Political Culture in Ethiopia’s Provincial Administration: Haile Sellassie, Blata Ayele Gebre and the (Hareri) Kulub Movement of 1948

Gedeo died in the fighting. The outburst lasted only a couple of days before it was quelled. A compromise was worked out, one that left a rather bitter taste in Gedeo mouths: the government would pay compensation for each Gedeo death and for loss of property; the briychas were fined heavily for their participation; all rents were to be paid; and for those who were unwilling to do so, undeveloped and less desirable land outside Gedeo was made available where they could establish new lives as freeholders. Landlords were also fined substantially for taking matters into their own hands. ${ }^{37}$

Here twenty years after the Italian war, the Gedeo were still seeking justice, equality and opportunity within the context of the Ethiopian state. They might technically be Ethiopian, but for many Gedeo that was not necessarily a mark of merit. Historically, they have every reason to question their relationship to a state that has done so little to promote their inclusion; at the same time, they have invested too much in blood and sweat to want to end that association. The Gedeo experience in the Italian war demonstrates the multiplicity of choices made; some Gedeo undoubtedly have felt an alienation deeper than others. For the great majority though it is not so much an issue of loyalty as one of opportunity. For both Woransa and Yoseph, the Italian war provided a chance to change their lives and create a better future; their decisions to accept the Italians were not so much an embracing of the “fermi” as an expression of disappointment in the failures of the Ethiopian state. Unfortunately, Ethiopia’s rulers learned little from this experience. They remained content with preserving the old “Abyssinia,” and little concerned about the need to foster a new “Ethiopia,” an Ethiopia that seeks to include all of its diverse peoples and provides opportunity and equality for all. The failure to learn this lesson helps to explain much about the trauma and disillusionment inherent in the country today.

POLITICAL CULTURE IN ETHIOPIA’S PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION: HAILE SELLASSIE, BLATA AYELE GEBRE AND THE (HARERI) KULUB MOVEMENT OF 1948

by Tim Carmichael

In 1948 the eastern Ethiopian city of Harer experienced political trauma that profoundly affected its futtle and that of its peoples. ${ }^{1}$ The crisis, known today as Kulub or Hanolato, marks a watershed in Hareri history and offers an example of Ethiopian national political culture in practice. ${ }^{2}$ Outside of Ethiopianist circles, it is also of interest to those concerned with Muslim/Christian relations or early forms of nonviolent African resistance. Harer, an independent Islamic city since about the tenth century, was conquered by the Christian King (later Emperor) Menilek in 1887. In return for acceptance of his rule Menilek offered the Hareri limited self-governance based on Islamic principles, rights that gradually eroded in succeeding decades. Beginning from at least 1946, however, the Hareri maneuvered to restore their political and social autonomy to the levels guaranteed to them by Menilek. In response, Deputy Governor Blata Ayele Gebre suppressed the Hareri movement, arrested thousands of people, confiscated personal and public properties and closed the madāris (Quranic schools).

The deputy governor’s heavy-handed response might seem an extreme overreaction, but is explainable at two levels. The first is international and concerns Emperor Haile Sellassie’s attempts to maintain Ethiopia’s territorial integrity throughout the 1940s. The looming threat of losing Eritrea and the Ogaden, with their large numbers of Muslims, left no room for him to consider perceived Islamic agitation elsewhere in Ethiopia. The second is internal and is rooted in Emperor Haile Sellassie’s newly restructured administrative apparatus that aimed at absolute centralization of power. Within it, officials like Blata Ayele depended solely on the emperor for their present and future positions and strove to prove their loyalty to him.

In this paper I contend that the tenseness of the international political scene at the time prevented the Ethiopian government from even entertaining Hareri

^[1]

grievances, no matter how moderate or reasonably presented. Locally, Blata Ayele knew that the success of his political future was contingent upon his ensuring law and order, and in his zest to perform admirably he applied far more force than was necessary. It is noteworthy that in Hareri recollections Haile Sellassie not only escapes blame for the official violence, but also is often mentioned as reasonable and just, in clear contradistinction to his local representative. Thus, in addition to accounting for the severity of government oppression that became a landmark in Hareri historical consciousness, this essay also investigates how actively Haile Sellassie participated in his post-war provincial administration and raises questions about the self-image that he then wished to project. In order to understand what the Hareri were trying to accomplish around 1947, it is first necessary to review aspects of Harer’s history.

Harer: Historical Background

For centuries Harer had been the primary urban Islamic center of Ethiopia and had served as Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi’s home base during the famous sixteenth-century jihads against Christian Abyssinia. When Emperor Galadewos and his Portuguese allies defeated the Muslim forces and killed their leader in 1543, Hareri attention focused much closer to home. Nur ibn Mujahid, successor to Imam Ahmed’s amirship and inheritor of his widow, built the wall that still surrounds the original town, possibly as protection against the growing numbers of Oromo pastoralists in the region. In 1577, the seat of the Islamic sultanate was transferred to Awsa, and although Harer remained a potent symbol of a great past for Ethiopia’s Muslims, scholars generally regard the following 300 years as a sort of Dark Age in Hareri history, about which we know little more than the names of ruling amirs. ${ }^{3}$

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century the Hareri and Oromo enjoyed a mutually dependent relationship. The Oromo cultivated Hareri cereal fields and relied upon the town as an outlet for surplus produce and as a source for essential commodities such as salt, cloth and beads. In return, the Hareri extracted as much as 70 percent of the Oromo harvest as rent. ${ }^{4}$ As the century progressed, Harer’s economy rested increasingly upon the more militarily powerful Oromo, and Hareri political dominance was undermined by local disputants enlisting Oromo backing for their causes. The balance of power in the region favored the Oromo by 1875, when Egyptian forces occupied Harer as part of Khedive Isma’il’s dream of an African empire. The general population had suffered for nearly twenty years under the unjust rule of Amir Muhammad ibn Ali, who advantaged his Oromo allies to the detriment of his Hareri

^[1]subjects, but his tyranny came to an end when an Egyptian soldier strangled him during evening prayers only hours after the occupation. ${ }^{5}$

Although brief, the period of Egyptian rule had important consequences for Hareri society. ${ }^{6}$ They improved the road from the coastal port Zayla, established postal services, introduced Egyptian currency, built an aqueduct to supply the town with fresh water, and erected houses. They ordered the registration of all marriages and divorces, real estate properties, houses, gardens and court cases. They started a hospital, improved other health services, and required the notification of deaths to prevent epidemics. During their stay, the annual number of caravans arriving to and departing from Harer multiplied and the economy prospered. ${ }^{7}$

This period also witnessed transformations in the town’s religious life. In 1875 The Egyptians found, apparently with some surprise, that Hareri children learned to read and write Arabic (though they spoke it only with difficulty), the adults met in the evenings with qualis to study Islamic jurisprudence (of the Shafi’i madhhab), and some Hareri were knowledgable about Egyptian literature and poetry, mathematical fundamentals, astronomy and the calculation of the Arabic, Coptic and Gregorian calendars. ${ }^{8}$ Despite these discoveries, the Egyptians thought there was room for improvement, and they raised an impressive new mosque, suppressed beer-drinking and qat-chewing, combatted “hommes de médecine” and “docteurs de miracles,” and imported qualis to ensure better application of the law. ${ }^{9}$ They also pacified the uncooperative Oromo and Somali of the region and spread Islam among them. ${ }^{10}$ Ultimately, the Egyptian occupation of Harer checked the growing power of the Oromo, reinvigorated Islam and Islamic practice, and emphasized the cultural uniqueness of urban, Islamic Harer within the broader region.

Owing to political and financial crises at home in the early 1880s, the Egyptians evacuated Harer in 1885, but the Islamic revival they stimulated retained some momentum. Abdullahi ibn Muhammad, who was the son and grandson of amirs and well-known for his Islamic learning, was installed as amir by the departing forces. He followed the examples of his father and the Egyptians by trying to convert the Oromo
${ }^{5}$ R. A. Caulk, “Harar Town and Its Neighbors in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African History 18, 3 (1977): 379-80. M. Sabry, Episode de la Question D’Afrique: L’Empire Egyptian Sous Ismail et L’Ingérence Anglo-Française (1862-1879) (Paris, 1933), 419.
${ }^{6}$ For conditions prevailing at the time of occupation, see Mohammad Moktar, “Notes sur le Pays de Harrar,” Bulletin de la Société Khéâtriale de Géographie 1, 4 (1886): 351-97.
${ }^{7}$ P. Paulitschke, “Le Harrar Sous l’Administration Égyptienne, 1875-1885,” Bulletin de la Société Khéâtriale de Géographie 2, 10 (1887): 588. Sabry, Episode, 420-22. G. Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédise Ismaïl, Tome III, L’Empire Africain, 3e Partie (1874-1876) (Fascicule A, Le Caire: Imprimerie de L’Institut Français D’Archéologie Orientale), 623-25.
${ }^{8}$ Moktar, “Notes,” 376-77.
${ }^{9}$ Sabry, Episode, 418-25, 429-30. The Egyptians thought that Harer’s qualis crafted their judgments more to please their amir than to abide by the tenets of Islamic law. Moktar, “Notes,” 364.
${ }^{10}$ Sabry, Episode, 427-28. It must be noted that Amir Muhammad ibn Ali earlier strove to convert the Oromo and restore the local power balance. Caulk, “Harar Town,” 380.

to Islam, and he “severely punished the laxity of the townspeople and all who came to Harār.” ${ }^{11}$ Although many Oromo revolted and refused to pay taxes during his brief rule, his proselytiating efforts and his strict enforcement of Islamic practices later earned him kudos in Hareri traditions. ${ }^{12}$

During this period of heightened Islamic religiosity, the Christian King Menilek of Shewa conquered Harer. The town was situated on a major trade route outside Emperor Yohannis’ control, allowing Menilek to import modern firearms to enhance his power. Harer’s proximity to the sea facilitated communications with the outside world, in particular with the Italians, who like Menilek wished to weaken ‘Yohannis’ position in the north. Furthermore, Harer was in a rich province, whose tax revenues promised to swell the king’s coffers. From the local perspective, however, the Battle of Ch’elempo on 6 January 1887 marked the end of Hareri independence and the beginning of its subjugation to a Christian authority. ${ }^{13}$

Hareri informants in 1994 were universally agreed that Menilek made an agreement with the Hareri guaranteeing them certain rights, including religious freedom and limited self-government based on Islamic principles, in return for an annual tribute equal to that previously paid to the Egyptian government. Although Caulk mentioned that a few copies of this treaty were “cautiously shown” to him, an official written version has not been located. ${ }^{14}$ Popular beliefs about the agreement are crucial to a study of Kulub, since Hareri desires for at least a limited selfadministration and the central government’s non-interference in Islamic practices seem to have been the prime motivations for the 1948 movement.

Other signs of discontent appeared much sooner. An influx of Christian administrators, soldiers and civilians accompanied the new Ethiopian administration in Harer creating new social tensions, and the local economy was dealt a severe blow in 1902, when the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway bypassed Harer. The townspeople seem to have expressed their discontent along religious lines, adopting more conservative Islamic practices and articulating Christian/Muslim differences. For example, Islamic ideals, such as the prohibition on alcohol were increasingly respected, and Hareri women began to dress more modestly. A type of butterfly was named the Almära kitäb (“Amharic book” or “Bible”), since "the cryptic and nonsensical markings on the wings

11 Caulk, “Harār Town,” 384.
12 Muhammad Hassan, “The Relations Between Harar and the Surrounding Oromo Between 1800-1887,” (senior thesis, Haile Sellassie I University, 1973), 34. Caulk, “Harār Town,” 384.
${ }^{13}$ Hareri say that the red earth floors of their homes symbolize the Hareri blood spilled at Ch’elempo. Sidney Waldron, “A Farewell to Bab Hajr. City Symbolism and Hareri Identity, 18771977,” in Working Papers on Society and History in Imperial Ethiopia: The Southern Periphery from the 1880’s to 1974 (Cambridge, 1980), 251.

14 R. A. Caulk, “Menilek’s Conquest and Local Leaders in Harar,” (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University [hereafter IES, AAU], n.d.). Caulk discusses various versions of the agreement, written and unwritten, 3-6. He probably saw the copies in the early 1970s. It is worth noting that one Arabic account of the conquest cites agreement upon the annual tribute, but mentions nothing of administration. See Muhammad, “The Relation,” app. 2, 55.
were said to be like Amharic writing, and the opening and closing, and flitting about, were intrinsic to the image also." Furthermore, Hareri converts to Christianity and Hareri who married Christians were termed as though they were dead. ${ }^{15}$

Hareri dissatisfaction remained high until 1936, when the Italians took control of Harer and formally recognized and encouraged Islam as the region’s leading religion. They built and repaired mosques, introduced Arabic into Islamic schools, and sent thousands of Muslims on the kajj to Makka. In Harer, Arabic was used for announcements and official decrees, attendance at the main Quranic school increased from 60 to 450 , and Muslim colonial officials received lucrative state salaries. ${ }^{16}$ The Italians also began to give Harer a more modern appearance. They created and improved “streets and roads, municipal buildings, an electric power station, postal facilities, tele-communications facilities, a one-pipe water system, a tourist hotel, military buildings and a large number of villas.” ${ }^{17}$ Despite Italian confiscation of some Hareri lands for these development projects, material life undoubtedly improved for Harer’s Muslims, and once again Harer experienced a revival of Islamic practice.

In 1941, the Italians were forced to give up Ethiopia, and with British help Emperor Haile Sellassie regained his throne. Despite the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) that the British established in Ethiopia, Haile Sellassie immediately resumed his pre-occupation pursuit of the centralization of power upon which his plans for modernization depended. He again built up his government structures throughout the country and named a number of ministers to oversee their functioning. The newly installed officials “were led by a carefully balanced group of newly elevated patriots, officers from Gideon Force [the British-led troops with whom Haile Sellassie reentered the country], returned exiles, and ex-collaborators.” By appointing individuals from the last category, Haile Sellassie guaranteed a certain practical experience in his administration, and attempted to overcome antagonism and resentment among Ethiopians. ${ }^{18}$

The most important personal qualities Haile Sellassie sought in his officials were absolute loyalty and obedience, and he prefered individuals of non-noble origins who owed their rise to power solely to him. In 1947 Blata Ayele Gebre, an excollaborator of humble stock, was made deputy governor of Harerge province.

15 Waldron, “Farewell,” 252.
16 Alberto Shacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London, 1989), 163.

17 Waldron, “Farewell,” 254.
18 Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley, 1994), 154. Political realities also affected Haile Sellassie’s treatment of ex-collaborators. Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (Evanston, 1969), 85.

Blata Ayele Gebre

Born in 1896 in Garamulata, near Harer, Blata Ayele attended the same Capucin Mission school where Haile Sellassie was educated. ${ }^{19}$ Blata Ayele’s career began in Dire Dawa, first in the railway; later in the Post Office, where he was one of the first Ethiopians to learn Morse code; and finally in Customs, where he became Director. He was then promoted to Acting Head of Customs in Addis Ababa. In 1929 he was named Director of the Municipality of Addis Ababa, “an appointment which always [went] to one in whom the Emperor [had] special confidence.” 20 He was suspended from this position in early 1932 for suspected graft, but nothing came of the charges. ${ }^{21}$ A few months later he became Head of the Special Court, which tried cases between Ethiopian nationals and foreigners, and he played an important role in establishing modern Ethiopian law.

Blata Ayele submitted to the Italians soon after occupation, helped them to develop the local judiciary, and took part in the search for those responsible for the 19 February 1937 assassination attempt on Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, the Italian Viceroy of Ethiopia. ${ }^{22}$ By April 1937, however, he was a prisoner at Asinara, Italy, where the famous scholar/colonial official Enrico Cerulli interviewed him. ${ }^{23}$ Marcus notes that Ayele’s stay in Italy lasted until 1939,24 when he was repatriated to Ethiopia, probably as part of Italy’s efforts to bolster local support for its government. ${ }^{25}$

After Haile Sellasie’s return Ayele was appointed Minister of Justice, then in 1942 he was assigned as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London, where he reopened the legation and made world news the following year with the comment that “Fascist blood would turn to water. The Ethiopians will not be satisfied until they can rip an Italian guilet.” 26 He returned to Ethiopia in 1947 and began an eight-year-stint as Hararge’s deputy governor. ${ }^{27}$

19 Haile Sellassie I, King of Kings of Ethiopia, My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress, vol. 2, ed. and annot. by Harold Marcus et al., trans. by Ezekiel Gebissa et al. (East Lansing, 1994), 82, n. 152 Based on Harold Marcus’s research in the Public Records Office and on an interview, this footnote is the most complete published account of Ayele’s life. Ayele died in the coup attempt of 1960.
${ }^{20}$ Department of State, Confidential Biographical Data, “Ayela Gabré,” 9 July 1932 (Michigan State University microfilm collection).
${ }^{21}$ Addison E. Southard to Secretary of State, #906, 23 February 1932 (Michigan State University microfilm collection).
${ }^{22}$ Alberto Sbacchi, “Italy and the Treatment of the Ethiopian Aristocracy, 1937-1940,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 10, 2 (1977): 216.
${ }^{23}$ Ibid., 215-16.
${ }^{24}$ Sellassie, My Life, vol. 2, 82, n. 152.
${ }^{25}$ Sbacchi, “Italy and the Treatment,” 219. Scholler incorrectly states that Ayele supervised “all traditional courts during [the] occupation.” Heinrich Scholler, The Special Court of Ethiopia, 1939-1935 (Stuttgart, 1985), 84.

26 Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, 27 August 1942, 55; Time, 14 June 1943, 36; Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, General Notice #1, 30 March 1942, 26.
${ }^{27}$ Sellassie, My Life, vol. 2, 82, n. 152.

Governor-generalships were sometimes sinecures administered on the ground by deputy governors who exercised the same powers, and such seems to have been the case with Blata Ayele in Harer. ${ }^{28}$ According to a 1942 decree, provincial governors-general were responsible to ministers. In practice, however, those governors-general with some influence might deal directly with the emperor. ${ }^{29}$ Owing to Blata Ayele’s good relationship with Haile Sellassie he likely possessed such privilege. I would nevertheless maintain that from the standpoint of political authority he would have preferred to be in Addis Ababa, closer to the emperor and to the possibility of another ministership. Blata Ayele would thus have sought to administer the region as effectively as possible in order to be invited back to the capital.

Kalub

For the Hareri, a brief respite occurred during the Italian occupation: who previously confiscated lands were returned to their original Hareri owners; Islam was encouraged; and Hareri were favored over Oromo in local administrative positions. When Haile Sellassie returned to Ethiopia, however, his administration revoked these Hareri gains and added insult to injury through policies such as assessment of back taxes for the years of the Italian occupation. ${ }^{30}$ Furthermore, the Hareri recount that they were then not able to find employment, especially in the administration; join the military; assemble publicly; use their own language or Arabic in official settings; and did not have access to quality facilities for Islamic education. Some Hareri consequently formed a political organization called the jam’iya al-wataniya or jam’iya hurriya al harariya. ${ }^{31}$ Highly conscious of Harer’s long Islamic history, and certainly inspired by the recent Islamic revival under the Italians, their purpose was to regain the rights guaranteed to the Muslim Hareri by Menilek in 1887.

The jam’iya sent a group of representatives to Addis Ababa to present Haile Sellassie with a petition stating their grievances and requesting his help. ${ }^{32}$ Accounts

28 John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Addis Ababa, 1974), 292-93; American Legation, Addis Abeba to Secretary of State, no. 436, enclosure, 5 July 1947 (Michigan State University microfilm collection).
${ }^{29}$ Perham, Government, 346-47; Christopher Clapham, Haile-Selassie’s Government (New York, 1969), 99.
${ }^{30}$ Ejetta Feyessa Basha, “Newcomers and the Peoples of Harar in the Early 20th century” (HIS, AAU, n.d.). A II this information is valid the situation in Harer was unique, since the general practice was to grant pardons on taxation for the years of occupation.
${ }^{31}$ Hajji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview by author, 6 July 1994. These Arabic names mean, respectively, The National(ist) Organization and the Organization for Hareri Freedom. Rahji traces the genesis of these names and although he notes that “it is generally called Jam’iya,” he prefers to use “Watani” (“Kulub-Hannolato,” 20). I use jam’iya, which was favored by my interlocutors. The group’s meeting place was the home of Hajji Ibrahim Sulayman. Hajji Ibrahim Sulayman and Hajji Abdullah Sharif, interview by author, 7 July 1994; Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 50.

32 The jam’iya disseminated its ideas more widely through written documents circulated in town, and poetry composed and sung in Arabic. Hajji Ali, interview by author, 15 April 1994; Hajji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr and Hajji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview by author, 10 July 1994.

of their reception vary. Most informants claimed that Haile Sellassie was sympathetic and sent a letter back to Blata Ayele, who chose to ignore it. ${ }^{33}$ One individual maintained that Haile Sellassie gave the party a lukewarm reception and falsely promised to do something. ${ }^{34}$ In any case, the appeal led to no discernible changes in the situation.

Meanwhile, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), under the leadership of Maqtal Tahir, opened an office in Harer. ${ }^{35}$ A variant pronunciation of the organization’s name later provided the crisis under discussion with the label “Kulub.” The Hareri believed that the SYC sought to educate the Hareri and other peoples about freedom, and to stir things up a bit. ${ }^{36}$ In the Ogaden the SYC slogan was “Somalia hanolato, Ethiopia hadimto” (Long live Somalia, death to Ethiopia). This is where the term “Hanolato,” which is interchangeable with the term “Kulub,” originates. ${ }^{37}$ In Harer the goals and philosophies of the SYC and the jam’iya apparently did not conflict, and Hareri joined both organizations in large numbers. ${ }^{38}$ Certainly, the groups shared a Muslim religious identity and a common sense of oppression, but at present little more is known by scholars about the specifics of their agendas in Harer. When news reached Harer that the Four Power Commission ${ }^{39}$ was coming to Muqadishu to ask Somalia what they wanted done with their country after the departure of the Italians, urgency compelled the SYC (by then reconstituted as the Somali Youth League - SYL) and the jam’iya to collaborate and secretly send a thirteen member delegation to Muqadishu to inform the commission about the mistreatment of Harer’s residents and the Ethiopian government’s refusal to address these problems. ${ }^{40}$ The delegation then continued on,
${ }^{33}$ For example, Sulayman and Sharif, interview.
34 Haiji Ali, interview.
35 The Somali Youth Club was founded on 13 May 1943, aiming to “abolish the wasteful clan rivalities of the past and to establish a new conception of nationhood.” It was renamed the Somali Youth League by late 1947, by which time it had evolved into an organized political machine. I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (London, 1980), 121-22.
${ }^{36}$ Sulayman and Sharif, interview; Haiji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr and Haiji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview.

37 Tibebe Eshete, “The Root Causes of Political Problems in the Ogaden, 1942-1960,” Northeast African Studies 13, 1 (1991): 17. On Maqtal Tahir see, 28, n. 61.

38 Muhammad Ibrahim, interview by author, 7 July 1994. Rahji reports how SYC members, wearing badges on their chests, verbally harassed non-Kulub Hareri; see Rahji, “KulubHannolatto,” 43. However, he cites an unpublished document written by the individual most often mentioned in Harer as a traitor to his own Hareri community, and as a lackey of Haile Sellassie. It is possible that this harassment was done by another group founded by the government to try to divide the SYL and the jam’iya. This group was described to me as the Somali League, headed by Farah Aidlid, and distinguished by the badges they wore on their chests; see Haiji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr and Haiji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview.

39 The Four Power Commission of Investigation for the former Italian Colonies, composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, gathered data from Libya, Cyrenaica, Eritrea, and Somalia to help the United Nations determine their post-war fates.

40 Rahji, one of whose informants was a member of this delegation, breaks it down into eight jam’iya members, four SYL members, and an independent. He also gives a detailed account of its reception in Muqadishu; see Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 41-49. I have not been able to find any
travelling to other Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia and Egypt to air their grievances. ${ }^{41}$

Cairo was apparently initially receptive, but when they heard that the Hareri did not have weapons or an organized underground guerrilla movement, the Egyptians said they could not help because they were occupied with the war in Palestine. ${ }^{42}$ King Faruk promised, however, to speak with Emperor Haile Sellassie on their behalf. ${ }^{43}$ Before he did so, the Ethiopian government evidently learned about the delegation and its mission through a radio broadcast from Muqadishu. It responded by subjecting the Hareri to serious harassment. ${ }^{44}$

On 20 January 1948, government forces seized the offices of the SYL and the jam’iya, confiscating all documents and membership registers and arresting those then present in the offices. ${ }^{45}$ Members of both groups marched peacefully to the government offices to find out what was happening. Informants claimed that there were few Hareri who had not joined one of the organizations, so the gathering must have been quite large. They added that Blata Ayele came out on the balcony and told the crowd that he could not speak with them all, and that they should select five individuals to meet with him inside. ${ }^{46}$

Haiji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr, one of the quintet, ${ }^{47}$ recounted that after they were seated in Blata Ayele’s office, in the presence of the governor-general of Harer, Prince Makonnen Haile Sellassie, the deputy governor held up a piece of paper and asked them if they sent some people to Egypt with a petition stating various
evidence of this party from the Somali end. The closest reference is the “Petition from the Issa Somalia” (22 January 1948), which describes Harer as “an important economic and commercial link between the various tribes of the west” and asks for its incorporation into a “Greater Somalia.” The Portion of Somali Territory Under Ethiopian Colonization (Mogadishu, 1974), 58.
${ }^{41}$ All my informants, and Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 48-49. The Ethiopian Legation in Cairo later provided the following list of members of the group: Haji Ahmad Adish (the leader), Haji Ibrahim Abdulsalam, Muhammad Ahmad Yusuf, Adish Umar, Haji Umar Gatu (Widato), Yunis Muhammad Yusuf, Yusuf Abdulrahman, Yusuf Shano, Muhammad Ismail, Haji Abukabir Faqi, Yunis Muhammad Adis Aboh, Adis Muhammad Adish, Muhammad Ismail (Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Blata Ayele Gebre, 11 Hidar 1941 [20 November 1948], no. 144/41, attachment). Based on comments following each name on the list, it appears to me that the two Muhammed Innads are the same person. This list differs slightly from that compiled by Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 47.
${ }^{42}$ Muhammad Abu al-Khaya, interview by author, 10 July 1994.
43 Most of my informants said it was Faruk, but others said Jamal Abd al-Nasser. Rahji’s interlocutors said it was Abdurahman Azam Pasha, the secretary of the Arab League; see Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 48.

44 Haiji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview by author, 6 July 1994; Sulayman and Sharif, interview.
${ }^{45}$ My informants all agreed on this date (11 tir 1940, Ethiopian calendar, which is Epiphany), as does Rahji, Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolato,” 50.

46 Sulayman and Sharif, interview; Haiji Zekaria Abu Bokr and Haiji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr, interview.

47 Account based on Haiji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr, interview by author, 2 July 1994; Haiji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview by author, 6 July 1994; and the two of them together, 10 July 1994.

grievances. ${ }^{48}$ They admitted they had done so and explained that everything was written down in the letter he was holding, which was a copy of the one taken to the Four Power Commission and to the Arab countries, and which was one of the documents seized that day. Blata Ayele stepped out on the balcony and announced that discussions would take quite a while, so everyone should return home and wait until the following day for his response. Back inside, the governors spoke with the five Hareri for a few minutes and then asked them to wait while they checked on some things. After a few hours the five were arrested and jailed.

In the minutes from a meeting of the Harer Provincial Administration held the following day, Blata Ayele offered a slightly different version. ${ }^{49}$ He said that when the crowd gathered initially. he spoke with three elders and instructed them to select the most respected community leaders and have them return in the afternoon to present their thoughts in writing. When they came, at about four o-clock in the afternoon, they informed him that all of Harer’s Muslims were in full agreement with those who had been arrested the previous day, and they requested him therefore to issue a pardon and release them from jail. Furthermore, they acknowledged that they had sent the party of thirteen to Muqadishu in order to request that Harer be released from the rule of the Emperor’s government and that the Hareri be permitted to administer the region themselves. Surprised by their total lack of fear, Blata Ayele made them sign the paper that they had presented and then, armed with this proof of their cooperation with Somalis in Muqadishu and their conspiracy against the state, ordered their arrest. ${ }^{50}$

The following morning, after news of the arrests spread, a meeting was held at the jum’a mosque, and the Hareri chose fifty other representatives. They went to the governor’s office to inquire about the detainees, whereupon they were also arrested. Then government forces began going door to door, incarcerating more people and seizing Hareri private properties, including houses and land. ${ }^{51}$ The guardian of the tomb of

48 Since Prince Makonnen, the governor-general, was generally not involved in active administration, it is significant that he was present at this meeting with the deputy governor.
49 Those in attendance were: Hararge Governor-General Prince Makonnen Mesfin, Hararge Deputy Governor Blata Ayele Gebre, Hararge Director Qahazmach Walda Ammanuet Takle Haymanot, Abba Margaha Sellassie, Hararge Treasurer Qahazmach Yohannes Bitaweleit, Hararge Police Chief Shalaqa Yimam Goshu, Gerazmach Ashagere Quise, Fitawrazi Almayahu Darbe, Fitawrazi Gwangul Kotase, Hararge Justice Vice President Blata Asfaw Habta Giyorgis, Hararge Army Commander Litanal Colonel Waqchira Sarada, Ato Tassew Ayala, and Ato Aktila Dejan, “Prosévérval,” 14 Tir 1940 [23 January 1948], minutes of a meeting of the Hareri Provincial Administration, 1 .

50 “Prosévérval,” 4.
51 During this time many books and papers, including unpublished local histories were burned or carried away. Muhammad Abu al-Khays, interview by author, 10 July 1994.

Shaykh Hashim recalled that so many people were arrested that people viewed him as some sort of sorcerer (tānaqq) since he remained free. ${ }^{52}$

The Provincial Administration meeting was called the day after the mass arrests in order to decide what to do next. In his opening remarks, Prince Makonnen spoke repeatedly of the ‘Hareri Muslims’ (Yádāri Islámoch), implying that the movement possessed both ethnic and religious dimensions. He pointed out that at “this hour in which all Ethiopians must unite like they are one family,” the Hareri had become individualistic and were trying to get the Four Power Commission to investigate the internal conditions of Ethiopia. Blata Ayele added that the administration really knew very little about the Kulub movement because they had no one who would provide them with inside information. He stressed the relationship between Kulub and Somalis in Muqadishu and the relevance of their combined activities to the issues of Eritrea and Somalia returning to their “Mother Ethiopia.” He added that everything the administration had learned pointed to a collaboration between the Somalis and the “Islamic Organization” founded in Harer.

The meeting then shifted to a discussion of what to do. It was agreed that someone needed to go to the capital to brief the Emperor in person, but those assembled were undecided as to whether that should be Blata Ayele or someone else. The necessity of asking for external military forces to help control the local situation was debated, as was the need for an exhaustive search for caches of weapons. Finally, they considered the best forum-Harer or elsewhere-for the trial of the detainees. ${ }^{53}$ Assuming responsibility for resolving the questions, Blata Ayele concluded the meeting by stating that additional troops were not necessary; that the trial should be held locally since the judges were more likely not to let the prisoners go (and that the judges should be carefully selected after some investigation); that the ultimate location for their incarceration would be determined by higher authorities; that the issue of hidden weapons was not important any longer; and that he would be the one to travel to the capital to speak with the emperor. ${ }^{54}$

In addition to the mass arrests, the government took over public properties, including Hareri madāris. Several informants bitterly recalled that the main madrasa, which had been established and administered with private funds, was changed into a non-Islamic government-run school, which it remains to this day. ${ }^{55}$

52 Shaykh Abd al-Jawad, interview by author, 23 April 1994. He recalled that the only other adult male at large was the guardian of the tomb of Aw Abadir, the patron saint of Harer.

53 According to the Public Security Proclamation of 1942, “The Commissioner of Police may order the arrest without warrant and detention of any person who in his opinion would . . . be a danger to Public Security if he remained at large.” But it added that “Any person so arrested shall without any delay be brought before the High Court”; Negarif Gazzia, Year 1, 30 March 1942, 8. Therefore, assuming that the Provincial Administration sought to abide by national law, there was a pressing need to determine the proper judicial jurisdiction.

54 “Prosévérval,” 11-12.
55 Haği Zekaria, interview; Muhammad Abu al-Khays, interview.

Since the jails in town were overflowing, some detainees were released but were required to report every morning to show that they had not fled. Meanwhile Hareri were prohibited from leaving Harer without special permission. ${ }^{56}$ Over the next few months, the authorities narrowed down the number of prisoners to eighty-one of the better educated, most politically active and locally knowledgeable, and shipped them off to prisons in Jimma, Gore and Gojjam. ${ }^{57}$

During this crisis a division in the Hareri community, which I suspect first played out when Haile Sellassie returned in 1941, intensified. ${ }^{58}$ Some Hareri did not want to have anything to do with the central administration, while others wanted a démarche to defuse local/national tensions. ${ }^{59}$ Some informants reported that Hareri who lived in Addis Ababa, and their followers in Harer, wanted conciliation. The government, on the other hand, harbored no doubts about what it wanted. A letter from the Ministry of Foreigns Affairs to Blata Ayele in late November 1948 expressed paranoia about the possibility of negative propoganda-of Ethiopia as an oppressor of Muslims-being spread among Arab countries, and instructed the deputy governor to utilize every means possible to get relatives of the Cairo group to convince them to return to Ethiopia. ${ }^{60}$ When a few Hareri approached the government soon afterwards, they were told that if the thirteen delegates who went to Egypt would come back then the government would release the eighty-one who were being held in jail. ${ }^{61}$

About a year and a half after the initial arrests, a small group of Hareri and government officials traveled to Cairo to try to convince the exiles to return. ${ }^{62}$ Not surprisingly the latter were not anxious to do so, fearing arrests and/or other reprisals.
${ }^{56}$ Hajji Zekaria, interview.
57 Hajji Abdullah Sharif and Hajji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr described in detail the terrible conditions of their confinement.

58 This may loosely correspond to the two prominent political parties in Harer today, the all-Haren Hareri National League, and the multi-ethnic Hareri Democratic Revolutionary Party. For further discussion of this division, see also Rahji “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 56.
${ }^{59}$ For a published example, see the only newspaper report of Kulub, “Abétuta,” Addis Zaman, 2 Miyarya 1940 (10 April 1948), 1-2. This article contains a petition delivered to the emperor from “Ethiopia’s Muslims” on 30 Meggahit 1940 (8 April 1948). The petition refers to the harm done against the nation and its government by fifty worthless Hareri traitors, bemoans the threat of their actions to the long-standing unity between Ethiopian Muslims and Christians, and calls for their immediate and severe punishment. Clearly, this petition is escopharitic propaganda, but it is worth noting the delay between the crackdown in Harer and official acknowledgment in the press, the article’s failure to provide any details about the allegedly treacherous deeds, and its indications of divisions within the country’s Muslim community.
${ }^{60}$ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Blata Ayele Gebre, 11 Hidar 1941 (20 November 1948), no. 144/41; see also: Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Blata Ayele Gebre, 16 Hidar 1941 (25 November 1948), no. $180 / 41$.
${ }^{61}$ Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 52.
62 Rahji reports that the Muslim Brotherhood assisted the Hareri party in Egypt; Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 49. Given the Brotherhood’s interest in Islamic movements in other countries, and its information gathering activities, I suspect its archives contain valuable information about Kulub. See Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (1969; reprint, New York, 1993), esp. 172-73. If the Egyptian government ever makes public the Brotherhood’s documents, its connections with Ethiopian and other African Muslims would be well worth investigating.

To assure them, the Ethiopian officials arranged a meeting with Egyptian officials present as impartial witnesses, and all parties signed an agreement guaranteeing the Hareri’s safety. Most of the thirteen Hareri delegates returned to Ethiopia and the eighty-one prisoners were released. ${ }^{63}$ The Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Makonnen Habte Wold, then brought the prisoners, delegates and negotiators together at the National Theater in Addis Ababa and admonished them: “With your activities you Hareri created something like an abdominal disease. Since abdominal illnesses are incurable you are the permanent disease of Ethiopia. But since Haile Sellassie has said that you are to go free, you may go home.” 64

Their return marked the effective end of the Kulub movement of 1948. Waldron’s informants in the 1960s recounted that Kulub was “. . the time when the integrity of the city was lost.” 65 One local Oromo proverb refers to the event as: “On that day [Hareris] were eliminated from earth.” ${ }^{66}$ Certainly, Kulub still remains a vivid moment in the popular historical consciousness of the Hareri. Why did Blata Ayele react so harshly to the jam’iya, whose purpose was simply to increase Hareri rights to levels guaranteed by agreement with Menilek? The primary answer to this question lies in the threat that Ethiopia might lose Eritrea and the Ogaden. Haile Sellassie was not entirely politically secure, and to prevent these regions from breaking away from Ethiopia he needed to demonstrate internal stability and strength in order to promote a positive image of his administration to the world. Such an image could not be sustained in the face of widespread social unrest.

The International Context: Eritrea and the Ogaden

After his return to Ethiopia in 1941, Haile Sellassie’s more militarily powerful ally Great Britain assumed effective control of Eritrea and the Ogaden. At that time, Britain sought to unite the Ogaden with the other Somali territories to form Greater Somalia. Similarly, they sought to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia and to carve it into two parts, one of which was to be joined with Sudan and the other with Ethiopia’s Tigrayan highlands to constitute a separate state. Despite Ethiopia’s continued claims over these territories, in 1944 it was forced to allow Britain to remain in the Ogaden, and in 1945 “the London Conference of the Allied powers rejected Ethiopia’s claims to both Eritrea and the Ogaden.” 67
${ }^{63}$ Sulayman and Sharif, interview; Hajji Zekaria, int… Rahji, “Kulub-Hannolatto,” 52-53.
64 Hajji Abd al-Rahman Abu Bokr and Hajji Zekaria Abu Bokr, interview. Rahji’s informants recalled three days of “political education and propaganda”; see Rahji, “KulubHannolatto,” 53.
${ }^{65}$ Sidney Waldron, “Farewell,” 255.
${ }^{66}$ “Gatas Adarenfa lafara yom hafte” (Basha, “Newcomers,” 7).
${ }^{67}$ Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (1991; reprint, 1995), 180-81.

The Ogaden’s fate remained largely an issue between Ethiopia and Great Britain, but Eritrea’s future was also a matter of concern to Italy, the Soviet Union and neighboring Arab countries and was taken up in the United Nations. While trying to convince the world of his point of view, Haile Sellassie also endeavored to weaken anti-Ethiopian forces in Eritrea. Although those wanting union with Ethiopia comprised the largest political bloc there, the emperor sought to inflame Muslim/Christian rivalries in order to undermine the growth of a separatist, Eritrean nationalism. ${ }^{68}$ The anti-Muslim sentiment that was generated led to numerous violent confrontations, and the religious tensions allegedly were followed closely by the Arab press. ${ }^{69}$ Well aware of how religious discord could weaken a country, Haile Sellassie encouraged it in Eritrea in order to ensure Ethiopia’s control there, but he could not endure it closer to home. Furthermore, owing to his weak international diplomatic position he had no desire to foster poor relations with neighboring Islamic governments, especially those with close relations to Britain like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Neighboring the Muslim Ogaden, and with long historical ties to the Arab world, Harer was simply too close to the action for any problems associated with Islam or its perceived persecution to be tolerated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based upon communications with the Ethiopian Legation in Cairo, informed Blata Ayele on 20 November 1948 that the Hareri in Cairo were spreading the false rumor that all Ethiopian Muslims were persecuted, and that this propaganda must not reach other Islamic countries. The Ministry added that the Ethiopian Government was attempting to solve the problem of the Hareri’s presence in Egypt diplomatically, but requested Blata Ayele very carefully to coopt the Hareri in Harer to get their relatives and friends to return voluntarily and as soon as possible. To facilitate his task they appended a list of the Hareri in Cairo, their home neighborhoods in Harer and the names of persons believed to be in contact with them. Two individuals were singled out as being homesick and therefore particularly vulnerable to persuasion. ${ }^{70}$

This letter-labelled Top Secret (tebeq mestir)-clearly shows that the central government was closely monitoring the situation. Also, it sought to resolve the problem quickly and with a minimum use of force, which might have generated bad press internationally and harmed Ethiopia’s chances of regaining control over Eritrea and the Ogaden. The initial brutality of Blata Ayele’s administration contrasts starkly to this careful, cautious approach and must therefore be explained. The trajectory of local events, which also illustrates the contemporary Ethiopian political culture in practice,

^[1]is best clarified by considering the structure and goals of Haile Sellassie’s post-war government and the position of officials like Blata Ayele within it.

The Local Context: Blata Ayele’s Reaction to Kulub

As mentioned above, after Haile Sellassie’s return in 1941 his primary concern was to centralize power in his person. To do so he appointed, whenever possible, officials at all levels of the government bureaucracy whose loyalty to himself was unquestioned. The emperor tolerated little opposition and forbade any sort of organized political activity, especially if it threatened to establish institutionalized power apart from his own. ${ }^{71}$ If he disapproved of the conduct of any of his officials, or if he suspected any of them of becoming too popular or powerful, he reshuffled his administration accordingly. In this context, no position was secure, yet at the same time no fall from his grace was irreversible. As a result, there was considerable competition among the emperor’s subordinates, and many long careers experienced rising and falling fortunes.

The coercive powers available to government officials, and governors-general in particular, were extensive and enabled these men to carry out the emperor’s wishes and thereby prove their continued loyalty to him. Governors-general were responsible for law enforcement, taxation and the administration of justice, ${ }^{72}$ and they could order the arrest of anyone they suspected of challenging official authority and detain him or her for as long as they thought necessary. ${ }^{73}$ As Deputy Governor of Harerge, Blata Ayele possessed these powers and would have been aware of his potential to regain a ministership should he employ his powers skillfully. In the context of international threats to Ethiopia’s retention of Eritrea and the Ogaden, SYL activities in nearby Jijjiga soon provided him the opportunity to do so.

By 1946 the SYL had opened a branch office in Jijjiga and hoisted its own flag. The SYL organized meetings and marches, “which were accompanied by chanting and slogans . . . meant to create an atmosphere of intimidation.” 74 The group also harassed American Sinclair Oil Company representatives who were surveying in the Ogaden. ${ }^{75}$ Ethiopian authorities were concerned about the long term national ramifications of these activities. The Ogaden’s perceived importance to national security, strikingly phrased in a letter from Haile Sellassie to Blata Ayele, compounded these concerns. ${ }^{76}$

^[2]

The degree of tension between the SYL and Ethiopian officials became apparent in June 1948, when Ethiopian police attempted to have the SYL flag lowered and an ensuing fight led to the deaths of about twenty-five League members. ${ }^{77}$

As the province’s deputy governor, Blata Ayele was in touch with Ethiopian officials in Jijiga. Certainly well aware of Haile Sellassie’s maneuvering to regain the Ogaden and having received a letter from him emphasizing the importance of the region, Ayele would have been particularly intent on closely monitoring political developments there. As a high official, he would also have been aware of Haile Sellassie’s fear of organized political activity, and Prince Makonnen’s presence at the early meetings with the Hareri indicates that the emperor would at least eventually be fully aware of the local situation and its potential. ${ }^{78}$ Although the violence in Jijiga followed that of Harer, Blata Ayele’s evolving knowledge of the political situation and SYL activities in Jijiga was surely a major factor in his actions towards Kulub in Harer. The opening of an SYL office in Harer must have been alarming in itself. But when he learned that the SYL and jam’iga had sent a combined group to Muqadisbu to meet with the Four Power Commission, he must have assumed that the organizations had merged or, at least, had begun coordinating their actions. ${ }^{79}$ Well aware of the highly tense atmosphere in Jijiga, which was to explode only six months later, he sought to prevent similar tensions from escalating in Harer, and thus aimed to crush the movement(s) completely. It is only after he did so that we have evidence of his consulting other administrative officials on how best to procede.

Blata Ayele’s status as an ex-collaborator also helps to explain his heavy application of state force. As such, he was viewed by many as a “traitor and thus suspect.” Knowing that his career always depended upon Haile Sellassie’s support, but especially so after his cooperation with the Italians, he must have particularly “feared any misstep that might end [the emperor’s] patronage.” 80 It follows that Blata Ayele was more concerned with loyally administering Haile Sellassie’s policies and

77 Eahete, “Root Causes,” 18. Tibebe follows Drysdale’s account. Lewis attributes these deaths to a riot that erupted when the eventual transfer of Jijiga to Ethiopia was announced. Laitin and Samatar follow Lewis, adding that “at the same time, the Ethiopian secret service mounted a massive purge in Dire Dawa, Harar, and other towns to weed out SYL adherents and sympathizers.” Presumably, this process had been under way for at least six months, beginning with the crackdown on Kulub in Harer. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964), 71. Lewis, A Modern History, 130. D. Laitin and S.S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, 1987), 64-65.

78 Prince Makonnen was Haile Sellassie’s favorite son. Harold G. Marcus, Haile Sellassie I: The Formation Years, 1892-1936 (Lawrenceville, NJ, 1995), 174; American Legation, Addis Ababa to Secretary of State, #1371, 21 May 1934 (Michigan State University microfilm collection).
${ }^{79}$ In April 1948 a petition, “which requested the British Government to give the people of Harrar assistance in their movement for independence from Ethiopia,” was signed by at least two Somalia. One was Maktel Dohir (Maqtal Tahir?-see note 37 above), who was said to have been an SYL leader in Muqadisbu, and also responsible for attacks on Sinclair Oil Company equipment in Dagahar; American Legation, Addis Ababa to Secretary of State, Airgram 2243, 16 May 1948 (Michigan State University microfilm collection).
${ }^{80}$ Charles McClellan, “Nation, Nationalism and the Italo-Ethiopian War,” forthcoming.
staying in the emperor’s good graces, than with determining and implementing plans more appropriate to the local situation or desired by the local population.

Post-Kulub Representations of Haile Sellassie and Blata Ayele

It is worth noting that, in 1994, Hareri recollections of Kulub condemned both Blata Ayele’s unwillingness to entertain Hareri grievances and his unjustified use of intense force. The same accounts, however, contained measured praise for Haile Sellassie’s readiness to receive an Hareri petition and consider their complaints. The “good guy/bad guy” dichotomy of Hareri reminiscences reinforces common assumptions about the emperor’s self-representations and raises questions about how he ruled his country.

There is no debate that Haile Sellassie fostered a domestic image of himself as a divinely ordained emperor, above reproach or fault. In Harold Marcus’ words, 'he submerged his personality into the emperorship by making himself into an aloof and distant symbol, surrounded by a deep moat of ceremony, for whom the form, not the substance was paramount." 81 In the Constitution of 1931, “the emperor’s person was declared ‘sacred’, his dignity inviolable, his power indisputable.” In fact, the subject of his powers occupied more than half the constitution, which was first drafted on the assumption “that all power emanated from the Emperor and could be enjoyed by others only in the form of temporary and revocable delegation by him: ${ }^{82}$ Haile Sellassie was also concerned with his image in international circles. ${ }^{83}$ As part of his conscious posturing, he subordinated his officials, yet distanced himself from them publicly. 84 His representatives also facilitated the construction of these images, as when Makonnen Habte Wold insulted the Hareri to their faces, but allowed them to return home thanks to the emperor’s magnanimity. Haile Sellassie was thereby able to take “personal credit for all that [was] praiseworthy,” and “disclaim” all responsibility for the opposite.” 85 Indeed, the common distinction between him and his venal and heavy-handed representatives was articulated by groups as diverse as Tigrayan peasants recounting the 1943 Weyane revolt, urban Hareri remembering Kulub, and even foreign observers of the Ethiopian scene. ${ }^{86}$

I suggest that this process could not have been successful across such a broad spectrum if the emperor did not personally follow and influence events taking place

81 Marcus, Haile Sellassie, 97.
82 Markakis, Ethiopia, 272; John Markakis and Asmelash Beyene, “Representative Institutions in Ethiopia,” Journal of Modern African Studies 5 (1967): 201, quoted in Marcus, Haile Sellassie, 117.

83 Clapham, Government, 50.
84 Ibid., 52.
85 Markakis, Ethiopia, 228.
${ }^{86}$ On Weyane, see Gehra, Power and Protest, 92. On foreigners, see Clapham, Government, 52. Clapham comments that the pursuit of such a status, in which one receives all praise but escapes all blame, is common to politicians the world over, but that Haile Sellassie was particularly adroit in attaining and maintaining this paradox.

throughout his empire. His information networks depended on his family members, often assigned to such posts as governor-generalships, while more qualified representatives effectively administered the country, constantly aware of the emperor’s observers and informants. This arrangement provided the emperor’s kin with wealth and prestige, assigned actual administration to more talented or respected individuals, and monitored those persons to ensure continued loyalty and adherence to the throne’s wishes. The Kulub movement provides one example of how Haile Sellassie appeared to take a largely “hands-off” approach when, in fact, he and his explicit policies directly shaped events on the ground in the provinces.

Concluding Remarks

Through this essay I have used the term jam’iya to refer to the Hareri organization that sought to regain limited autonomy and secure official respect for Islam, and SYL for the Somali organization that strove to integrate the Ogaden and other neighboring regions into a “Greater Somalia.” The term Kulub encompasses both groups and refers in particular to the government suppression of them in January 1948. These usages are in accordance with Hareri recollections. It has not yet been determined in the literature when and how, in Hareri popular consciousness, the jam’iya and SYL came to be encompassed by the label Kulub. I submit that the amalgam occurred after the crackdown, and that Blata Ayele’s misunderstanding of the jam’iya and fears of the SYL helped to create the unity.

To conclude, uncertainty about the futures of Eritrea and the Ogaden prevented Haile Sellassie from tolerating perceived insurrections elsewhere that might raise doubts about the stability of his administration and Ethiopia’s capability to regain and retain the contested territories. Locally, no matter how moderate Hareri demands may have been, Somali politics in the Ogaden led to Ayele’s association of the Hareri jam’iya with the SYL in Jijjiga. This viewpoint, along with his determination to prevent Somali nationalism from taking root in Harer, caused him to misinterpret events around him. Further, Blata Ayele was well aware of Haile Sellassie’s intolerance of alternative sources of power, especially ones rooted in potentially enduring institutions, and of the importance of the Ogaden in the emperor’s conception of Ethiopia. Blata Ayele’s total dependence on the emperor, and the potential to regain a ministership, account for the vigor with which he set out to suppress Kulub and its organized structures. The physical force at his disposal as deputy governor guaranteed his success at crushing the movement. Lastly, modern Hareri representations of Haile Sellassie’s and his deputy governor’s styles of rule in Harer complement general published analyses and, when juxtaposed against the emperor’s administrative structures, reveal the seemingly aloof monarch as directly involved in provincial administration during the post-war consolidation of his power.

LaVerle Berry earned his B.A. from the College of Wooster (1964), his M.A. at Georgetown Univerity (1969), and his Ph.D. from Boston University (1976), following research conducted in Ethiopia on a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Fellowship (1971-73). He served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ethiopia (1964-66). Berry has taught at Boston University (1975-79) and worked in the editorial divisions of Time Inc. and the National Geographic Society (1979-84). Since 1985 he has worked as an Africa Analyst in the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, where among other duties he edits the Sub-Saharan Africa volumes in the U.S. Army’s “Country Studies” series.

Stephanie F. Beswick is student of Harold Marcus. Her dissertation is entitled “Violence, Ethnicity and Political Consolidation: A History of the Dinka of South Sudan.” She is also co-editor, with Jay Spaulding, of the forthcoming volume White Nile, Black Blood.

Tim Carmichael is a graduate student in African history at Michigan State University. He has published articles about Islam in Ethiopian and Kenyan history and is presently conducting dissertation research in Ethiopia.

Robert O. Collins is Professor of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara and author of numerous articles and books on the history of the Sudan and of Africa.

Donald Crummey earned his B.A. (Honours) from the University of Toronto (1962) and his Ph.D. in African history from the University of London (1967). From 1967 to 1973 he taught in the History Department of what is now Addis Ababa University. In 1973 he joined the faculty of the University of Illinois where he has been affiliated with the Center for African Studies, serving as Director from 1984-94. He holds the rank of Professor in the Department of History. He is author of the forthcoming Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century.

Tibebe Eshete is a doctoral student in history at Michigan State University.
Laird Jones is Associate Professor of History at Lock Haven University. His research centers on economic and urban history in early colonial Tanzania.