, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
“You are wrong” is a strangely vague remark after a long debate (4 posts) with various linguistic arguments from Alaexis and Andreas. You don’t react at all on what they say, you only promote your new source analysis. You also don’t react on my posting (8 July) just above the linguistic discussion. Please, see my new posting below, where I repeat to you my non-indoctrination argument I made yesterday. --Corriebertus (talk) 17:19, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The dictionaries are a bit dated, that's true. But if I google for وَثِيقَة English, one of the first results is [15], which offers:
وَثِيقَة
- act; bill; Certification; charter; deed; doc; document; indent; indenture; legal; Memo; muniments; paper; policy; proxy; record; script; voucher; waiver Andreas JN466 08:05, 10 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
On 8 July, I’ve argued here on logical grounds, that Jayen/Andreas, similarly to VR and Raskolnikov, prefers a title with the word ‘charter’ in it, because such title does, in Wikivoice, (further) enhance the idea in readers that the so-called ‘2017 charter’ fully replaces the 1988 charter (above the eventual statements of cited Reliable Sources in our article that also further such ideas in the readers but fairly and not in Wikivoice).
Later on 8 July, Andreas replies that linguistically the used Arabic word can be translated as ‘charter’. This can be true, and it is a new argument in our discussion. Words often have (near) equivalents in the same language, and can often be translated to several words in another language. So, we can choose between ‘charter’, ‘document’, and perhaps more possibilities. Hamas themselves chose to give the 2017doc in Arabic language a different name than their 1988doc. Most likely (and logically) they did so to indicate a difference in status, and to not suggest that the 2017doc replaced the 1988doc (as they’ve explicitly stated it doesn’t). In their own official English translation they chose the word ‘Document’(says one of our RS). Wikipedia has once chosen the word ‘charter’ for the 1988doc—which was not 100% inevitable but anyway it was our choice and I don’t intend to challenge or dispute that choice now. That being so, we in 2017 and later have again a choice for the new document: we can follow the example of Hamas and measuredly give it a different name, e.g. ‘document’, to avoid the too easy impression that 2017doc replaces 1988doc. Or we can do the opposite—as happened 4Dec2023,17:36—and give it (deliberately) the same name: ‘charter’, which inevitably suggests to the (not-informed) readers that the 2017doc replaces the 1988doc. As I argued here on 8July, this would be indoctrination on the part of Wikipedia (in Wikivoice) —(unless Rask might have prooved today that ‘charter’ is the WP:COMMONNAME which I haven’t yet been able to verify). Perhaps this was not the deliberate intention of Selfstudier with his Move on 4Dec2023, but since we’ve debated these options at length on this talk page, still opposing the Move back from ‘charter’ to ‘document’ means deliberately maintaining this indoctrination in Wikivoice. Andreas, VR and Raskolnikov have implicitly admitted they are aware of this ‘indoctrinating’ effect(as I showed above on 8July) but nevertheless prefer to keep the title as it is. Andreas does not react on this issue which I brought up here yesterday(neither does Rsk), comes only with this new argument for ‘charter’. If he would care for a neutral, not-indoctrinating Wikipedia, he (and Rsk) could and would by now support the above given arguments to replace the word ‘charter’ in the article title with for example ‘document’. --Corriebertus (talk) 17:19, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Oppose. Based on the source analysis in the sections above, "charter" appears to be the more common name. But also "charter" appears to be WP:CONSISTENT with 1988 Hamas charter and is also slightly more WP:CONCISE. VR (Please ping on reply) 09:46, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Vice regent: (Your first argument:)
    [#1]Do you have any argument(s) why (the ‘tally/tallies’ and/or the ‘scores(s)’ in) the table(s) presented in section #Updated table (which ‘score’ by the way has not been transparently made up and presented by anyone anywhere since my attempt here on 10 June) should be decisive in the dispute about article title?
    If ‘yes’ on [#1]: can you give that argument(s), and can you give the relevant tally(s) or score(s), for any version of that/those table(s) that you (have once) approve(d) of?
    If ‘no’ on [#1]:
    [#2]Do you have argument(s) why (such tallies(s)/score(s) in) those table(s) should play any role(s) whatsoever in (settling) that dispute? If ‘yes’ on [#2]: which role(s), and which argument(s), and which relevant score or tally have you read in the table?
    Personally, I think those ‘tallie(s)/score(s)’ in those table(s) cannot play any role in settling that dispute, which seems to be also the opinion of Raskolnikov: see my arguing in my posting above of 14June,22:14. --Corriebertus (talk) 05:52, 15 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent: (Your second argument:)
WP:CONSISTENT seems not a valid argument here. If 2017 charter/doc is assessed or perceived, by a considerable portion of ‘relevant commentators’, as being essentially different from charter 1988 – I’ve asked Alaexis to be more precise about that in his #Updated table – there’s nothing wrong from the viewpoint of ‘consistency’ with having title ‘2017 Document etc.’ for the 2017 charter/doc. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:35, 21 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Alternative (compromise!) proposal: If editors (e.g. Raskolnikov, 11June,21:23) are abhorred by the length (8 words) of the proposed title, we can, for my part, safely condense it into: ‘2017 Hamas political Document’. --Corriebertus (talk) 22:28, 13 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    No. The WP:COMMONNAME is charter, it is referred to as a charter by the majority of cited sources and other RS, and the attempt to try to downplay its status in relation to the 1988 charter through this renaming when the overwhelming consensus in the RS, including among those that refer to it as a document, is that it is of far greater significance violates WP:NPOV. Moreover as VR and Andreas also said that title also violates the WP:CRITERIA for WP:TITLES of "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency". So once again, the proposed title change falls afoul of all the Wikipedia standards for naming a page, whereas the current title meets all of them. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 06:01, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    That's fine by me. Alaexis¿question? 09:58, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis:, and others: The purpose of any Wikipedia talk page discussion, like this one too, should always be to respect the other ‘party’, take their concerns seriously, and try to find a compromise that partly satisfies both sides; not to destroy, obliterate that ‘other party’ by getting more votes than them (as seems to be the climate in many modern Western democracies like Germany, France, the Netherlands, the U.S.A., etc.). Raskolnikov certainly has a point by stating(11June,21:23) that our proposed new title is tiresomely long and is “clunky technical jargon”. Currently there are yet only two ‘support’ votes (while the RM seems also to be paused): Alaexis and me. Alaexis, can you ‘live’ with this alternative compromise? This shorter title is friendlier (better) for people who are not yet versed in these matters like we are, and for ‘those experts’ (‘us’) who are crowding these talk pages since two years there can be no doubt as to what is meant with ‘the 2017 Hamas political Document’. If ‘yes’: what is the practical way to organise this, to half-way adapt the RM proposal, while the RM has already started? Perhaps: simply renaming this RM proposal on the 2 or 3 formal locations where it is lodged, simply renaming this talk section and continue it, and friendly asking the very few people who have yet reacted here, to reconsider their own stance and arguments, in the light of the changed proposal. --Corriebertus (talk) 05:50, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
As I said I'm okay with it, but I'm a bit hesitant about changing the RM since the name 2017 Hamas policy document doesn't appear in this specific form in many sources. Maybe I can add something like this to the RM "If you're concerned about the length of the proposed new name, please indicate whether you'd support an alternative name 2017 Hamas policy document". WDYT? Alaexis¿question? 16:06, 14 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Having realised that I'd have to strike out from and add too many things to my original RM rationale, I decided to open a new RM, otherwise it would've been a mess. My apologies to everyone who has !voted and commented here. If your opinion has not changed please copy-paste your !votes. If there are no objections I'll collapse this thread in a while. Alaexis¿question? 21:05, 18 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

There is an objection in terms of the timing. Do not collapse the responses to this RM while the other one is ongoing, as it contains arguments that are relevant for it. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 05:12, 19 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Requested move 18 June 2025

[edit]
The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: no consensus. Both sides in this discussion made many wrong or unclear policy arguments. In the end, I don't see a strong enough case from either side to meet the standard of a "consensus." (closed by non-admin page mover) —Compassionate727 (T·C) 12:43, 24 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

2017 Hamas charter → Hamas Document of General Principles and Policies – The current title does not reflect how this document is most commonly and neutrally described in reliable sources, contrary to WP:COMMONNAME and WP:NPOV. An analysis of sources shows that sources more frequently use "document" or similar terms than "charter", even when generously counting sources that use "charter" only with qualifications like "could be considered." Among sources that consider whether this constitutes a charter, there is no consensus, with some explicitly noting the document "does not replace the charter."

The proposed title uses the official name given by Hamas, reflects the predominant terminology in sources, and maintains neutrality on the contested question of whether this document constitutes a new charter. If you're concerned about the length of the proposed title, please indicate whether an alternative 2017 Hamas policy document would be preferable.

The current name is the result of a move that was done without a RM despite being clearly controversial and was challenged almost immediately here, so it doesn't constitute a stable consensus version. Alaexis¿question? 21:02, 18 June 2025 (UTC) — Relisting. CoconutOctopus talk 17:50, 26 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Alaexis, please pause this RM for now. I have already looked at some of the sources you added to your updated "source analysis table" and you once again misrepresented them to falsely claim that it is the WP:COMMONNAME. You went around doing a fast Google search and added whatever you could find without bothering to look at the rest of the source or its context to once again pad it for the "document" side. I need more time to go over the rest and will then post the update. You also did not wait until I added the tab about whether the RS in question considers the 2017 charter to be more significant than the 1988 one even though I told you two days ago I was working on that. I will be able to get to it within several days.
You have now twice completely misrepresented what is in the sources, including removing sources that say "charter" even though you knew full well that they said that. I am becoming convinced now that you are deliberately falsifying information to get your way in this RM, which is in gross violation of Wiki rules.
Your claim about the current title not being the stable consensus version "because it was almost immediately challenged" is also false. The Talk page you linked to does not challenge the title change. It challenges content on the page about the 2017 Charter being considered more significant than the 1988 Charter, something that you incidentally said was wholly irrelevant as regards the title. Moreover that challenge was by one sole editor, it was responed to by another editor, and nothing else came of it. Now you are citing that as a "challenge" to the title to argue it is not the stable consensus version. What exactly are you doing here?
I will also repeat what I have said before as none of these arguments have been addressed whatsoever and make clear that the current title should stay as is:
  • Oppose "2017 Hamas charter" is the clear WP:COMMONNAME, and as WP:CRITERIA states, page titles should be named in accordance with "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency", and per WP:COMMONNAME ambiguous names should be avoided even if they are more widely used in RS, which is not the case here as I have shown in detail in my response to the RM creator Alaexis' so-called "source analysis" table, which reveals problematic behavior like the removal and omission of sources that ended up padding references to "document" and got it above "charter" in their tally ahead of making the RM. As I show there, the real tally is the opposite of what they claim, namely 13 for "charter" and 9 for "document".
Moreover, as I have also detailed in my response, the attempt to change it to "document" is itself in violation of WP:NPOV, as it is an attempt to downplay its significance in violation of the consensus view in RS, including those that use "document" such as Seurat, Legrain and Kear. All of these sources state that it marked a significant shift by codifying Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders and removing antisemitic verbiage, and all of them downplay the signifance of the 1988 charter as being representative of the Hamas movement's goals and aims.
By keeping the 1988 charter title as is and changing this to a overlong document title, it gives the impression that it is somehow of lesser value than the charter, when in fact the overwhelming consensus in the cited RS is that it is of much greater value in reflecting Hamas' officially codified consensus position. Once again, this would be a violation of WP:NPOV.
In short, "2017 Hamas Document of General Principles and Policies" falls afoul of all the Wikipedia standards for naming a page, whereas the current title of "2017 Hamas charter" meets all of them.
Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 05:10, 19 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The significance of the 2017 document compared to the 1988 charter is irrelevant - unless you can explain what part of WP:AT this argument is based on. Of course you may do this analysis regardless but I don't think that adding it to the table would be helpful. When I created the table I kept my interpretations and comments separate and only included the things relevant from the policy pov.
I've got access to and checked almost all sources in the table except for a few ones mentioned by u:VR here which I've added to the table assuming good faith. Considering the number of sources it's possible that there are minor errors. Let me know if you found something specific and I'll fix it, and please refrain from casting aspersions. Considering that the initial table was created on May 13 and the last major additions and overhaul was made on June 13-14, I don't think it makes sense to delay this RM further. You're right about the talk page link, I'll fix it. Alaexis¿question? 06:41, 19 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I already explained the argument in detail several times. You ignored it. Your use of "charter with qualifications" in the table falsely implies the authors believe the 2017 charter is less significant than the 1988 charter, when the overwhelming consensus is precisely the contrary. And the primary motivation behind the original RM, where you cited WP:NPOV, was that calling the 2017 charter a charter rather than a document wrongly assigns greater significance to it, hence the violation. Yet it is precisely the contrary: The overwhelming majority and consensus view is that the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 one, so it violates NPOV by changing it to imply the opposite. I will add that tab to the table, and correct your misrepresentations of the sources. Your refusal to pause it for a few days even though I have told you that your table misrepresents the sources, is yet another indication that you are not interested in going by what the RS says in determining the title. Other editors can draw their conclusions from that.
Also your new talk link for the supposed "immediate challenge" to the title change links to a talk page where one editor cites "taqqiya", an Islamophobic trope where all Muslims are said to be liars, to argue that the entire charter is meaningless. Ironically, this same editor makes the case against the charter title because they erroneously believe, in opposition to the consensus in RS, that the 1988 charter is more significant than the 2017 charter due to its supposed status as a "covenant". They then added more complaints about the content of the article, one editor replied, and that was it.
You are now citing that to argue that the title was properly challenged and so the current title is not the consensus stable version right after arguing that whether or not the consensus in RS is that the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 charter is wholly irrelevant to the question and shouldn't even be brought up as an argument for this RM. I again ask you, what exactly are you doing? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 07:25, 19 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Raskolnikov.Rev: I’ve criticized Alaexis and asked him to improve his ‘table’ (see my post below,20June). Now I have also a question for you.
What do you estimate the proportion to be, among the relevant observers and commentators of the Palestinian conflict worldwide, between them who say '[2017] charter' and them who say '[2017] Document' or similar? I don’t mind a very great margin of uncertainty in your answer, like for example: ‘between 30 and 70 % I estimate to say 'charter'’ (or 40–60 %, or 40–80 %, etc. etc.)?
Only contending that “"2017 Hamas charter" is the clear WP:COMMONNAME” without the merest argumentation for that stance seems to me no valid nor impressive argument in these RM debates at all.
Opinions of ‘sources like Kear, Legrain’ about ‘significant shift’ etc. ought to be in the article—I don’t understand why they’re not yet—but are no argument for any title.
‘Having title 'Document' would give some readers the impression that doc2017 is “somehow” less important than charter1988’ is not an argument against title 'Document': the fact (or opinion!?) of 2017 being better in “reflecting Hamas' officially codified consensus position” doesn’t necessarily mean that 1988 can’t be ‘somehow more important’ in other respects – at least in the perception of some readers; if we want to discourage readers from having such feelings or perceptions by choosing title 'charter' instead of 'Document' we are indoctrinating them. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:02, 21 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I can’t vote, yet. Currently, I can’t give any vote in this RM debate, because for me there is too much unclarity about the reliability and contents of the so-called (‘analysis of sources’ and) ‘Updated table’. (I’ve warned Alaexis on this talk page about the difficulties of making and using such a table, on 3 June 2025.) Read my detailed criticism now on talk page of Alaexis. [shortened my original posting here, 1 July.] --Corriebertus (talk) 17:02, 20 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Support. I support this move request, because the proposed title is (slightly) better, in the sense of less misleading our reading audience (into thinking the old charter has been fully replaced, which I believe is not so, at least is not admitted by Hamas). Nevertheless, some arguments given by Alaexis seem dubious; and I can understand why certain editors (VR, Rask) seem to oppose this title move – though many of their arguments also seem wrong or dubious. Certainly there are several (influential) sources who indicate the 2017 document as “charter”; but as yet it appears very hard, or impossible, to assess whether those sources would constitute a majority, or merely a significant minority. --Corriebertus (talk) 07:04, 1 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Raskolnikov has produced (9 July) a new so-called ‘source analysis table’, which he suggests to prove or support his stance that “charter” is the WP:COMMONNAME. However it remains fully unclear – after critical comments of two editors (9 and 10 July) – how he has compiled his roughly 79 ‘sources’. So, unfortunately, there’s no reason yet to assume this new table is unbiased and representative and can play an important role in this RM. --Corriebertus (talk) 06:54, 12 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The argument that our readers will be misled into thinking this document fully replaces the 1988 charter from the article title alone is an incredibly weak one. This is simply the title of the article - a WP:HEADLINE, which in itself does not always encompass all considerations and implications of a topic. That is better handled in the lead sentence - which as written, gives the detail that this is simply a new document. It's also better handled by the entirety of the lead section - which includes further sourced details about how "Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter." All of this information is quickly accessible to our readers in the lead section. PhotogenicScientist (talk) 16:21, 15 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Support. Document is more in line with the sources presented. Not all sources describe it as a charter replacing the previous one. Nehushtani (talk) 09:27, 30 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Oppose. "2017 Hamas charter" seems the most compliant with the entirety of the WP:TITLE policy.
Reminder that this article needs a "title", not a "name" - and while this document definitely has a "title", there's more to it than just using this as the title of the article.
Starting at the actual beginning of the policy (instead of at WP:COMMONNAME, which is so often done...), it's clear that for this document, "there is more than one appropriate title for an article." So, looking at the criteria for article titling, "2017 Hamas charter" is the better choice, and it's not particularly close.
  • Recognizability: The combination of "2017" and word "charter" plainly identify what document we're talking about here. Although, the alternate title is roughly the same in this criteria.
  • Naturalness: "2017 Hamas charter" is the clear winner here. This term is much more natural for searching (if you don't want to take my word for it, check Google search trends - even when compared to a more generic phrase like "Hamas document")
    • NGram is less useful in this case, due probably to how recently this document was published. Still, there is little relative change at all between usages of "charter" or "document" starting around 2017, showing that that authors don't have a far-and-away first preference for which to use for this document.
  • Precision: Both titles unambiguously identify the article's subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.
  • Concision: Yet again, "2017 Hamas charter" is the clear winner here. It's a much shorter way to identify the article's subject and distinguish it from other subjects.
  • Consistency: Though the last (and imo lowest) of criteria, "2017 Hamas charter" also wins here. It's consistent with the title of our article on another Hamas document that outlines "the basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group" - i.e. a charter.
Personally, I see little creedence to opposition to this much more natural language phrase. But I'm absolutely open to hearing a concise counter argument, without having to read the entirety of the past 13 months(!!) of discussion about this. PhotogenicScientist (talk) 15:50, 15 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
More strongly oppose now that I've got a better idea of the differences between "mithaq" (the Arabic word used in the title of the 1988 Hamas charter) and "wathiqa" (the word used in the title of this document.
While it was difficult for this non-arabic speaker to find definitional sources on these terms, I've generally found that they both mean some sort of agreement or promise. "Mithaq" seems to most closely mean "covenant", implying the highest level of authority - in some contexts, from divinity itself. Whereas "wathiqa" seems to translate to either "confidence" or "document" - though the word is used in the title of one of the most ancient constitutions in the Islamic world. While it definitely seems that a "mithaq" is meant as a more binding agreement or promise, "wathiqa" in context can also refer to a very strong agreement or constitution.
As I noted above, "charter" and "constitution" in English are near synonyms. "Charter" seems a fine translation for "wathiqa" from an etymological standpoint. And the fact that so many English-speaking sources use "charter" establishes even more of a basis to use this translation. I do believe that it's extremely relevant that Hamas titled this document as "wathiqa", while the old charter was called "mithaq", for the reason that many of the sources linked at this Talk page identify - they did not want to anger more traditional or radical members by outright repudiating or replacing the old charter. This is a bit of context that must remain in the article.
(truthfully, "1988 Hamas covenant" might be a better title for the article on the older document, in the context of this document now existing. However, that document clearly has a WP:COMMONNAME in English now as a "charter" - there was some initial usage calling it a "covenant," but "charter" clearly became the preferred translation. And we're not really here to WP:RIGHTGREATWRONGS in translation.) PhotogenicScientist (talk) 15:06, 16 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@PhotogenicScientist: Thanks for joining this debate with your elaborate contribution. Ofcourse you make a correct point about Concision, saying the proposed title(7 words long) is very much longer—someone called it “clunky technical jargon”, which it indeed is. On the other hand: an unpleasant truth quite often can take much more words to express than an oversimplified slogan. Just tell me: why do our colleagues of the German Wikipedia call this page de:Hamas-Grundsatzpapier (‘paper/document with principles’)? It’s not because their language doesn’t know the word Hamas-Charta (‘charter’). This extreme length and clunkiness of the proposed title can be remedied though – though perhaps I should start a new discussion for that – with title ‘2017 Hamas policy document’, or ‘2017 Hamas 'charter' or 'document' ’. But if title ‘2017 charter’ is misleading(indoctrination), as I’ve argued above(1July) and Nehushtani has confirmed, your argument on Naturalness naturally fails: if most readers are ‘indoctrinated’ enough to search on ‘2017 charter’, that should not force us to choose what we (arguedly) consider a needlessly wrong (propagandistic) title. Your argument on Consistency even fails badly and ‘loudly’, as I’ve already told VR(21June, previous discussion). A group can only have one ‘paper of basic principles’ at the time, so adopting a new one means discarding the old one (which Hamas clearly doesn’t); but it’s even total madness(pardon my French) to suggest that if one policy paper of any group bears title ‘charter’, every other slightly similar paper of them – perhaps different on an important aspect – should therefore (‘consistently’!??) also be titled ‘charter’!? That would equal washing all the subtleties of human language down the drain as silly redundant twaddle!
You furthermore dismiss my argument about misleading (some) readers, you say ‘this is just the title’ and all such further considerations can be handled in the lead section (as they mostly are). This reasoning of you neglects, ignores the enormous image-forming (‘propagandistic’) impact of a title – especially on people who rush past and see nothing more than just that title.
I understand your reasoning around mithaq and wathiqa, but in all that verbosity the (i.m.o.) essential fact (which you even affirm!) that the two documents have different names(titles) in Arabic is somehow manoeuvred out of our sight and attention. With all due respect, --Corriebertus (talk) 17:01, 16 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Seeing as this topic area is fraught enough as it is, I'll ask you to drop the WP:Battleground language that dominates your reply ("propagandistic" "madness" "indoctrinated" "twaddle").
To answer some of your points in order:
  • Your argument to the German wiki's treatment of this topic falls under WP:OTHERCONTENT.
  • Your argument against Naturalness is wrong on its head. It is a Policy that literally compels us to consider what "readers are likely to look or search for" - whether we think those readers are "indoctrinated" or not.
  • Your argument that "a group can only have one ‘paper of basic principles’ at the time" is also perplexing. Western governments add to their corpus of governing documentary all the time. Does the United States not have a Declaration of Independence (where they outline their principles), and a Constitution (which is made of many sections, which could by reasonable convention could be considered separate documents), and a Bill of Rights (which could even more plausibly be considered a separate document), and guide on Rules and Resources for the House of Representatives (which lays out additional principles and procedures for this particular governing body)... this seems an odd line in the sand to draw - Hamas shall publish no more documents unless they invalidate previous, similar documents?
  • "Charter" is a plain english word with many possible meanings. It is not unreasonable to consider multiple related or similar documents all as "charters" - especially when looking at foreign cultures, and trying to translate their intentions to english.
And this article is not meant to serve people who "rush past and see nothing more than just that title" - it's meant to serve people who want to find and learn about the topic subject. It's for those people that the article should be titled. PhotogenicScientist (talk) 18:10, 16 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
OPPOSE for reasons PhotogenicScientist stated. The common/regular Wikipedia reader will search for “Hamas charter”. The main purpose of titles is to help readers find the content they are searching for. The current title is used in sources, it is concise and accurately conveys the content of the article and is accessible for readers to find. All this makes “2017 Hamas Charter” the preferable title. Dualpendel (talk) 21:42, 17 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Ambiguous or inaccurate names for the article subject, as determined in reliable sources, are often avoided even though they may be more frequently used by reliable sources, is also stated in the policy. Calling it a “charter” induces readers to assume the original charter is abolished (which it is not); this is misleading, on the part of Wikipedia, who has alternative names to choose that are not or less misleading. The argument of “help readers find the content they are searching for” (Naturalness) may technically seem to plead for title ‘charter’, but seems in this specific case of (very) little importance (less than the importance of ‘not misleading readers’), because the overwhelming majority of readers will search for the article ‘2017 charter’ only after they’ve heard of its existence in a Wikipedia article, so they’ll have an already functioning wikilink at hand. --Corriebertus (talk) 17:25, 23 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
"Ambiguous name" it is not. "Inaccurate name" it is not either. I've explained sufficiently well that "wathiqa" may be translated into English as "charter" or "constitution." PhotogenicScientist (talk) 19:03, 23 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion

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Comment I have posted an update of the source analysis table fixing source errors in the Alaexis version and adding more sources including those he misrepresented and neglected to include despite being told multiple times.

The majority of RS call it a "charter" alongside the official title. Of the tier 1 RS this is 11 for "charter" as opposed to 6 for only "document", tier 2 is 27 for "charter" as opposed to 9 for only "document", and tier 3 is 24 for "charter" with 2 for only "document". This makes "charter" the clear WP:COMMONNAME.

More importantly, the overwhelming consensus in the RS is that the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 one. Of the 79 sources in total, 63 say the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 charter in determining the views of Hamas as a movement, while only 8 say the 1988 charter is more significant (and 8 others do not express a view).

Also, Alaexis says what the sources say about the significance of the 2017 charter versus the 1988 charter is irrelevant even though he cited as a legitimate challenge to the new title someone making that exact point, arguing the 1988 charter is more significant and hence the title is bad because it downplays that. Furthermore, the only way the WP:NPOV argument he made in the initial RM makes sense is per that argument. However, if you look at the table I posted with that information included, the overwhelming consensus in RS is the exact opposite, stating the 2017 charter is much more significant than the 1988 one. Hence it would be a gross violation of WP:NPOV and also of RS to downplay that fact.

Also the current title meets all the WP:CRITERIA for titles: "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency" as I explained, whereas the rename violates all of them.

The rename would therefore violate every Wikipedia rule, whereas the current one is in congruence with them. @Vice regent @Jayen466 you participated in the now closed RM so here's a ping alerting you to the new one here. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 08:04, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Naming of the 2017 document/charter - analysis of sources

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The table below contains the sources that discuss the 2017 document or reference it in greater or less detail. Its first version was created when I tried to tabulate all the sources that were used in this article and in the Hamas article, as well as the sources mentioned in discussions on this talk page. Several editors, including myself, brought up more sources after that with the last ones added on June 17. Since editors holding different opinions contributed to this list, I believe that by now it covers pretty much all the sources that discuss the politics and ideology of Hamas published since 2017 and most of scholarly sources that mention the charter/document.

The purpose of this table is to demonstrate that the current name "2017 Hamas charter" is used by a minority of sources. Since it's non-neutral (not everyone agrees that it's a charter), it cannot be used as a "non-neutral but common name" (WP:POVNAME).

Among the sources that actually consider the question of whether the 2017 document can be considered a new charter there is no consensus:

Seurat, Leila (2019). The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 18 :

Hroub, A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter :

Legrain, Hamas According to Hamas, A reading of its Document of General Principles (part of Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, p. 79) :

Alsoos, From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas’s discourse in the framework of mobilization :

Finally, Hamas itself called the document وﺛﻴﻘﺔwathiqa rather than ميثاق mithaq, like the 1988 charter. We should do the same and use the neutral and accurate name 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies.

Tier 1: High Weight - Direct Academic Treatment

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Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar Notes
Hroub, Khaled (2017-08-01). "A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter". Journal of Palestine Studies. 46 (4): 102. doi:10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.100. ISSN 0377-919X. Yes with qualifications Yes "Document of General Principles and Policies" that "could be considered Hamas's new charter"
Alsoos, Imad (2021-09-03). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. ISSN 0026-3206. Yes with qualifications Yes "Hamas's 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies – widely regarded as its new charter"
Seurat, Leila (2019). The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 18. ISBN 9781838607449. Yes Calls it a "document"
Musgrave, Nina (2023). "Hamas's Quest for Legitimacy". In Maher, Shiraz; Cook, Joana (eds.). The Rule Is for None but Allah. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197690390. Yes with qualifications Yes "'A Document of General Principles and Policies,' which was seen by some to be a new Charter"
"Charters of Hamas". Contemporary Review of the Middle East. 4 (4): 393–418. 2017-11-01. doi:10.1177/2347798917727905. ISSN 2347-7989. Yes "new charter"
Kear, Martin (2018). "Hamas' ideological evolution". Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Democratization and Government. Routledge. ISBN 9780429999406. Yes "a new policy document"
* Brenner, Bjorn (2022). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 206. Yes
Milton-Edwards, Beverley; Farrell, Stephen (2024-06-24). "Changing of the Guard". HAMAS: The Quest for Power. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-5095-6494-1. Yes with attribution Yes "In one of his last acts as leader, Meshaal said the 1988 founding charter of the group had been updated and revised. The new document had Hamas..."
Legrain, Jean-François (2020). "Hamas according to Hamas: A reading of its Document of General Principles". In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Political Islam. Routledge. pp. 79–90. doi:10.4324/9780429425165. ISBN 978-1-138-35389-3. Yes Called "Document of General Principles and Policies"
Polka, S. (2017). "Hamas as a Wasati (Literally: Centrist) Movement: Pragmatism within the Boundaries of the Sharia". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 42 (7): 683–713. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2017.1402432. Yes "A Document of General Principles and Policies"
Berti, Benedetta (2019). "Religion and politics in Palestine The case of Hamas". In Haynes, Jeffrey (ed.). The Routledge Handbook to Religion and Political Parties. Routledge. p. 329. ISBN 9781032239361. Yes "Indeed, in 2017, Hamas published an updated ideological manifesto. This document, the ‘Document of General Principles and Policies’ ..."
Kear, Martin (2022). "Wasatiyyah and Hamas's modulating positions on the two-state solution and Israel: finding the middle path". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 76 (1): 57–75. doi:10.1080/10357718.2021.1926421. Yes "a new policy document"

Tier 2: Medium Weight - Academic Works with Incidental Coverage

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Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar Notes
Luz, Nimrod (2023-09-07). The Politics of Sacred Places: A View from Israel-Palestine. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 163. ISBN 978-1-350-29573-5. Yes "the current charter of Hamas" (brief reference)
Ayoob, Mohammed; Lussier, Danielle Nicole (2020). The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in Muslim Societies. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-03765-0. Yes Yes Mixed terminology: refers to "new charter" (p.124) and "2017 charter" (p.125) but also calls it "2017 statement"
Schulz, Michael (2020). Between Resistance, Sharia Law, and Demo-Islamic Politics. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 72. ISBN 978-1-5381-4610-1. Yes "2017 Charter"
Slater, Jerome (2020). Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917-2020. Oxford University Press. pp. 333–334. ISBN 978-0-19-045909-3. Yes "new charter"
Radonic, Ljiljana (2021). "New Antisemitism and New Media: Leftist Derealization of Islamist "Emancipation"". In Lange, Armin; Mayerhofer, Kerstin; Porat, Dina; Schiffman, Lawrence H. (eds.). Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. ISBN 978-3-11-067203-9. Yes "a new policy paper" and notes "the paper does not replace the charter"
Burke, Paul; Elnakhala, Doaa'; Miller, Seumas, eds. (2021). Global Jihadist Terrorism: Terrorist Groups, Zones of Armed Conflict and National Counter-Terrorism Strategies. Political science and public policy: the Elgaronline political science and public policy subject collection. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781800371309. Yes "2017 document"
Maria Koinova. Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States. Oxford University Press. p. 150. Yes "The 2017 Hamas charter accepted a Palestinian state with 1967 borders, but still without recognizing Israel"
Lagervall, Rickard (2021). "The Muslim Brotherhood". In Upal, Muhammad Afzal; Cusack, Carole M. (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill. p. 82. ISBN 978-90-04-42525-5. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.23. Retrieved 2023-11-26. Yes a "document with general principles and policies" (brief reference)
Spoerl, Joseph S. (2020). "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism". Jewish Political Studies Review. 31 (1/2): 210–244. ISSN 0792-335X. JSTOR 26870795. Yes Calls it "2017 'Document'" (brief reference)
Bartal, Shaul (2021). "Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement". In Upal, Muhammad Afzal; Cusack, Carole M. (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill. p. 397. ISBN 978-90-04-42525-5. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.23. Retrieved 2023-11-26. Yes Calls it "A Document of General Principles and Policies" (brief reference)
Mintz, Alex; Chatagnier, Tyson; Samban, Yair (2019). Terrorist Decision-Making: A Leader-Centric Approach. Contemporary Terrorism Studies. Routledge. ISBN 9780429515439. Yes "new policy document" (brief mention)
Timea Spitka (2023). "Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities". National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Springer International Publishing. p. 88-89. Yes "2017 Document of General Principles and Policies" (brief reference)
Gaza's Cycle of Destruction and Rebuilding: Understanding the Actors, Dynamics, and Responses (1st 2024 ed.). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. 2024. ISBN 9783031671975. Yes Yes p. 81 "On the other side, in May 2017, Hamas has officially revealed its new (amended) charter in Doha, Qatar..." p. 44 "In Article 16 of the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies, the movement affirmed that "its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion""
"Fragile Stability" as a Political Background of October 7: Current and Foreseeable Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1st 2025 ed.). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2025. ISBN 9789819625864. Yes Yes p. 142 "As outlined in Hamas' new charter, announced by Meshal in May 2017, this policy was a..." p. 19 "Hamas revised its original charter of 1988 and issued a new document called the Principles Document and Public Policies in May 2017, and moderated its positions in many ways"
Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2023). The Arab-Israeli conflict: a ringside view. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781000871845. Yes "Hamas charter, revised May 2017"
Responses to 7 October: law and society. London New York: Routledge. 2024. ISBN 9781040101582. Yes "The 2017 charter just as they were in the 1988 one."
Schulz, Michael (2020). Between resistance, sharia law, and demo-Islamic politics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 72. ISBN 9781538146101. Yes "In the 2017 Charter we see a shift in language in relation to Israel."
Israel-Palestine: lands and peoples. New York: Berghahn. 2021. ISBN 9781800731295. Yes "In 2017 Hamas replaced its charter and removed these references."
Key concepts in the study of antisemitism. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 2021. p. 46. ISBN 9783030516581. Yes "The revised 2017 Charter of the Palestinian group Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, departs from its earlier rhetoric..."
Esposito, John L.; Zubaidah Rahim, Lily; Ghobadzadeh, Naser. The Politics of Islamism Diverging Visions and Trajectories. Springer. p. 261. ISBN 9783319622569. Yes "2017 policy document"
Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches by Hani Awad Yes "a statement of principles and general policies."
Christie, Niall (2020). Crusaders: Christianity's Wars in the Middle East, 1095–1382, from the Islamic Sources. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781351007344. Yes
Mintz, Alex; Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima), eds. (2019). "The decision calculus of Khaled Meshaal". How Do Leaders Make Decisions? Evidence from the East and West, Part B. Emerald Publishing Limited. p. 95. ISBN 9781838678111. Yes "new policy document"
Kear, Martin (2018). "The Dilemmas of Dual Resistance: Hamas and Political Learning in Gaza". The Politics of Islamism. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319622569. Yes "new policy document"

Tier 3: Lower Weight - Media and Think Tank

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Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar Notes
Levitt & Rich, Hamas's Moderate Rhetoric Belies Militant Activities Yes Calls it a "new statement"
Dunning, New Hamas Charter: Too little, too late? Yes Explicitly calls it a "new charter"

Note: I've checked almost all the sources in this table. I wasn't able to access three sources that use "charter" but I've added them assuming good faith. Alaexis¿question? 21:19, 22 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Alaexis check out my most recent addition to my entry in the RM above. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on "wathiqa" vs "mithaq." PhotogenicScientist (talk) 15:07, 16 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
For the most part I agree with your analysis. However, the name should also satisfy wp:npov and the "charter" option is clearly worse since quite a few sources don't think that it's a charter. When it comes to most other criteria it's a draw (2018 Hamas document is just as concise). Sorry for the delayed response. Alaexis¿question? 21:15, 22 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Naming of the 2017 document/charter - Updated analysis of sources

[edit]

I have updated and fixed the source analysis table. As you can see, the majority of RS call it a "charter" alongside the official title. Of the tier 1 RS this is 11 for "charter" as opposed to 6 for only "document", tier 2 is 27 for "charter" as opposed to 9 for only "document", and tier 3 is 24 for "charter" with 2 for only "document". This makes "charter" the clear WP:COMMONNAME.

More importantly, the overwhelming consensus in the RS is that the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 one. Of the 79 sources in total, 63 say the 2017 charter is more significant than the 1988 charter in determining the views of Hamas as a movement, while only 8 say the 1988 charter is more significant (and 8 others do not express a view). This makes renaming the title of this page and all references to the 2017 charter across Wikipedia to "document" so as to minimize its value in relation to the 1988 one, which is what some editors have been trying to do for a long time now, constitutes an grave violation of WP:NPOV. Moreover, the renaming of the title violates all the criteria set out in WP:CRITERIA for titles of "recognizability, naturalness, precision, concision, consistency", as I explained here.

More about the table: I have added more RS and fixed the sources Alaexis added by doing a fast Google search without looking at the content of the sources. He also recently added two more sources to pad the "document" side. The first is the "Esposito, John L.; Zubaidah Rahim, Lily; Ghobadzadeh, Naser" source. But they do not use "document", they use "charter" in the introduction on page 7. So what then is page 261 that Alaexis cited it for? It is a double use of Martin Kear that was already separately included as: "Kear, Martin (2018). "The Dilemmas of Dual Resistance: Hamas and Political Learning in Gaza". The Politics of Islamism. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319622569". But he did not specify the author or title of that chapter to make it appear as if it's a separate author who used "document". This is one of the now several falsehoods Alaexis has introduced to his source analysis table to pad the "document" side. Kear, along with the volume editors, are also among those who stated that the 2017 charter supersedes and is more significant than the 1988 charter.

The second source he added, "Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches by Hani Awad", only uses the official title of the charter in a footnote, where he explicitly notes that it was superseded by other Hamas documents prior to the 2017 charter: "In 2017 it was superseded by a "statement of principles and general policies." Yet Alaexis added it as part of the "document" side of the tally to create the false impression that they believe the 1988 charter to be more significant than the 2017 one.

This is the fundamental flaw of the table as it was made by Alaexis, as I pointed out in my replies here and here.

To fix this, I added a tab indicating how each of the RS assigns significance to the 2017 vis-à-vis the 1988 charter. I have added 2017 for all the sources that assign greater significance to the 2017 charter, by stating that it is the revised, new, updated charter or document superseding the 1988 charter; that by contrast to 1988 charter it represents the consensus view of the Hamas movement rather than being the narrow views of a few isolated figures as was the case for the promulgation of the 1988 charter; that the 1988 charter already was already superseded by other documents from the 1990s and 2000s, and therefore of little to no significance in indicating the views of Hamas.

I have done the same for the sources that state the 1988 charter is more significant, or that deny the significance of the 2017 charter.

As you can see, of all the substantial academic texts analyzing the 2017 charter, they believe it is of greater significance in understanding the views of Hamas than the 1988 charter.

Only very few other sources state the opposite.

Alaexis sought to obscure this ahead of the RM by not including this essential information at all and instead using the meaningless "charter, with qualifications" designation to create the mistaken impression that there is a great deal of contention in the RS on the question of significance, whereas in reality the overwhelming consensus is that the 2017 charter is much more significant than the 1988 charter, which is deemed to be of little to no significance at all in understanding Hamas' views and policies.

Once again, this means to the contrary of what Alaexis has claimed, it would be a gross violation of WP:NPOV to alter the title of this page and downplay the significance of the 2017 charter in relation to the 1988 one, alongside violationg WP:COMMONNAME and WP:CRITERIA for titles.

Tier 1: High Weight - Direct Academic Treatment

[edit]
Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar 2017 or 1988 more significant Notes
Hroub 2017, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 102 Yes Yes 2017 (the chapter focuses on the evolution of Hamas views from one chapter [correction --Corriebertus (talk) 07:35, 11 July 2025 (UTC)] charter to the other)[reply] "Document of General Principles and Policies" that "could be considered Hamas's new charter" p100 "what is de facto Hamas’s new charter" p102
Alsoos 2021, From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization Yes Yes 2017 ("officially Hamas no longer defines itself as a ‘jihadist movement’,Footnote136 as stated in the 1988 Charter and the 1993 Introductory Memorandum, but a ‘muqawama movement’,Footnote137 as stipulated in the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies.") "Hamas's 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies – widely regarded as its new charter" "In Hamas’s new charter" "While the Introductory Memorandum aimed to redefine Hamas, it was not introduced as an alternative charter like the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies."
Brenner, Gaza under Hamas (2022 edition), p. 206 Yes Yes 2017 ("Hamas issued a new and comprehensive policy document, adding it to its 30-year-old and much-criticised charter. This new document, a new charter, included substantial revisions of Hamas’s policy positions, including a de facto recognition of Israel, while removing its previous anti-Semitic language and religious overtones." p204 "Following years of internal deliberations, the different parts of Hamas had managed to come together to formulate, negotiate and finally ratify by consensus a text considered by many on the inside as very controversial" p205 "several Hamas leaders nevert responded affirmatively that ‘The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement’s bookshelf as a record of our past.’" p206) "Hamas’s First Change: Issuing a New Charter" p205 "While Hamas did not explicitly name the new document its ‘Charter’, due to a lack of internal consensus on that; in practice, this was precisely what it was." p206 "the

new charter went largely unnoticed" p208

Milton-Edwards & Farrell, HAMAS: The Quest for Power, chapter Changing of the Guard Yes Yes 2017 ("In one of his last acts as leader, Meshaal said the 1988 founding charter of the group had been updated and revised." p378) "In one of his last acts as leader, Meshaal said the 1988 founding charter of the group had been updated and revised. The new document had Hamas..." p378 "The language in the revised charter" But even before the charter’s revisions" p379 "In the Qatari capital Doha, the Hamas leadership present their new and revised charter-covenant" p468
Musgrave, Nina (2023). "Hamas's Quest for Legitimacy" Yes with qualifications Yes "'A Document of General Principles and Policies,' which was seen by some to be a new Charter"
Tristan Dunning, Palestine: Past and Present p21, 178, 180, 192 Yes Yes 2017 On 1 May 2017, Hamas released the “Document of General Principles and Policies” after years of speculation that the movement would rearticulate and publicly codify its evolving political platform, which has been widely interpreted as the movement’s new charter. The document reiterates a variety of longstanding positions, both expressed by the leadership and in policy documents, while articulating some new directions in a coherent document bearing the official imprimatur of the movement
Charters of Hamas, Contemporary Review of the Middle East (editors) 2017 Yes 2017 ("Given its significance, the latest as well as the 1988 Charters are reproduced here." p. 393) "new charter"
Dunning, New Hamas Charter: Too little, too late? Yes 2017 ("they haven't used the [original] charter as point of reference for the movement's policies for over 20 years", ) Explicitly calls it a "new charter"
Tristan Dunning, Martin Kear, Imad Alsoos, "Whither Palestine?" in Palestine: Past and Present p235 Yes 2017 "Hamas’ new 2017 charter officially codifying the possibility of a two state solution with Israel is a welcome development."
Colter Louwerse, "Is Hamas to Blame for the Failure to Resolve the Israel-Palestine Conflict?" in Deluge: Gaza and Israel from Crisis to Cataclysm p. 73-74 Yes 2017 "This pragmatic compromise was formalized by Hamas’s adoption of a new covenant in 2017. Supplanting the “outdated” as well as antisemitic original, Hamas’s “de-facto” new Charter stipulated that, whereas Hamas itself would not recognize Israel, the movement would accept the reality of Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders as “a formula of national consensus.” This positioned Hamas closer to the international consensus framework for resolving the conflict than every mainstream political party in Israel."
Milton-Edwards, 2017, "Is Hamas rebranding to orient towards Egypt?" Yes 2017 And the new charter... the revised charter...
Seurat, The foreign policy of Hamas: ideology, decision making and political supremacy, p. 18 Yes 2017 ("Since 2006, they had been debating the opportunity of providing Hamas with a new political document that would reflect the movement’s current strategy in a more comprehensive way than the Charter." p17 "The Charter illustrates the period of the 1980s and the Document of General Principles presents our policy in 2017. Each document belongs to a specific period" p18 "Khaled Mesh’al describes the Document of General Principles and Policies published on 1 May 2017 as a new political benchmark for Hamas" p62) Calls it a "document"
Kear, Hamas and Palestine, chapter "Hamas' ideological evolution" Yes 2017 ("The new document was also an attempt by Hamas to expound to Palestinians and the international community how Hamas was a more flexible and adaptive movement politically, and whose current ideological narrative had little in common with its Charter. Hamas hoped that the new policy document would serve as a new ideological reference point for the movement that would supersede the Charter." p61) "a new policy document"
Legrain, HAMAS ACCORDING TO HAMAS A reading of its Document of General Principles Yes 1988 ("The silence of the Document on the Charter and Khaled Meshaal, which avoids the question of its repeal can only refer to the fact that it is not repealed." p88) Called "Document of General Principles and Policies"
Sagi Polka Hamas as a Wasati (Literally: Centrist) Movement, p. 1 Yes 2017 (p22) "A Document of General Principles and Policies"
Berti, Benedetta (2019). "Religion and politics in Palestine The case of Hamas". In Haynes, Jeffrey (ed.). The Routledge Handbook to Religion and Political Parties. Routledge. p. 329. ISBN 9781032239361. Yes 2017 ("Nor has Hamas’s religious framework as articulated in the 1988 Charter prevented the organisation from further debating and adapting its overall ideological framework based on the evolving political and security environment. Indeed, in 2017, Hamas published an updated ideological manifesto." p329) "Indeed, in 2017, Hamas published an updated ideological manifesto. This document, the ‘Document of General Principles and Policies’ ..."
Kear, Martin (2022). "Wasatiyyah and Hamas's modulating positions on the two-state solution and Israel: finding the middle path". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 76 (1): 57–75. doi:10.1080/10357718.2021.1926421. Yes 2017 ("Indeed, Hamas intended that the policy document would supersede its Charter and serve as the movement’s new ideological locus.") "a new policy document"

Tier 2: Medium Weight - Academic Works with Incidental Coverage

[edit]
Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar 2017 or 1988 more significant Notes
Ayoob & Lussier 2020, The Many Faces of Political Islam Yes Yes 2017 ("Hamas’s ideological flexibility is borne out, above all, by clearly calibrated changes between its 1988 founding charter and the new charter it issued in 2017" p124 "Hamas’s 2017 description of itself places greater emphasis on its nationalist and resistance character" p124) Mixed terminology: refers to "new charter" (p.124) and "2017 charter" (p.125) but also calls it "2017 statement"
Gaza's Cycle of Destruction and Rebuilding: Understanding the Actors, Dynamics, and Responses (1st 2024 ed.). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. 2024. ISBN 9783031671975. Yes Yes 2017 "On the other side, in May 2017, Hamas has officially revealed its new (amended) charter in Doha, Qatar..." p. 81 "In Article 16 of the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies, the movement affirmed that "its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion"" p. 44
"Fragile Stability" as a Political Background of October 7: Current and Foreseeable Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1st 2025 ed.). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2025. ISBN 9789819625864. Yes Yes 2017 p. 142 "As outlined in Hamas' new charter, announced by Meshal in May 2017, this policy was a..." p. 19 "Hamas revised its original charter of 1988 and issued a new document called the Principles Document and Public Policies in May 2017, and moderated its positions in many ways"
Schulz, Michael (2020). Between resistance, sharia law, and demo-Islamic politics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 72. ISBN 9781538146101. Yes 2017 ("this was most likely one reason why they revised and published the new charter of 2017" p71 "another interviewed leader also had earlier said that the leadership rarely referred to the 988 Charter" p71) - the book compares the evolution between the two chapters on numerous ocassions emphasizing the new version "2017 Charter"
Slater 2020, Mythologies Without End, p. 334 Yes 2017 ("As early as 2009, Hamas began moving away from its 1988 Charter... In May of that year, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal said that the charter should be ignored... Meshal and other Hamas leaders reiterated that the charter no longer described the practical goals of the organization. Finally, in May 2017 [...] a new charter was issued" p333) "new charter"
Luz 2023, The Politics of Sacred Places, p. 163 Yes 2017 ("in the original charter of Hamas... In the current charter" p163) "in the current charter of Hamas" (brief reference)
Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States Yes 2017 (no mention of the other charter) "The 2017 Hamas charter accepted a Palestinian state with 1967 borders, but still without recognizing Israel" p150
Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2023). The Arab-Israeli conflict: a ringside view. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781000871845. Yes 2017 "Its revised charter, published in 2017," p190
Responses to 7 October: law and society. London New York: Routledge. 2024. ISBN 9781040101582. Yes 2017 (qualifies the issuance of the 2017 charter as a "rebranding", p43) "The 2017 charter just as they were in the 1988 one."
Israel-Palestine: lands and peoples. New York: Berghahn. 2021. ISBN 9781800731295. Yes 2017 "In 2017 Hamas replaced its charter and removed these references."
Key concepts in the study of antisemitism. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 2021. p. 46. ISBN 9783030516581. Yes 2017 "The revised 2017 Charter of the Palestinian group Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, departs from its earlier rhetoric..."
Christie, Niall (2020). Crusaders: Christianity's Wars in the Middle East, 1095–1382, from the Islamic Sources. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781351007344. Yes 2017 "However, in 2017, Hamas produced a new, much more moderate charter" p162
Esposito, John L.; Zubaidah Rahim, Lily; Ghobadzadeh, Naser, "Introduction: Theological Contestations and Political Coalition-Building" in The Politics of Islamism Diverging Visions and Trajectories, p. 7 Yes 2017 As Kear highlights (in this volume), this uncertain era has prompted Hamas in 2017 to promulgate a new Charter in recognition that its past strategy of armed resistance is unsustainable and that flexible political approaches and discourses are imperative in realising its goal of establishing an independent Palestinian state
Skare 2025, "Road to October 7: A Brief History of Palestinian Islamism" p192 Yes Mishal, its architect, hoper that the document would create consensus... rather than considering the charter a moderation of Hamas... Hamas's efforts to revise its charter in 2017
Hirsch, Freedman 2024, "Responses to 7 October: Law and Society" Yes
Weiser, Ury, Goldberg 2020, "Key Concepts in the Study of Antisemitism" p46 Yes the revised 2017 Charter of the Palestinian group Hamas
Mishal 2022, "Gaza under Hamas" p.xii Yes 2017 This

new de facto charter depicts the movement as tracing wasatiyya, ‘the middle road’, between extremism and flexibility.

Perez 2023, "Understanding Zionism: History and Perspectives" p190 Yes some argue that Article 20 of their revised 2017 charter implies the possibility of conceding to the 1967 borders
Christie 2020, "Muslims and Crusaders" Yes 2017 However, in 2017, Hamas produced a new, much more moderate charter
Lentin 2025, "The New Racial Regime: Recalibrations of White Supremacy" Yes 2017 In fact, the 2017 Hamas charter states, ‘Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion
Wizfeld 2018, "The Federation of Palestinian and Hebrew Nations" p.xv Yes 2017 The current 2017 version of the Hamas Charter has annulled this defect
Harrison 2020, "Blaming the Jews" Yes 2017 In 2017, Hamas issued a new charter... the 2017 charter... Article 16 of the new charter reads...
Fraihat, Stevenson 2023, "Conflict Mediation in the Arab World" p.299 Yes 2017 In May 2017, Hamas published a new political charter that reflected a policy change
Baroud 2017, "New Charter: Should Hamas Rewrite the Past?" Yes 2017 On May 1, Hamas introduced a new Charter, entitled: “A Document of General Principles and Policies.”
Schulz 2020, Between Resistance Sharia Law and Democracy, p. 72 Yes 2017 "2017 Charter"
Slater 2020, Mythologies Without End, p. 334 Yes 2017 "new charter"
Nishikida, Ezaki, Tsujita 2025, "“Fragile Stability” as a Political Background of October 7" p.142 Yes 2017 As outlined in Hamas new charter, announced by Meshal in 2017
Radonic 2021, Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media Yes 1988 "a new policy paper" and notes "the paper does not replace the charter" (could not find this as a direct quote)
Paul Burke, Doaa' Elnakhala, Seumas Miller (editors) Global Jihadist Terrorism Yes 1988 ("Hamas’s April 2017 document, which is considered an addition to, rather than a modification of, its 1988 Charter" p60 "Over time, Hamas issued several official documents adding to and modifying its

founding Charter; the last of those was published in April 2017" p199)

"2017 document"
Spoerl, "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism" Yes 1988 (the article basically focuses on why the 2017 charter doesn't really count) Calls it "2017 'Document'" (brief reference)
Bartal, "Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement" p. 397 Yes 1988 Calls it "A Document of General Principles and Policies" (brief reference)
Mintz, Chatagnier, Samban, Terrorist Decision-Making A Leader-Centric Approach Yes 1988 ("The document was not intended to replace the organization's 1988 founding charter, but to complement it") "new policy document" (brief mention)
Spitka, National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, chapter Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities Yes "2017 Document of General Principles and Policies" (brief reference) p88
Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches by Hani Awad Yes 2017 ("In 2017 it was superseded by a "statement of principles and general policies." p47) "a statement of principles and general policies."
Mintz, Alex; Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima), eds. (2019). "The decision calculus of Khaled Meshaal". How Do Leaders Make Decisions? Evidence from the East and West, Part B. Emerald Publishing Limited. p. 95. ISBN 9781838678111. Yes 1988 ("the new document provides a review of Hamas' so called updated positions, but does not reverse the principles of its original charter") "new policy document"
Kear, Martin (2018). "The Dilemmas of Dual Resistance: Hamas and Political Learning in Gaza". The Politics of Islamism. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319622569. Yes 2017 ("The contents of Hamas’s 2017 policy document are emblematic of a long process of political learning undertaken by Hamas since its formal entry into politics in 2006. Since that time, Hamas has had to face a series of crises, frustrations, and significant changes in its political environment. The document reflects an increasingly pragmatic outlook on the part of Hamas that can be tied to the experiences it has learnt since in government." p261) "On 1 May 2017, the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas announced that it had released a new policy document that would replace its much maligned Charter" p243

Tier 3: Lower Weight - Media and Think Tank

[edit]
Source Uses "Charter" "Document" or similar 2017 or 1988 more significant Notes
Wintour 2017, "Hamas presents new charter accepting a Palestine based on 1967 borders" Yes Yes 2017 The new document... The new charter
AFP 2017, "Hamas to amend controversial charter in bid to ease ties" Yes Yes 2017 a supplementary charter... The new document
Tamimi 2017, "Hamas’ political document: What to expect" Yes Yes 2017 Khaled Meshaal is expected to reveal the new document... The new charter, or political document as Meshaal prefers to call it
Quisay 2017, "Timeline: How new is the new Hamas charter?" Yes Yes 2017 When the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, announced the publication of its new charter last week, many experts pinned their focus on the organisation's acceptance of the two state solution; however the document’s most important addition was overlooked.
Margolin 2022, "Hamas at 35" Yes Yes 2017 As Hamas has repeatedly noted, two main documents highlight its goals and evolving direction: the 1988 charter, and the May 2017 update to the charter
Hoffman 2023, "Understanding Hamas’s Genocidal Ideology" Yes Yes On May 1, 2017, Hamas issued a revised charter... In fact, the new document differs little from its predecessor.
Adwan 2019, "HAMAS CHARTER: CHANGES AND PRINCIPLES" Yes Yes 2017 “Hamas” issued two important documents... The three decades distance between both charters
Greenblatt 2017, "Hamas: New Charter, Same Old Anti-Semitism" Yes Yes Its new charter... the new charter... Throughout the document, which mirrors the original
Ravid, Khoury 2017, "Israel Blasts Hamas' New Charter: Group Still Dedicated to War With Israel" Yes Yes 2017 Hamas presented its new charter in Qatar on Monday... The document, which contains 11 chapters with 41 articles
van Veen 2024, "The realities of Israeli state and Hamas’ violence" Yes Yes 2017 The 2017 revision of Hamas’ charter ... the document also contained... its 2017 charter revision...
Bishara 2017, "Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders" Yes 2017 their philosophy and the philosophy behind writing a new charter is that “we are going to be a dynamic and open organisation”
Pfahl-Traughber 2023, "Antisemitismus und Antizionismus in der ersten und zweiten Charta der Hamas (Antisemitism and anti-Zionism in the first and second Hamas charters)" Yes 2017 This second charter also received wider media coverage in the West.
2017, "Fatah, Hamas sign reconciliation deal" Yes 2017 In a new charter announced earlier this year, Hamas dropped its wording of "destroying" Israel and said it would recognize a Palestinian state within the borders created by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The charter says Hamas would continue armed resistance as a legitimate right
Eshman 2023, "The truth of Hamas is in its charter" Yes 2017 In 2017, Hamas issued a revised charter
Clarke 2017, "Hamas's Strategic Rebranding" Yes 2017 The revised charter
Khoury 2017, "Hamas Presents New Charter Supporting Palestinian State Along 1967 Borders" Yes 2017 Hamas presented its new charter
Nimah 2017, "Hamas’ revised Charter" Yes 2017 Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, has recently announced a revised political charter.
deRaismes Combes, Nagl, 2024, "A Viable Solution for Mideast Peace? - Lessons from the U.S. Misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan" Yes 2017 While the original Hamas Charter of 1988 called for the complete elimination of the Jewish state, the updated 2017 charter implies Israel’s right to exist.
Asmar 2024, "Hamas’s resistance doctrine is making it harder to broker a deal" Yes 2017 Hamas’s 2017 charter characterizes Palestine
ADL 2024, "Haniyeh in His Own Words" Yes 2017 as its revised 2017 charter
House of Representatives, U. S., 2024, "H. Res. 883" Yes 2017 Whereas Hamas’ 2017 Charter states
Marks 2023, "What the World Gets Wrong About Hamas" Yes 2017 as its core goal in its 2017 Charter
Skare 2023, "Texts or Praxes: How Do We Best Understand Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad After October 7?" Yes 2017 when Hamas announced its new charter on May 1, 2017... the 2017 charter was carefully worded
Salam 2023, "Hamas group explained: Here’s what to know about the group behind the deadly attack in Israel" Yes 2017 In 2017, 30 years after its founding, the group issued a new charter that appeared to stop short of that goal. The document, known as the Hamas 2017 charter
Levitt & Rich, Hamas's Moderate Rhetoric Belies Militant Activities Yes 1988 ("the new statement -- which does not supersede the previous charter") Calls it a "new statement"
Milton-Edwards, "Ausgangspunkt für Friedensverhandlungen" Yes 2017 Calls it a "new document"

Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 07:54, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Discussing the qualities of this ‘Updated analysis of sources’

[edit]

Representativeness of the list

[edit]

Thanks for the analysis. I think that we can use these sources to add further nuance to the article. I'll take a closer look at the sources you've added. Could you share how you've selected the sources in the 3rd group? (…) Alaexis¿question? 12:13, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for attempting to improve a table earlier compiled by Alaexis but hardly usable for assessing an eventual WP:COMMONNAME, mainly because it was unclear why it could be considered representative for worldwide coverage of the topic – as I told Alaexis on 20 June 2025 in User talk:Alaexis#Criticism on your (usage of) ‘Updated table’ (about a 2017 Hamas declaration). Alaexis’ table however has always remained flawed in that respect. Recently, you presented this “fixed” version, as you say. Before scrutinizing it in detail, I’d also like to hear from you, why and in what sense you consider your (‘fixed’) table representative. Merely “adding more RS” doesn’t necessarily make the table (more) representative. What is your method, how did you search, and find (and select) your extra sources, and in what degree and why do you consider the earlier table of Alaexis representative? (…) --Corriebertus (talk) 16:33, 10 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Aspect of ‘significance’

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(…) However, the relative significance of these two documents is irrelevant for the purposes of naming. The 2017 document might be more important than the 1988 charter, it doesn't mean that it should be called charter. It neither follows logically nor is based on any policy. Alaexis¿question? 12:13, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

(…) By the way, I support the remark of Alaexis here, that the importance/significance of the 2017doc compared with the 1988doc, in the view of authors(=sources), is not something we need to know or investigate to be able to assess an eventual COMMONNAME. --Corriebertus (talk) 16:33, 10 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

“Significance” means something like: ‘meaningfullness’, ‘importance’. Rsk(in this ‘updated analysis’) contends that many RS in his table consider “the 2017 charter more significant than the 1988 one”. This is a [1]meaningless statement to me (but it is also not corroborated in his table). Suppose someone would say: President Trump is more significant than President Putin – what on earth would that suppose to mean? ‘Temperature is more significant than humidity’ (in the climate of an area): what can or should that mean? Both are important, but in different ways, aspects. But this vague assertion is also [2]not at all corroborated: Hroub 2017 “focuses on the evolution of Hamas views from one charter to the other” – so what? I presume he finds differences (otherwise there wouldn’t be to texts) and tries to interpret them; that is not the same as assessing one of them ‘more important’ than the other, is it? Thirdly: [3]this (vague) issue has nothing to do with the current debate about naming the Wikipedia article. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:39, 11 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Why not focus on: ‘Calls the 2017Doc a "charter"’?

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Why is your focus on the question: “Uses "Charter"”? If you want to determine a WP:COMMONNAME – and I understand you do – this seems the wrong question to investigate. A more relevant question for finding out how We(kipedia) should call the article (besides other questions), is: how many RS do directly call the 2017document a “charter”? Hroub apparently writes(p.102): "(…)what is de facto Hamas’s new charter" : such a fragment of a sentence says not much (just vaguely suggests certain appreciation of the Document) but certainly doesn’t say that Hroub himself directly calls it a “charter”. --Corriebertus (talk) 22:59, 15 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Submission for Good Article review

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In my personal opinion, I believe this article is a strong candidate for a Good Article (GA) rating and would like to suggest that it be submitted by a contributor who meets the requirements to submit Good Article Nomination (GAN). Eulersidentity (talk) 20:01, 31 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Misrepresentation of Martin Kear position

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@Alaexis, this edit of yours misrepresents Martin Kear's position on the new charter. You appear to have read the introduction to that chapter after doing a quick search of it, and copied that straight into the page because it comported with the POV you appear you want to push.

However, as you had already read in my update to your source analysis, Kear's view is the opposite of what you stated on the page. In 2019 he, along with Dunning and Alsoos, stated that "Hamas’ new 2017 charter officially codifying the possibility of a two state solution with Israel is a welcome development."

Also in 2019, Kear states that Hamas accepted a Palestinian state along the 1967 border, and that it extended implicit recognition to Israel even before the 2017 charter:

"Without expressly stating as much, Hamas had agreed to 'respect' UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the once reviled Oslo Accords, and by extension, the problematic issue of Israel's existence. While Hamas had previously proposed hudnas with Israel, this was the first time that they had signed any Agreement that tacitly accepted that any future Palestinian state would only consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. After the Agreement, Meshaal reiterated Hamas's position concerning its understanding of what any prospective peace agreement with Israel would look like: that any Palestinian state should be established along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, acknowledgement of the right of return for all Palestinian refugees, the dismantling of all West Bank settlements, and the complete withdrawal of all vestiges of Israeli rule (Tamimi 2009 : 261; Caridi 2012 : 248).

This truncated version of any future Palestinian state was a key ideological concession from Hamas that finally brought it in line with Fatah, and more importantly, with the views of most of the Palestinian public. Crucially, it demonstrated an apparent ideological adroitness and political pragmatism by Hamas. As discussed in Chapter 4 , after the 2006 election Hamas had failed to articulate its policy response to the demands for it to recognise Israel. By adopting this position, Hamas’s leadership had apparently found a political solution that artfully sidestepped the ideological black hole tied to any explicit recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Hamas’s leadership demonstrated a willingness and ability to push through this key ideological concession to remain an integral player in Palestinian politics. More importantly, the Agreement proved to the Palestinian public that Hamas was committed to pursuing the national interest through diplomatic means. The signing of the Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."

From Kear, Martin (2019). Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood (Hardcover). Routledge. p. 217.

Kear explains this by noting the distinction between the "utopian" and practical realist dimension of Hamas' position. Here the argument is the same as that of Hroub, Baconi and others who agree that Hamas accepted the 1967 borders and implicitly recognize Israel due to their acceptance of political reality, yet maintain the utopian vision as a bargaining chip for negotiations with Israel, and to maintain support among the Palestinian population disillusioned by what is perceived as the PLO's premature abandonment of these positions such as the explicit recognition of Israel:

"As will be described in more detail in Chapter 4 , after Hamas’s 2006 election victory it became vulnerable to strident and politically damaging criticism over its lack of a firm policy position concerning its vision for a future Palestinian state, and whether it would participate in any negotiations with Israel. Since that time, Hamas’s leadership has attempted to shift its narrative by adopting more pragmatic policy positions that it can justify politically to its various constituencies while remaining within its existing ideological framework. To accomplish this, Hamas began by separating its narrative concerning its trenchant and unwavering opposition to Israeli occupation from its evolving and increasingly nuanced narrative concerning its position on any future Palestinian state. Where once Hamas saw the end of Israeli occupation as being synonymous with the liberation of all of Palestine, it began to divide this issue up into two distinct, yet complementary, objectives. The fi rst is a long-term utopian view, where Hamas continues to argue against the Israeli state’s legitimacy and advocates for the restitution of a sovereign Palestine from the ‘river to the sea.’ The second acknowledges current political realities, with Hamas advocating a short to medium-term view of accepting the notion of a truncated Palestinian state based on those territories Israel conquered in 1967 ( Caridi 2012 : 150–151).

The import of these subtle distinctions is borne out by the 2017 policy document (Hamas 2017). During the announcement, Meshaal ( al-Jazeera 2017 ) stated, "Hamas considers the establishment of a Palestinian state, sovereign and complete, on the basis of the 4 June 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital and the provisions for all the refugees to return to their homeland is an agreeable form that has won consensus among all the movement members."

This was not the first time that Hamas had made such a dramatic concession. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 , Hamas made a similar announcement in the lead-up to the signing of the Mecca Agreement in 2007 ( Mecca Agreement 2007 ). Nevertheless, the distinction between then and now is that for the first time, a truncated Palestinian state became a central pillar of Hamas’s ideological narrative rather than simply a policy position. Page 90-91.

Kear then goes on to explain, in similar terms to Baconi, Seurat, Hroub and others, why Hamas also maintains the utopian aspect:

"What Hamas appears to be saying is that while it refuses to relinquish its long-term organisational goal of the restitution of Palestine from ‘the river to the sea,’ it is willing to place this desire in abeyance and support the establishment of a truncated Palestinian state for the sake of national consensus. While this position may appear Janus-faced, by crafting its narrative in such a way means that Hamas can officially adopt a more pragmatic and politically expedient, medium-term position. This generally reflects the position of many Palestinians, is broadly acceptable to the international community, and is reflective of international law concerning any future Palestinian state. Importantly, this can be done without making any potentially ruinous ideological compromises by relinquishing its quest for a Palestinian state in its entirety."

"Hamas’s progressively shifting narrative justifies its continuing resistance to the ceding of any further Palestinian land while simultaneously painting Fatah’s negotiating position as weak and ultimately harmful to the cause of Palestinian statehood. As Meshaal (2008, cited in Rabbani 2008: 80) states, Hamas demands, ‘A state on , and not within , the 1967 borders. On the borders of 4 June 1967, including Jerusalem, [and] the right of return, with full sovereignty, and without settlements.’ Intriguingly, any acceptance by Hamas of a truncated Palestine would by definition amount to the de facto acknowledgement of the state of Israel. However, Meshaal (2013 : 25–26) explains that there is a clear difference between acknowledging the existence of an Israeli state and the formal process of recognising an Israeli state under international law. For Hamas, any legal recognition would legitimise al-naqbah , the 1967 war, and continued Israeli occupation, without any Israeli reciprocity concerning the recognition of Palestinian rights, particularly the right of return and the right to self-determination. This objection is one that all Palestinians can immediately identify with and goes to the very heart of the Palestinian/ Israeli conflict." Pages 92-93.

This appears to contradict what you cited him for, except it does not at all. You only read the first page of the Kear 2018 piece, where he indeed states the following:

"The most astounding aspect of the document was Hamas’s acceptance that in the foreseeable future any Palestinian state would exist along the 1967 ceasefire lines delineating the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, known collectively as the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).

While this appeared like a tacit acceptance of the two-state solution, a framework vehemently opposed by Hamas since its inception, the reality was more nuanced. Hamas was careful to clarify that this version of a Palestinian state was an interim measure, and did not amount to either the formal recognition of the state of Israel, nor the repudiation of its utopian goal of seeking a Palestinian state from ‘the river to the sea’. Hamas also remained adamant that it would not relinquish its commitment to armed resistance against Israeli occupation of the OPT (al-Jazeera, 2017)." On page 243-244.

First, note that you even misrepresented this, by leaving out the fact that Kear acknowledges "Hamas’s acceptance that in the foreseeable future any Palestinian state would exist along the 1967 ceasefire line".

He then moves to stating that while this appears to be a tacit acceptance of the two-state solution, nuance is necessary and then makes the point you cited him for.

However, in the rest of the chapter which you apparently did not bother to read to check if the information you added to the page was correct, even though you know very well from the discussions we had on the Hamas page that Martin Kear has stated that Hamas accepted the 1967 borders much earlier, since at least 2007. It is therefore very strange that you are citing Kear as if he does not believe that Hamas accepted a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders.

In the rest of the chapter he makes the same argument, as part of a broader analysis of what he terms Hamas' "dual strategy", between armed resistance and political engagement:

"The gradual tempering of its reliance on armed resistance in favour of political participation was not only an acknowledgement of the failure of its strategy of unilateral armed resistance‚ but an acknowledgement by Hamas that it required an independent political voice. Hamas needed this voice to participate substantively in the administration of the OPT. More importantly, a political voice would allow Hamas to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making processes undertaken by Palestinian representatives in the perpetual negotiations with Israel concerning the advent of a sovereign Palestine.

The contents of Hamas’s 2017 policy document are emblematic of a long process of political learning undertaken by Hamas since its formal entry into politics in 2006. Since that time, Hamas has had to face a series of crises, frustrations, and significant changes in its political environment. The document reflects an increasingly pragmatic outlook on the part of Hamas that can be tied to the experiences it has learnt since in government. It is here that having a DRS has been essential to Hamas’s political perseverance. The DRS has enabled Hamas to re-conceptualise the mechanics, and operationalisation of its resistance to Israeli occupation, while bolstering its flagging political authority. The transformation of Hamas into a ‘dual-status’ movement through the inclusion of a political identity, has enabled it to adopt this more pragmatic, and incrementalist resistance strategy that is aligned to its current political situation.

The reconceptualization of Hamas’s resistance to Israeli occupation of the OPT, and its determination to remain an influential actor in Palestinian politics is reflected in Hamas’s gradual shift towards moderating its political stance. In this way, Hamas is able to present a fresh face to the international community as it continues to learn from its experiences in government." Page 244, 262-263.

Kear's analysis in the chapter you cited is therefore the same as his more detailed analysis in his 2019 chapter and book.

However, you took out of context his statement about Hamas' "utopian" aims leaving out all the context in which he makes that point, to present it as his stated position on the subject.

Why do you keep misrepresenting sources like this that you know do not say what you cite them for, as you must have read Kear's quote I added to the page from my source update where I included it? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 10:14, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

This is what he wrote - I'm quoting the whole paragraph
Where do I misrepresent it? Alaexis¿question? 15:18, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You quoted solely the part where he states the nuance about Hamas' official position, and left out the context both immediately prior to that part, and in the rest of the chapter, which he confirmed in his book and in a chapter for an edited volume in 2019. His position is not that Hamas does not accept a two-state solution, never has including in the 2017 charter, and also does not recognize Israel, as your edit made it seem. It is the opposite of that, as I showed with the quotes from his 2019 book and chapter, and as is also present in the 2018 chapter you selectively quoted from.
Kear stated in 2019: "Hamas’ new 2017 charter officially codifying the possibility of a two state solution with Israel is a welcome development."
""Without expressly stating as much, Hamas had agreed to 'respect' UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the once reviled Oslo Accords, and by extension, the problematic issue of Israel's existence. While Hamas had previously proposed hudnas with Israel, this was the first time that they had signed any Agreement that tacitly accepted that any future Palestinian state would only consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. After the Agreement, Meshaal reiterated Hamas's position concerning its understanding of what any prospective peace agreement with Israel would look like: that any Palestinian state should be established along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, acknowledgement of the right of return for all Palestinian refugees, the dismantling of all West Bank settlements, and the complete withdrawal of all vestiges of Israeli rule (Tamimi 2009 : 261; Caridi 2012 : 248).
More importantly, the Agreement proved to the Palestinian public that Hamas was committed to pursuing the national interest through diplomatic means. The signing of the Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."
So I once again ask you, why did you cite Martin Kear as believing that Hamas never accepted two-states along the 1967 borders or recognition of Israel, when you knew from the discussions on the main Hamas page and also from my source analysis here where I included the first quote from him stating the direct opposite in 2019, that that is not his view on the subject? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 16:00, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Fine, let's use the 2019 article but that's not a good reason to ignore the nuances he described in 2017.
Nothing in the passage that you cited contradicts that the putative acceptance was considered 1) "an interim measure", 2) "did not amount to either the formal recognition of the state of Israel" 3) "nor the repudiation of its utopian goal of seeking a Palestinian state from ‘the river to the sea'" Alaexis¿question? 17:00, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You are claiming that Martin Kear's view is that Hamas did not accept a two-state solution on the 1967 borders, did not recognize Israel, and continues to seek a Palestinian state from the river to the sea.
He believes the opposite of this.
You are basing your claim on one out of context passage from the first page of a chapter he wrote in 2018 about Hamas' dual strategy of armed resistance and political engagement, where his argument is the opposite of what you claim his position is. He argues, as I quoted in my initial post, that over time Hamas' pragmatic, realist, political dimension took precedence over the utopian. That is what led to its acceptance of the two-state solution along 1967 and the informal recognition of Israel. The utopian dimension still remained, however the purpose of it was to avoid falling victim to the same trap as Fatah had with Oslo while also maintaining legitimacy among the Palestinian populace.
This is the same argument Baconi, Seurat and others make. Yet you are attempting to recruit Kear into an opponent of this view, who does not accept that Hamas' political pragmatism is sincere or genuine.
Once again, in 2019 he wrote an entire book on the subject alongside a chapter where he states the opposite view in detail. This does not contradict the 2018 chapter, because you are merely focusing on one passage from it from the first page, ignoring the part directly preceding it and the entire rest of the chapter that follows it.
In any case, even if it did contradict it, the book and chapter from 2019 are more recent so that is the most up to date version of his view on the subject. Adding contradictory information from 2018, which I maintain is due to your taking it out of the context, is unwarranted given this. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 17:27, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Also @Alaexis why did you restore your contentious out of context Kear passage when it was challenged by me and is part of an active discussion in Talk and you have no consensus for its inclusion?
You are violating WP:BRD alongside restoring misrepresented content from a source, as has been pointed out to you, which violates WP:VERIFICATION.Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 17:31, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You've just added a passage citing his 2019 work as a proof of the acceptance ofthe 1967 borders.
As I explained above doing this without mentioning the caveats that Kear himself described would present a one-sided picture to the reader, violating wp:npov. Alaexis¿question? 17:50, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Your claim about Kear's position in the 2018 source is inaccurate. You are misrepresenting the source by taking it out of context, as I have explained in detail multiple times now. You have now introduced a false claim to the page, making it appears as though Kear has contradictory views on the subject when he does not.
Even if you believe this is a violation of NPOV, you have violated WP:BRD. In addition, you have violated WP:V by misrepresenting a source, and then restoring this misrepresentation after it was pointed out to you that you had done so.
The 2018 source itself has information that directly contradicts what you have cited it for.
You present the Kear 2018 source as stating: "that while the document appeared to accept the two-state solution, the reality was "more nuanced" as Hamas considered it as a temporary measure, did not recognise Israel and did not renounce its goal of seeking a Palestinian state replacing Israel."
You leave out the fact that Kear acknowledges that "The most astounding aspect of the document was Hamas’s acceptance that in the foreseeable future any Palestinian state would exist along the 1967 ceasefire line". This is the sentence immediately prior to the one you took out of context and misrepresented. In the paragraph immediately after the one you took out of context, Kear reaffirms that Hamas did accept the 1967 borders, and traces it back to its move to political engagement over a decade prior:
"To many in the international community the contents of this policy document, especially the acceptance of a truncated Palestinian state, seemed to be a remarkable volte-face for a movement better known for its use of egregious violence, and a dogmatic adherence to Islamist ideology. Despite this violent, and intransigent reputation, the May 2017 document forms part of Hamas’s continued efforts to reposition the locus of its ideological narrative by integrating a distinct political facet into its long-standing resistance to Israeli occupation. Hamas began this integration when it, and the other 13 Palestinian factions, signed the Cairo Accord in 2005 (ECF-a). Here Hamas signalled its intent by agreeing to prioritise political participation over armed resistance as the most appropriate strategy for achieving its organisational goals."
You also leave out the entire subsequent analysis of the dual strategy, where Kear states that Hamas' pragmatic political side from which that acceptance came, became the norm after 2006.
Once more, you are grossly misrepresenting the 2018 Kear source. You have now been told this multiple times and you are refusing to abide by WP:BRD. You should self-revert and make a case for why you believe your edit should be included, and try to obtain consensus for it. I oppose its inclusion for reasons mentioned at great length. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 18:34, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The section already discusses the notability of the conditional acceptance of the 1967 borders so I thought this context has already been provided.
But this is not a hill I'd die on and as a compromise I've added the points you've mentioned (characterisation of the change as "astounding" and reflecting the pragmatism of Hamas).
WP:BRD is one way of reaching consensus, it can also be reached iteratively. Alaexis¿question? 20:53, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Your edit is not a compromise. You did nothing to address the blatant misrepresentation of Kear's position by quoting him out of context not only from the 2018 piece, but his other work where he explicitly states the direct opposite of what you misrepresent him for. The challenge was for the entire statement you quoted out of context, so your refusal to remove it pending consensus is a clear violation of WP:BRD. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:57, 3 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't misrepresent the source in the slightest. Kear makes two points
  • The document represented a significant change and was notable due to Hamas accepting a truncated Palestinian state under certain conditions
  • They still did not recognise Israel and did not abandon their long-term goals and framed the acceptance of the 1967 borders as an interim measure
There is no contradiction between these two points or between this and his subsequent works. Has he said anywhere that Hamas actually recognised Israel? Has he said that Hamas repudiated its goal of Palestine from the river to the sea?
The first point is already well-covered in the article and I've added Kear's characterisation of the document as "astounding" to the article. Alaexis¿question? 08:54, 5 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Raskolnikov on 3Sept2025 started the main section here about “Martin Kear position” with a terribly long posting: I’m not going to read all that right now. Can we get a summary of the (alleged) dispute, ‘for dummies’? --Corriebertus (talk) 14:34, 22 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Updated phrasing

[edit]

Creating a distinct section for this because this is a long one.

@Alaexis, when making edits like this, please follow WP:BRD. I dug around in the sources here and @Raskolnikov.Rev is broadly correct. Let me explain:

In order to properly understand Kear's position, we have to look at it w/r/t all of his writing on the 2017 charter and its status.

I found a very helpful text from 2020 where he directly discusses this topic: "Coping with Occupation: Hamas and Palestinian Politics", in the Routledge Handbook on Political Parties in the Middle East and North Africa (1st ed). Not only does Kear express the opposite view of what is being attributed to him in the phrasing added by Alaexis and sourced to the two 2019 texts, he did so (in the 2020 text) even more explicitly. He directly addresses the question of the status of the 2017 charter and the point about maintaining Palestine "from the river to the sea" and the refusal to extend formal recognition, unambiguously stating that the 2017 charter accepts the two-state solution "in totality":

However, the most important concession came with Hamas’s acceptance that any future Palestinian state would consist solely of the OPT, with East Jerusalem as its capital. While in the previous two examples Hamas had agreed to "work" and then "respect" the premise of the two-state solution concept, Hamas had now come to "accept" the two-state solution in totality. Like the Mecca Agreement, the caveat to this was that the borders of this sovereign Palestine needed to be the 1948 ceasefire lines, the evacuation of all Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the transfer of control of East Jerusalem from Israel to the new Palestinian state (Hamas 2017). (p. 159) (Emphasis mine.)

As in the 2018 text, he acknowledges (what he terms) nuances and caveats here as well. But similarly to what he does there, which, as Raskolnikov.Rev pointed out, is being done in a larger broader context where he makes these points as part of a broad analysis explaining why Hamas adopts strategic ambiguity. Other scholars have also noted this, i.e. Tariq Baconi who makes a point about how Hamas does so to maintain a bargaining chip.

Here Kear makes this plainly clear, stating that ...for Hamas to justify any concessions, it needed to accentuate its resistance credentials to provide it with political cover. (p. 158)

The 2018 text makes the same point with the 'dual strategy analysis,' as is clear from the quotes provided by Raskolnikov.Rev. I read the piece and confirmed it myself. The armed resistance portion is described as being used to maintain legitimacy among its own followers and the broader Palestinian population, disillusioned by the perceived failures of Oslo and Fatah in general.

However, Kear is clear to stress that this is a rhetorical move for the purposes of political cover for concessions. Hamas adopted a conciliatory, diplomatic, political engagement approach post-2006 when it came to govern the OPT's Gaza Strip, as is reflected in not only the 2017 charter, but also the 2006 agreement.

So, Alaexis' inclusion of the "river to the sea" point is addressed directly by Kear, again in the appropriate context of his broader analysis. He says the following, beginning with the political cover point and its various caveats and nuances:

One of the key aims of Hamas’s strategy is to counter the narrative proffered by Israel and Fatah that Hamas cannot be trusted to participate in the debate concerning the advent of the Palestinian state. However, any functional strategy means meeting the IQ’s stipulations. This poses several ideological problems for Hamas because they involve it having to concede on issues that lie at the core of its raison d’être: specifically, accepting the two- state solution and recognising the Israeli state. Ipso facto this would mean legitimising Israel’s occupation, al-naqbah, the expulsion of Palestinian refugees, the expropriation of Palestinian land, and the Judaisation of East Jerusalem.

However, these hurdles have not prevented Hamas from articulating a nuanced and incremental strategy that involves ideological flexibility and compromise while simultaneously placing caveats on these compromises that provide Hamas with political room to manoeuvre and a degree of plausible deniability. Hamas does this by accentuating its resistance narrative to provide it with a political bulwark behind which it can incrementally modify its position on these key ideological tenets. (pp. 155-156) (Emphasis mine.)

Note that he explains the purpose of these nuances and caveats on the part of Hamas. Contrary to how he has been quoted in the article, he does not believe that this rhetoric makes their stated positions insincere and untrustworthy, rather he believes the nuances and caveats are the rhetorical ploys they need to engage in to maintain domestic legitimacy in the eyes of their followers and Palestinians more broadly.

He makes this clear in what he goes on to say about Hamas' position on recognising Israel versus maintaining a claim on the whole of Palestine 'from the river to the sea' that you have cited:

First evidence of this strategy came in March 2006 when Hamas PM Haniyeh outlined his new government’s future political program (C- SPAN, 2006). Haniyeh opened by declaring that his government’s top priority would be to protect the right of Palestinians to resist the occupation that, "...restrict[s] our nation and put us in reservations and camp towns..." (C- SPAN, 2006). He proclaimed that Palestinians had a right to an independent and viable status with East Jerusalem as its capital, and committed his government to destroying Israeli settlements and the Separation Wall. He also defended his government’s right to ensure the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees (C- SPAN, 2006).

After Haniyeh had affirmed Hamas’s resistance credentials, he then proceeded to outline key political and ideological concessions. First, he acknowledged the authority and position of Mahmoud Abbas as President of the PA by committing his government to respect the constitutional relationship between the PLC and the Presidency so that they could work collaboratively to further Palestinian national interests. Second, he announced that his government would, "...work with the previous agreements that the PLO had already signed and the Palestinian Authority has signed with national responsibility and in a way that will work to the interests of our nation..." Furthermore, Haniyeh stated that his government would, "...deal with the international resolutions that are related to the Palestinian cause with great national responsibility in a way that also protects the rights of our nation" (C- SPAN, 2006).

For the first time, Hamas had agreed to operate in concert with a political system established by the previously loathed Oslo Accords, and deal with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242(1967) and 338(1973), in a “responsible” way. These two Resolutions provide the international legal framework for the two- state solution. Unlike the uncompromising language of its pre- 2006 treatises, Hamas was no longer advocating for the establishment a Palestinian state from “the river to the sea” or the destruction of the Israeli state. From this point on, Hamas agreed to govern within an institutional framework that promoted the two- state solution and by extension, acceded to Israel’s legitimate existence. Without expressly stating as such, Hamas had complied with two of the IQ’s three stipulations. (p. 156) (Emphasis mine.)

Unambiguously stating the very opposite of how he was cited in the article!

He reiterates the point about the purpose of the caveats:

These caveats provide Hamas with political room to manoeuvre when it comes to any prospective deal for Palestinian statehood that Fatah may negotiate with Israel in the MEPP. Because there is no unequivocal acceptance of the two- state solution framework per se, simply Hamas’s acknowledgement that it accepts its premise, it means that Hamas could criticise any peace agreement if it believed it was not in the Palestinian national interest.

He says that same dynamic is at play in the Mecca Agreement of 2007:

Displaying Hamas’s penchant for incrementalism, the Mecca Agreement stated that the unity government would "respect" UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the Oslo Accords, and its attendant political framework. This meant that Hamas had tacitly "respected" Israel’s right to exist. Equally, it meant that Hamas "respected" the primacy of the two- state solution and "respected" the fact that any future Palestinian state would consist solely of the OPT.

When it comes to the 2017 charter, Kear notes While in the previous two examples Hamas had agreed to "work" and then "respect" the premise of the two-state solution concept, Hamas had now come to "accept" the two-state solution in totality.

So. Now we have three separate sources where Kear makes the opposite point from what he is cited as saying in the part you have added. I don't see how this is anything other than a clear-cut case of WP:CHERRYPICKING, also violating WP:DUE and WP:WEIGHT even if we overlook the question of whether the 2018 source is properly cited within context.

If we have Kear stating at great length (!) the opposite view from what we cite him as saying in the article – in three separate, more recent texts – we are not informing the reader, we're misleading them as to the nature of his actual position on the matter.

Turning to the 2018 source now, we have to consider the nature of the text. It is a chapter in an edited volume whose topic is not the 2017 Charter but rather the question of the "dual strategy". The charter is discussed very broadly and briefly on the first page before Kear moves on to the analysis of this strategy, and makes the argument that Hamas' pragmatic political dimension became its dominant one post-2006 due to the realities of governing and diplomacy. The thesis of the chapter is therefore at odds with what Alaexis has cited it as saying, wherein it again supposedly makes the opposite point.

The 2019 book source where Kear states that Hamas implicitly recognised Israel and two-states along the Green Line, and the 2020 chapter I quoted from earlier reiterating the same, are detailed discussions of the 2017 charter by Kear. The subject of the 2020 chapter is Hamas' position on Israel.

So per WP:DUE and WP:WEIGHT in the context of Kear's overall analysis on this point, we should not give the reader the mistaken impression that he believed something he did not actually believe.

I have therefore updated the article with a compromise version based on the 2020 text.

This includes Kear's point about nuances and caveats and the use of strategic ambiguity for political purposes to justify concessions, as part of his broader analysis of the status of the 2017 charter.

Alaexis, if you disagree with this version, please propose an alternative here, and explain why, preferably grounded in the sources. Smallangryplanet (talk) 09:18, 15 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Smallangryplanet, thank you for this, I was unaware that Kear had explicitly written that Hamas had totally accepted the two-state solution.
@Alaexis is nevertheless still deliberately misrepresenting Kear's position by cherry-picking from one source that was written before.
This is a repeated violation of source misrepresentation and BRD. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:16, 18 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Smallangryplanet, thanks for explaining your reasoning.
However, Kear never retracted or contradicted the statements he made in 2018 about the temporary nature of acceptance of the 1967 borders and retaining the same long-term goals (which are the two sides of the same coin). This is precisely what I've added. Alaexis¿question? 20:42, 19 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
As to the BRD, it should be applied to your changes as well. I'll restore the previous version. Alaexis¿question? 12:12, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You added RS content, misrepresented it, then restored it multiple times, finally deciding to remove it when it became clear it's a POV that contradicted the POV it had been originally added to represent. This last without even bothering to provide an argument for its removal? I have restored it as it is RS and relevant content and you have provided no argument for its removal, but plenty of arguments have been provided for maintaining the Kear. I am trying very very hard to AGF but what appears to have happened here is that you added an RS you thought agreed with your POV, then when you saw it didn't, you decided to remove it. I don't see how this adheres to NPOV (let alone not being a POVPUSH). Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:42, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't misrepresent anything. You failed to respond to my comment above Kear never retracted or contradicted the statements he made in 2018 about the temporary nature of acceptance of the 1967 borders and retaining the same long-term goals.
I'm fine with incremental improvements and simultaneous discussion, in which case this version should be restored. I'm also fine with restoring the article to the status quo ante until the consensus is achieved, per WP:BRD this version. Alaexis¿question? 14:48, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I'd like to ask for clarification regarding one of the sources you've added.
The Middle East Monitor article quotes Khaled Meshaal as saying “The 1967 borders represent 21 per cent of Palestine, which is practically one fifth of its land, so this cannot be accepted,”, (rejection of 1967 borders) but then the article goes on to say:
"that Hamas has reiterated that, in order to form the basis for a joint meeting and a joint national programme with the other Palestinian factions, it accepts a state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, with complete independence and with the right of return without recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist entity." (acceptance of 1967 borders)
Unless I'm missing some nuance here, these seem like contradictory stances. Butterscotch Beluga (talk) 16:43, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis I have reverted your edit as the source you have added says the opposite of what your cited it for. Moreover, you left out important context such as the timing of it, and we already include the POV on the page that states the acceptance of two-states is insincere. Please stop including misrepresented sources on the page. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:00, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Please stay on topic and focus on content not contributors.
User talk pages, AE, and other venues are for discussing user conduct. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 23:03, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The reason I asked is because the source does support the claim, technically, but it also contradicts itself. So the issue is less misinterpreting the article, but more of it being unclear & potentially unhelpful here. Butterscotch Beluga (talk) 23:06, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@IOHANNVSVERVS you are right, that should be left to AE. I have updated my response.
@Butterscotch Beluga, the reason for this contradiction is because of the "dual strategy" Hamas pursues as is noted in the Kear and other RS. @Alaexis is aware of this as they have engaged with this topic on his and the main Hamas page for a long time. Hamas' "utopian" position is as Meshaal states that they establish a Palestinian state "from the river to the sea". We already state this in the lede and it is in the body. However, they have adopted the practical policy of accepting the 1967 borders as the national consensus position. Baconi and others argue that they retain the utopian position as a bargaining chip for negotiations, given that the PLO gave that up before any talks and it did not produce anything fruitful, according to their perception. However, they note that the acceptance of the 1967 borders is their officially stated position, and the 2017 charter codified it.
@Alaexis selectively quoted the source only for the one side, though it contained the opposite view as well. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:16, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You're still being accusatory towards Alaexis and violating AGF. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 23:18, 20 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Butterscotch Beluga, I'm not sure what you mean by clarifications. Hamas leaders have made contradicting statements regarding the acceptance of the 1967 borders. The article included a statement that appeared to support it. In order to maintain the NPOV I've added another that contradicts it. Alaexis¿question? 18:29, 23 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The issue is not that Hamas officials contradict each other, but that both statements I quoted above are attributed to Khaled Meshaal from the same interview.
My best interpretation of this apparent contradiction would be that Khaled Meshaal personally finds the border's unacceptable, but accepts Hamas' official position. That's just my interpretation though, so it's not too helpful for deciding content.
My point is that the source is weak here due to contradicting itself, though the issue worsens by the fact that you cited it to only support the rejection of the 1967 border (i.e. concerns of WP:CHERRYPICKING). On top of that though, is that the statement accepting the 1967 border is the much clearer of the two, directly addressing the issue, but was ignored in favor of representing unilateral rejection. Butterscotch Beluga (talk) 19:05, 23 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't misrepresent anything. You failed to respond to my comment above Kear never retracted or contradicted the statements he made in 2018 about the temporary nature of acceptance of the 1967 borders and retaining the same long-term goals. I responded to it at great length. You did not acknowledge my response, instead restating that Kear believed the 2017 Charter's acceptance of 1967 and two-states was not genuine when there are multiple occasions, including one in 2020, where he says without any caveats that While in the previous two examples Hamas had agreed to "work" and then "respect" the premise of the two-state solution concept, Hamas had now come to "accept" the two-state solution in totality.
Once again, even if your claim about the 2018 text were accurate - which I and others have pointed out it isn't - it's superseded by Kear stating without any caveats that in its 2017 Charter Hamas came to accept 1967 and two-states in 2019 and 2020. If you want to start an RfC to include your line on the page, then go ahead. I will oppose it for reasons I have explained multiple times. But you have not cited any rules-based reason for why the RS content currently on the page ought not be included. Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:48, 21 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Could you guys – all of you – please be clear in discussion sections, what the disputed issue is? For example: Smallangryplanet on 15Sep2025,09:18, writes in this subsection: “Creating a distinct section for this because this is a long one”, however, on that date he did not add a new (sub)section. Why not say clearly, when you made which new section? And about what? Raskolnikov on 3Sept2025 started the main section here about “Martin Kear position” with a terribly long posting: I’m not going to read all that right now. Can we get a summary of the (alleged) dispute, ‘for dummies’? --Corriebertus (talk) 14:34, 22 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

It's this one, the one I created when I made that edit: Talk:2017_Hamas_charter#Updated_phrasing. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:39, 22 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, I'll add a new subsection. Alaexis¿question? 18:35, 23 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Edit request 4 October 2025

[edit]

Description of suggested change: Put "Zionist Project" in quotes to reflect that is the particular language used in the charter. This is how it is used in the rest of the page.

Diff:

−
While the 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism, the 2017 document removed the antisemitic language and stated that Hamas' fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the Zionist project.
+
While the 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism, the 2017 document removed the antisemitic language and stated that Hamas' fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the "Zionist project."

TaqPCR (talk) 20:20, 4 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Done Nubzor [T][C] 20:35, 4 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
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