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By the end of March 1945, the European phase of the Second World
War was close to an end. The Soviet armies were thirty miles
east of Berlin and encountering fierce resistance on their way
to Germany’s capital. General Eisenhower’s armies
were about 200 miles west of Berlin, but encountering light resistance
as they rapidly advanced eastward.
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In Early March 1945 Churchill
tried to talk Ike into capturing Berlin. (Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library)
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Eisenhower was advised to strike toward Berlin. Winston Churchill
sent the Supreme Commander cables urging him to order his 21st
Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery to attack and capture
the capital city. General George Patton believed Monty’s
forces could get to Berlin in less than three days and implored
his friend Ike to order the attack. Instead, in mid-April, Ike
ordered his allied armies to halt all eastward movement at the
Elbe river line leaving the 21st Army Group about 70 miles from
Berlin, and then to move both south into Czechoslovakia and north
to the Baltic Sea to eliminate remaining elements of the Wehrmacht.
Many allied leaders — including his own 9th Army commander
General William Hood Simpson, whose forces were poised to attack
the city if Ike would give them the order — bitterly criticized
Eisenhower for this decision. To this day, some military and political
historians characterize this order as Dwight Eisenhower’s
major command failure of World War II. Why did he halt instead
of attack? Their critiques deserve an answer: Why did Ike halt
the Allied advance at the Elbe?
Ike had earlier made it clear that he intended to seize the German
capital. During the invasion of France in June 1944 he personally
announced to the media that his ultimate military target was Berlin.
As the allied armies moved through France toward Germany during
the rest of that year, many of Ike’s subordinate commanders,
including Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, Simpson, and others, frequently
announced their intentions to take Berlin and force a German surrender.
But Yalta changed Ike’s plans. At the Yalta summit meeting
in February 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt presented Stalin with
a proposed map of Germany to go into effect after the
war ended. The map divided Germany into four zones, each of which
was to be governed by the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain,
or the United States. Stalin agreed to this division of the enemy’s
territory. Under this proposal Berlin would be in the Soviet zone
of control about 200 miles away from the nearest allied zone. Also
at Yalta, Stalin agreed to have the Soviet Union join the United
Nations after the war. This was very important to Roosevelt, who
believed establishment of the U. N. would be a major element of
the postwar settlement and would make for world peace. He was willing
to make concessions to Stalin in order to secure his agreement.
After Yalta there seemed to be little incentive for Eisenhower
to race to Berlin, capture it, turn it over to the U.S.S.R., and
then retreat 200 miles to the American occupation zone. Eisenhower’s
orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the military leaders
of Britain and the U.S., were to defeat the German army in northwest
Europe, and they did not require him to capture Berlin. Eisenhower
was meticulous about matters of command. His military actions were
subject to the strategic commands issued by the Combined Chiefs
, just as they were subject to the political commands of Roosevelt
and Churchill.
In later years, Eisenhower justified the decision not to take
Berlin by pointing out that many American soldiers would have been
sacrificed in the effort. The Soviets endured over 380,000 casualties
in their battle for the German capital. Even with the advantage
of hindsight, Ike could not see any military reason to have American
soldiers killed or wounded in capturing a city his forces would
have to abandon. He left unexplained, however, his most important
reason for halting at the Elbe.
When Churchill demanded that he race to Berlin and capture the
city, Eisenhower realized that the only remaining reason to do
it was political and not military. He therefore cabled General
George Marshall in Washington on April 7th and explained that he
did not plan to capture Berlin. But he added: I “would cheerfully
adjust my plans” if the Combined Chiefs ordered me to do
so. General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army
and the dominant force on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, usually
discussed these kinds of wartime political decisions with President
Roosevelt. But in this case he didn’t need to talk to the
President. He knew fully well that Roosevelt wanted no conflict
with the Soviet Union, and Marshall agreed with Eisenhower’s
conclusion that there was no military justification for changing
Eisenhower’s orders. General Marshall and the other United
States military chiefs overruled Churchill and the British military
chiefs and refused to order Eisenhower to capture Berlin.
Ike followed those orders and his forces did not take Berlin.
This was not the first or the last time that Dwight Eisenhower
publicly accepted responsibility for a controversial policy without
blaming those who actually made the decision.
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the Eisenhower Memorial Web Site
